

ENGLISH
RULE IN GASCONY
1199-1259

MARSH



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ENGLISH RULE IN GASCONY

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1199-1259

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TOWNS

By

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PREFATORY NOTE

In its original form this study was presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. It has since been considerably extended and much recast, owing to the appearance of additional volumes in the Rolls series.

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FRANK B. MARSH

Austin, Texas

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INTRODUCTION

THE latter part of the twelfth century witnessed the rise of the house of Anjou to a position of great outward splendor and widely extended dominion. By a series of fortunate marriages, inheritances and conquests Henry II became the ruler not only of England but of a large part of France. During his lifetime and that of his son Richard, this empire resisted all the efforts of the Capetians for its destruction. In the reign of John, however, it gave way. Gaining a pretext under the feudal law, Philip Augustus declared John to have forfeited all his French fiefs and forthwith set about the task of dispossessing him of them. In no long time John had been driven out of all his northern possessions; but in the south he was successful in resisting the French monarch's advance. Neither side had, therefore, been entirely successful. The English king had lost the north and the French king had not gained the south. For more than fifty years following the death of John each side made vain attempts to realize its entire ambition, yet the situation remained substantially the same; the English king could not regain the northern fiefs, nor could the French expel the English from the south. At length in 1259 Louis IX accepted these results and signed a treaty recognizing the continued sovereignty of the English king in Gascony.

At first sight it might seem that the territories which the Plantagenets retained were those on which they had the weakest hold. Normandy had been united with the English crown much

longer than Gascony; the Norman and the English baronage had been closely allied since the days of the Conqueror; and the control of the central government had been much better organized and firmer in the north than in the south. Yet Normandy was conquered by the French, who nevertheless failed in repeated attempts to win Gascony.

The explanations of this fact which have been offered do not seem wholly satisfactory. It is true that the people of the south felt little sympathy for those of the north, and that a wide difference in temperament, speech, manners and culture existed between them. To the Gascon the Norman and Parisian seemed aliens and foreigners; but was not this true in a greater degree of the Englishman? The personal influence of John's mother Eleanor certainly counted for much, representing as she did the old line of the dukes of Aquitaine, but Henry III was equally successful in maintaining his authority against the French and this at a time when Eleanor was but a memory. It has been suggested that the restless and turbulent Gascon lords preferred the distant and feeble king of England to the king of France, powerful and near at hand. Gascony had however a third claimant in the king of Castile, who though only across the Pyrenees was too much occupied in Spain to be likely to govern strongly in any part of France. Why should he not have been considered an equally convenient overlord? So indeed he was by at least a large number of the Gascon nobles, who supported an attempt to enforce his claims. It has likewise been pointed out that there were strong commercial ties binding the Gascon towns to England. Certain it is that Gascon wine found a ready market across the channel and the desire to retain that market would tend strongly to keep the citizens of Bordeaux and Bayonne loyal to the English crown. Yet, after all, in what way and to what degree did such ties exist? How much and what sort of a rôle did the towns have in maintaining English rule in Gascony?

It is especially to this last side of the problem that the following study is devoted. The aim here then is to trace in detail the rule of the English government in southwestern France so far as it affected or dealt with the townspeople, and to see what was their attitude toward it, and what part they played in its maintenance. The feudal nobility will be dealt with only incidentally. In point of time that period only will be treated when the continuance of English authority was most seriously in question. This will give as limits the years 1199 and 1259. The death of Richard, in the former, marks the disruption of the Angevin empire. From the time of John's accession Gascony was menaced on the one side by France and on the other by Castile. Throughout the earlier part of Henry's reign the English supremacy was almost continually threatened. It was not until the treaty with Alfonso X in 1254 had removed him from the contest, and the treaty with Louis IX in 1259 had settled the French claims that the English could be said to have enjoyed an authority undisputed by the neighboring monarchs.¹

¹In the following study the term Gascony has been somewhat loosely used to designate the possessions of the English king in southern France. In strictness these possessions consisted, after the losses of John, of the duchy of Gascony proper and certain portions of Poitou.

CHAPTER I

JOHN AND THE TOWNS

Death of Richard. Disputed succession. Attitude of the Gascon towns and policy of John. Claims of Castile. Attack of Philip on Poitou and of Alfonso on Gascony. Attitude of the towns. Privileges and concessions granted by John.

THE death of Richard shook the ill-compacted Angevin empire to its foundations. Not only did it place upon the throne one unable to hold his own in the perpetual struggle with Philip Augustus, but it raised immediately a question of succession. Richard being dead, should the crown pass to John or to Arthur? This was the problem which pressed for solution. Richard, himself, had on his deathbed recognized John as his successor,¹ and this seems to have secured him the support of the ruling officials.² John's claims were also supported by his mother Eleanor, whose rights in Aquitaine none could dispute. So England obeyed the royal officers and Aquitaine followed the duchess and accepted John without serious question; but Anjou, Maine, Touraine and Brittany declared for Arthur, who had, moreover, the powerful support of John's ever-watchful antagonist Philip II. John, who was in Brittany at the time of Richard's death, hastened north to secure Normandy and England, leaving his mother to hold the south for him. In the midst of this crisis the obvious policy, for both John and his mother, was to be

¹ Ramsay, *Angevin Empire*, 365.

² *Ibid.*, 378.

conciliatory, to seek to win as much support as possible in the regions which John sought to rule.

In Gascony the reigns of Henry II and Richard had, apparently, seen a considerable development in the prosperity and power of the towns. To Henry, indeed, has been attributed the grant of a charter to the commune of Bordeaux in 1173. Though this is almost certainly a mistake,³ there is little doubt that a commune developed there during his reign, apparently without opposition; for it was certainly in existence by the death of Richard. The same thing may also be said of Bayonne, which not only developed a communal organization but secured various commercial privileges. These go back to the time of William IX, last independent Duke of Aquitaine, but were confirmed and extended by Richard.⁴ At Dax Richard had suppressed the authority of the viscount and substituted a government of a capdel and twenty justiciars.⁵ He also granted to the citizens freedom from all dues (*de omnimoda consuetudine*) throughout Poitou, Aquitaine and Gascony,⁶ a privilege which would seem to be merely a repetition of one accorded to Bayonne. Thus, by the time of John's accession the towns had made sufficient progress to be a factor of importance among the political forces with which the king had to reckon.

³ The existence of this charter rests wholly on a statement of de Lurbe in his *Chronique bourdeloise*, 15. It has been fully shown, however, that here de Lurbe has attributed a charter of Henry III to Henry II: see Sansas, *Mémoires sur les Origines municipales de Bordeaux* (published in the *Actes de l'Académie de Bordeaux*, 23^e Année), and Rabanis, *Administration municipale et institutions judiciaires de Bordeaux pendant le moyen âge*, in the *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger*, VII (1861).

⁴ See Giry, *Établissements de Rouen*, I, 103-5. Balasque has published Richard's charters in his *Études sur Bayonne*.

⁵ Abbadie, *Le Livre noir de Dax*, xxiii; Duforcet, in the *Bull. de la soc. Borda*, I, 456. Duforcet finds a mayor at Dax with the title of capdel as early as 1189 (*Bull. de la soc. Borda*, I, 458).

⁶ *Le Livre noir*, 178. The document occurs in a *vidimus* of 1294.

The feudal nobles of the south were always a turbulent and lawless body and both Henry II and Richard had been forced to fight vigorously against them. It was, perhaps, in the midst of these struggles that the communes had been founded, and possibly the kings had favored them with the deliberate aim of creating some counterpoise to the feudality, lay or ecclesiastical. Though the nobles showed little disposition to favor the cause of Arthur, we can scarcely suppose them wholly passive spectators, especially when, it would seem, the church set them an example of lawlessness. At a later date, at any rate, serious charges relating to this time were brought against the archbishop of Bordeaux, and in 1204 Innocent III ordered an investigation of the accusation that on the death of Richard this eminent churchman had seized the fortified places, prevented the inhabitants from leaving, and committed many grievous crimes.⁷ These charges would seem⁸ to have considerable justification, and we may well believe that the example of an archbishop who allied himself with the mercenary troops and allowed them to ransom the clergy was but too well imitated by the lay nobility. In any case, it was not a favorable moment for an energetic policy toward the nobles, who do not seem to have openly questioned Eleanor's authority or John's succession. The wisest course must have seemed to rest content with that for the moment and to attempt to secure a more stable support in the rising municipalities.

The towns, apparently, saw their opportunity for the crisis was fruitful of concessions. At La Rochelle all the liberties of the commune were confirmed.⁹ Niort, St. Jean-d'Angély and Oléron received communal charters, some of them, perhaps, for the first time.¹⁰

⁷ *Calendar of Papal Registers: Papal Letters*, I, 16.

⁸ From the picture of the archbishop's conduct, drawn by Richard, *Histoire des Comtes de Poitou*, II, 446.

⁹ *Giry, Étab.*, I, 68.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 89, 239, 294.

At Saintes the commune was not only confirmed but the Établissements of Rouen, then in force at La Rochelle, were extended to it.¹¹ In Gascony, also, extensive favors were granted. Thus one of the first acts of Eleanor was to issue a charter suppressing certain duties levied by Richard at Bordeaux.¹² This concession to the merchants—for so we must regard it—John confirmed from England.¹³ On the same day he also confirmed another grant of Eleanor's by which she had declared that a mint should be maintained at Bordeaux.¹⁴ In addition to such concessions to the commune John conferred upon Elias Viger, a prominent citizen of Bordeaux, a *placia* in that city, adjoining one which king Richard had given to his two brothers. Likewise the king took the burgher and his goods under the royal protection and gave him commercial privileges in Poitou.¹⁵ At St. Émilion the citizens received a charter confirming their commune with all its rights and liberties.¹⁶ At Dax, if we may trust the chronicler, John confirmed all privileges.¹⁷ At Bayonne he granted a revenue of 50 pounds a year to Vitalus de Viele, to be paid from dues on whales.¹⁸ Such favors, it would seem, helped John through the crisis over the Angevin inheritance. His success was for the moment complete, Gascony was quiet, passively loyal at least. Normandy and England recognized him without serious opposition; after some desultory fighting even the feifs that had declared for Arthur submitted, and Philip, accepting the failure of his designs, consented to a treaty which recognized John as heir to all the territories of Richard.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹² *Livre des coutumes*, 437.

¹³ *Rotuli Chartarum*, 4b.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Guadet, *St. Émilion*, 212. The charter is contained in a *Vidimus* of 1340.

¹⁷ Compaigne, *Chronique de la ville de Dax*, 11.

¹⁸ Balasque, *Études*, I, 450. Delpit, *Notice*, 125, note 1.

John's difficulties, however, were by no means at an end. Philip had recognized him for the moment but was far from having abandoned projects of expansion at his expense. There is no need here to trace in detail the impolitic actions by which John drove the Poitevin lords to appeal to Philip, nor the judicial proceedings by which, in 1202, Philip declared John's feifs on the continent forfeited to the French crown. As a result of these developments John was assailed on two sides at once, by Philip in the north and by Castile in the south. The trouble with France was simply a new phase of the old rivalry between the Capetians and the Plantagenets. That with Castile sprang from one of the many royal intermarriages. Alfonse VIII of that country had married Eleanor, a sister of John, and now, doubtless emboldened by John's entanglement with France, advanced a claim to Gascony, which he declared had been promised him by Henry II as a dowry.¹⁹ John not unnaturally refused to concede any such claim, and, to counterbalance Alfonso's intrigue in the south, he concluded a treaty with Navarre, and attempted to injure his rival by commanding the citizens of Bayonne to abstain from all business dealings with the Castilians.²⁰ Thus in 1202 John had before him the task of defending himself at the same time in both the north and the south, against both Alfonso of Castile and Philip of France.

Of the two enemies the most formidable and successful was Philip, who by a vigorous and rapid campaign stripped John of his northern territories. To the victorious advance of the French king John offered little opposition; his forces were soon expelled from Anjou, Maine and Normandy. The weakness of the defense may have been due in part to John's insecure position in Gascony. That many of the southern nobles favored Alfonso was shortly to be made plainly evident, and John may very well have had a perception

¹⁹ Abbadie, *Livre noir*, xxiv.

²⁰ Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 127.

of the fact. But although he did not take the field against his foes with energy, he showered concessions on the towns. Evidently the less he could depend upon the nobles the more necessary it became to gain the burghers. To the citizens of Dax he granted, with praises for their loyalty, the right to carry on commerce in his dominions freely and without hindrance upon the payment of the customary dues.²¹ In Bordeaux John gave his royal protection to the person and merchandise of Elias Viger, and added to this the special privilege of carrying 300 tonelli of wine to any part of his dominion, by land or by sea, free from all duties saving only the liberties of London.²² That the Vigers were an influential family at Bordeaux there can be no doubt, and the concessions to Elias look very like an attempt to keep the town loyal by conciliating prominent citizens, doubtless those powerful in the commune. Apparently following this same policy, John granted favors to another influential family. On June 23 he gave to William Raymond Colom and his brother Amaneus the right, upon the payment of the proper dues, to travel and transact business throughout his dominion. Further than this he conceded to William the right to carry one shipload of wine or salt to any part of his territories free from all royal duties, a privilege which was to hold good for four years.²³ It was doubtless an extension of the same policy to other towns that led John to grant letters of protection to Marcus Sturmin,²⁴ merchant of St. Émilion, as well as to Raymond

²¹ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 5 b.

²² *Rot. chartarum*, 112 b.

²³ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 31. The family name of the brothers is not given in the document; they are designated simply as William Raymond and Amaneus his brother. Since, however, we know that in Bordeaux there was a William Raymond Colom who had a brother Amaneus and that they were wine merchants, the identification is not difficult. The Coloms were, as we shall abundantly see, a very powerful and wealthy family and destined to play a great part in the affairs of Bordeaux (see *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, p. 142).

²⁴ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 25.

de Pins and his son Senebrunnus, who appear to have been merchants of La Réole.²⁵

By these concessions John seemed striving to win the towns to his support. In the next year their loyalty was put to a decided test. Philip, having conquered Normandy, now turned southward and formed a combination with Alfonso of Castile.²⁶ The Spaniard was to seize Gascony while Philip took Poitou.

The French king's part of the bargain was loyally fulfilled. Poitou was easily and swiftly taken. Some even of John's newly chartered communes, such as St. Jean-d'Angély, turned against him at the critical moment and went over to Philip.²⁷ The nobles, or at least some of the more important of them, as the viscount of Thouars, were won over to the French cause.²⁸ In spite of the favorable reception which Philip received, he did not advance beyond Poitou, perhaps because of his engagements with Alfonso, perhaps because in Gascony the archbishop of Bordeaux, having gathered a considerable force, stood loyal to England.²⁹

If John did little in the field to oppose his rival, he continued his favors to Elias Viger, conferring on him an estate at Beggles which Richard had given to a man named Chitre. The ambitious burgher, wrongly representing Chitre as dead, induced the king to transfer the estate to him as a hereditary possession, for which he was to pay a sore-hawk annually.³⁰ Nor did John interfere when the citizens of Bayonne negotiated a commercial treaty with Sancho of Navarre by which they secured full right to trade in that

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁶ Balasque, *Études*, I, 320-2. Richard, *Histoire des comtes de Poitou*, II, 454.

²⁷ Giry, *Étab.*, I, 294.

²⁸ Richard, *Histoire*, II, 452.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 454.

³⁰ *Rot. chartarum*, 135.

kingdom.³¹ Perhaps he was willing enough to see the city bound by close commercial ties to his ally against Castile.

The following year, 1205, might seem a crisis in the fate of John's continental possessions. Philip reduced all of Poitou except Niort and La Rochelle³² and Alfonso invaded Gascony. The chief support of the English cause was, as has been indicated, the archbishop of Bordeaux, Hélié de Malmort. Acting for the king, he had assembled troops in the south and established himself firmly at Bordeaux. In June of 1204 he had gone to England to arrange measures of defense with the king and John had granted him a subsidy of 28,000 marks of silver. With this support his brother, who was in actual command of the troops, continued to augment his force of mercenaries while the archbishop himself remained in England as a hostage.³³ Yet while thus endeavoring to strengthen his army John did not abandon his policy of granting favors to the townspeople, and accorded privileges to Oléron and La Rochelle, perhaps as a means of holding them against the French.³⁴

The chief danger for the moment came from the side of Castile. Alfonso's attempt on Gascony had been well prepared and a charter of October 25, 1204, affords us a glimpse of the intrigues he was carrying on behind the scenes. The charter in question was drawn up at San Sebastian and is dated in Spanish style. It contains a gift of certain serfs to the bishop of Dax and is witnessed by the bishop of Bayonne, the count of Armagnac, the viscounts of Béarn, Tartas, and Orthez.³⁵ This gift, thus witnessed in Spain, would indicate that the leading seigneurs of the south, ecclesiastical as well as

³¹ Giry, *Étab.*, *Pièces*, II, 76.

³² Norgate, *John Lackland*, 113 and also note 6.

³³ Richard, *Histoire*, II, 445-48. However, Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 345, regards the amount (given by Coggeshall) as preposterous.

³⁴ Giry, *Étab.*, I, 69, 90.

³⁵ Balasque, *Études*, I, 321.

secular, were prepared to support Alfonso. He, therefore, had little to fear from them when, in 1205, he crossed the border.

Once in Gascony the Spaniard turned his attention first to Bayonne. The bishop favored him; but the burghers closed the gates of their city and remained loyal to the English king. Turning aside from Bayonne, Alfonso found a welcome in Béarn and thence proceeded north in triumph till he reached La Réole, where he again found the city true to John. Learning that Bordeaux would take the same attitude, he advanced no farther, but after some delay, recrossed the Pyrenees, having ranged under him—if we may trust Balasque's version of a Spanish chronicler—all Gascony except Bordeaux, La Réole and Bayonne.

The Spanish success, however, was as transitory as it was easy. The next year (1206) John took the field in person with such forces as he could muster,³⁶ and attempted to regain the ground that had been lost. It was soon evident that Alfonso's conquest had no solid foundation. The chief communes were loyal to John and some of the nobles now rallied to his cause.³⁷ Of the rest even those who had welcomed the Spaniard were little disposed to fight for him, and he himself seems to have done little to support his cause. John was therefore able to crush the opposition in Gascony, to regain some of the lost ground, and to conclude with Philip a truce leaving what he had thus retaken in his hands.³⁸

In this struggle the attitude of the towns was clearly of great importance to John. Had they yielded to the Spaniard any attempt at reconquest would have been enormously more difficult. While they remained loyal not only were they a center round which John's partisans could rally but they rendered it an easy matter to land troops at any time within the province. The conduct of

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 333.

³⁷ Norgate, *John Lackland*, 114.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 116-17.

the king showed that he was well aware of their importance and meant to keep them loyal to himself if possible. Threatened by France and Spain at once he granted new concessions. One might almost trace the progress of the invaders by the letters patent of John. It was, indeed, no more than a continuation of the policy he had followed from the beginning of his reign.

Among the concessions granted during the pressure of the double peril we may note the following. At Bayonne he issued letters patent taking the citizens under his royal protection and granting them the right to come and go as they would in his dominions and to transact business anywhere upon the payment of the proper dues.³⁹ He further took the persons and property of two Bayonnese merchants⁴⁰ under his special protection, and paid certain debts to the sailors of that town.⁴¹ At Bordeaux he granted more extensive privileges. First he accorded to his faithful and well beloved citizens (*dilectis et fidelibus nostris probis hominibus nostris, etc.*) exemption from all royal dues for their merchandise both at Bordeaux itself and throughout the region of the Gironde.⁴² He also, at the request of the citizens, made or sanctioned certain changes in the laws governing the inheritance of property, and furthermore accorded them the right to receive strangers into the commune after they had resided in the town for one month. This last privilege he expressly declared was to be granted for such time as the citizens should remain loyal. At La Réole he assisted certain merchants, possibly influential ones, to collect a debt from the merchants of Dieppe by seizing the property of the latter in his dominions. No sooner was his truce with France concluded than he extended to the Réolese the

³⁹ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 49.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 48 b.

⁴¹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 48 b.

⁴² *Rot. chartarum*, 145 b.

same commercial privileges that were already enjoyed by the Bordelais.⁴³

The success which attended this policy of conciliating the towns we have already seen. But here an obvious query suggests itself. If favors alone were necessary why was it that John could not win the support of *all* the towns? Why could he not hold Poitou as well as Gascony? And going further we might ask, why might not Alfonso win the towns as easily as John? Surely the mere granting of favors could by itself never furnish the basis for an enduring power. Gratitude seldom seems to have counted for much in the politics of Gascony. Not only must the towns be in a position to assert themselves against the neighboring nobles but the favors must lie in the direction of the interests of the towns themselves. How little favors by themselves could accomplish is well illustrated by the conduct of St. Jean-d'Angély. This town, after receiving favors from John, deserted to Philip upon his promising to confirm its liberties. For John's policy to succeed the towns must have some interests which bound them to their protector. In the case of the Gascon towns such ties existed, as a glance at the commercial geography of the province will show.

Commercially the great artery of Gascony was the Garonne river. At its mouth, commanding and concentrating the commerce of its upper reaches, stood Bordeaux. Above, St. Macaire, Langon, La Réole and Bazas sent their trade down the river through the great central port of the duchy. To the north on the Dordogne stood St. Émilion, commercially less dependent upon Bordeaux. Of course such towns as La Réole were so situated that their trade could easily flow toward northern France on the one hand, and toward Toulouse on the other. This may in part explain the uncertain loyalty of some of them to the English cause. But England, in any case, offered a

⁴³ *Archives de la Gironde*, I, 298.

near and profitable market for their wines. The wine trade with England had under the Angevins assumed large proportions. Wine had come to be regarded in that country as a necessity of life, and every year a fleet of 30 or 40 vessels sailed from Gascony laden with wine and returned bearing English goods.⁴⁴ To a considerable extent this wine trade was concentrated at Bordeaux and some of the other towns conducted their business mainly through her as a port. Merchants indeed of La Réole, St. Macaire, and St. Émilion in the thirteenth century had their names entered on the registers of the Guild Hall of London,⁴⁵ but their wine was, in most cases, shipped from Bordeaux.

Turning to the south of Gascony, we find only two towns of real importance, Dax and Bayonne. Dax, on the upper course of the Adour, could send her commerce in three directions, south down the river to Bayonne and thence by sea, south across the Pyrenees to Navarre, Castile⁴⁶ and Béarn, or north to Bordeaux.⁴⁷ Richard had already granted the Dacquois the right to trade throughout his possessions in Gascony.⁴⁸ These privileges had been confirmed and extended by John and similar ones had been granted both to La Réole and St. Macaire in the north. If enforced they secured to the northern towns their trade through Bordeaux and to Dax, hers, in both Bordeaux and Bayonne. But the English king was on several occasions called on to interfere in order to secure to these towns their rights, both Bayonne and Bordeaux showing a disposition to ignore them, either aiming at securing a monopoly for themselves or for other reasons.

⁴⁴ The specific figures are cited from Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 350. The fact of a flourishing trade in wine is made abundantly clear by the numerous references to it in the rolls, many of which have been or will be cited.

⁴⁵ Michel, *Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux*, I, 89-91, 92.

⁴⁶ See privilege of Ferdinand III, *Livre noir*, 309.

⁴⁷ One of the old Roman roads connected Dax and Bordeaux.

⁴⁸ The privilege, which is without date, is published by Abbadie in his edition of the *Livre noir*, 351, and dated by him about 1170.

The smaller towns were thus forced either to endanger their trade through these ports or to adhere loyally to the power that controlled them.

Bayonne was in a somewhat different case. Situated near the sea her commerce could go either north along the coast, or south to Spain, or northwest to England. That it flowed in all three directions, we shall see. One consideration must not however be omitted, namely, that Bayonne was a great center of shipping. It was in her ships that a part, at least, of the wine of Bordeaux was sent to England.⁴⁹ Her navigators' association had a regular tariff of freight rates from Bayonne to Bordeaux, La Rochelle, or Oléron, and from La Rochelle to Flanders.⁵⁰ The ships of her merchants, also, traded with England.⁵¹ Thus a considerable part of Bayonnese trade was at the mercy of the English king both in England and at Bordeaux. Here, too, John had granted extensive commercial privileges, as we have seen. The communes in these towns were under the control largely, if not wholly, of the merchant body⁵² and in granting these privileges the king may well have felt that municipal organizations controlled by merchants whose commerce he could injure, if he would, were likely to prove loyal adherents and a useful counterpoise to the versatile and untrustworthy nobility.

The years from 1206 to 1213 were years of comparative quiet for Gascony. John was occupied by his conflict with the papacy and with the growing discontent in England. On the continent, the war with France had been suspended by a truce and John's diplomacy was constantly aimed at a reopening of the war. By the sentence of the French peers *all* John's fiefs were forfeit to the crown and with the expiration of the truce Philip might resume his efforts to carry

⁴⁹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, II, 170 b. *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 204.

⁵⁰ Fagniez, *Documents*, I, 120.

⁵¹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 579 b, and many other references.

⁵² This seems evident from the nature of the concessions and the general part played by the communes.

this sentence into effect. Yet for some few years the peace was maintained. John was busy in England, the king of Castile made no attempt to renew his claims, and Philip Augustus was variously occupied. Hence, though both John and Philip were planning to renew the war at a favorable moment, as neither found the time propitious the truce was fairly well observed. As to the towns, either they had gained all they desired for the moment, or John felt it less necessary to conciliate them; for there are few facts of his affecting them on record.

John's chief reliance for the recovery of his lost provinces was a great league against Philip, at the formation of which he labored earnestly during these years. By 1214 this league was not only formed but ready to act. The plans called for a double invasion of France, an attack on Poitou by John and an invasion from the north by Otto, Holy Roman Emperor, the most important of John's allies. Directly the war was begun John resumed his former policy toward the townspeople. No sooner had he landed at La Rochelle than he granted letters of protection to two merchants of Bayonne.⁵³ On April 11, from St. Émilion, he granted letters patent to the citizens of Bordeaux. By these letters he exacted the payment of the duties on wine and salt brought up the Gironde to Bordeaux which had been in force under Richard. However, he exempted from all duty such wine as was brought from the vineyards of the citizens of the town, provided it was brought to the town for sale.⁵⁴ Five days later the king took all the burghers of Bordeaux under his especial protection.⁵⁵ Nor was La Réole forgotten. There John also accorded letters of protection to a certain Senebrunnus de Pins and his brother.⁵⁶ During the year John also exacted an oath of fidelity from the principal burghers.

⁵³ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 110 b.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁵⁶ There are two entries. In the one the name is given Selebrunnus de

The opening of John's campaign was successful. Though he brought few men with him to Gascony he was well supplied with money⁵⁷ and the Poitevin lords received him favorably, recognized his suzerainty and entered his service. He thus easily brought the greater part of Poitou under his nominal control. How slight his hold really was shortly appeared.

Louis, Philip's son, who commanded in the south, no sooner advanced against John than the Poitevins refused to engage in a pitched battle, and John, fearing worse treason, hurriedly retreated.⁵⁸ A reason for their refusal may have been their desire not to commit themselves too deeply while the success of the emperor in the north was still uncertain.⁵⁹ As we might expect, this discovery of the unreliability of the barons threw John more than ever on the towns. Hardly had the king begun his retreat from the north when on July 7, at Mansy, he solemnly confirmed the commercial privileges granted to Dax by his father and brother. The act was attested by the bishop of Dax, the viscount of Tartas, Reginald de Pons, the senechal and two citizens of Bordeaux, namely Elias Viger and Amaneus Colom.⁶⁰ Possibly these two burghers were instrumental in securing the confirmation. At any rate, they were both in favor with the king; for on July 9 we find John, now at La Rochelle, authorizing Amaneus to hold the property of Gerold de Mota in pawn until he had repaid a debt which Gerold owes him.⁶¹ Persons unpopular at court were not likely to be thus aided in their business transactions. The decisive issues of the campaign were settled neither in Poitou nor Gascony. John's hopes were mainly built on the success of the

Pons, in the other *Sedebrunus de Pins*. Since there was a *Senebrunnus de Pins* I have assumed that to be the correct name. *Rot. litt. pat.*, III b and 114.

⁵⁷ Ramsay, *Angevin Empire*, 448-9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 451.

⁵⁹ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 372-3.

⁶⁰ *Rot. chartarum*, 199 b; also *Livre noir*, 243.

⁶¹ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 118b.

emperor and his allies who simultaneously with his invasion of Poitou were making an attack on Philip from the north. There the battle of Bouvines shattered all his hopes. The best he could do now was to arrange a five years' truce with Philip⁶² and return to face the long accumulated discontent of England.

The details of this struggle concern English rather than Gascon history, but in the struggle the Gascon towns seem to have played a part. John would appear to have relied upon them for supplies, especially wine for his mercenary troops, since we find in the close rolls numerous orders for the payment of citizens, chiefly of Bordeaux, for wine,⁶³ and on December 24 one for one hundred marks to Arnold of Bayonne and others for the transportation of soldiers.⁶⁴ Possibly it was as a reward for such services in the way of transportation that John on April 19, 1215, extended to Bayonne the municipal institutions of La Rochelle.⁶⁵

When, to oppose John's foreign mercenaries, the English barons called in Louis of France, the situation was somewhat modified. Though Philip Augustus declared himself neutral, Louis received supplies from the continent. John might not unnaturally desire to cut off his rival's communications. It was doubtless with this end in view that he directed letters patent to the communal authorities at Bayonne (*Rex XII juratis et consolatui de Bayonne*) directing them to arm their galleys for his service in harassing his enemies.⁶⁶ Certainly John must have considered this harassing of his enemies a matter of vital importance, for he not only sent these letters patent, but dispatched the archbishop of Bordeaux and the archdeacon of Poitou to Bayonne to urge the commune to carry out his orders.

⁶² Norgate, *John Lackland*, 205.

⁶³ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 193 b and 222.

⁶⁴ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 161.

⁶⁵ Balasque, *Études*, I, 362.

⁶⁶ *Rot. litt. pat.*, 185 b; also published by Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres de rois*, I, 26.

Whether the citizens of Bayonne obeyed the king in this or not, the time seemed to them favorable for concessions. They petitioned John for exemptions from all tolls and customs in his territories. John replied favorably to this request, but his sudden death prevented any measures being taken. Such at least is the statement made by the town itself to Henry III in 1219,⁶⁷ and, though rendered somewhat suspicious by the obvious self-interest of the commune, it hardly seems improbable when we consider John's position at the time. At any rate, if the king made any promises his death prevented their fulfilment.

⁶⁷ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 65.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, 1216-1220

Difficulties of the English government after the death of John. First measures of the regency. Bankruptcy of the government. Dangers in Gascony. Weakness of the seneschal. Anarchy in Gascony and Poitou. Marriage of Isabella. Quarrel with Hugh of La Marche. Attempts of towns and church to maintain peace. Position of towns as supporters of the royal power. Concessions to them. Danger in France.

JOHN, at his death, bequeathed to his son Henry a chaotic state and an uncertain throne. The new government had before it the double task of driving Prince Louis out of England and of maintaining the king's authority over such continental dominions as yet remained to him. On the continent, indeed, France and England were still at peace, since Philip continued to observe the truce concluded with John. Nevertheless, this peace was only temporary for the war was certain to be renewed sooner or later, and in the mean time the task of maintaining order in Gascony surpassed the resources of the bankrupt government.

Dark as the situation seemed, it was not hopeless. There were in Henry's favor several circumstances. He was a child and his father's enemies could, therefore, have no personal animosity against him. He had, moreover, a wise and able regent in the person of William Marshall and, in addition, the powerful support of his guardian Honorius III. The pope had already come to the assistance of his father, having in 1216 dispatched a mandate to the archbishop of Bordeaux instructing him and his suffragans to urge John's vas-

sals in their diocese to hasten to his defense in England.¹ On John's death the Pope acted with equal energy in Henry's favor. He commanded his legate in England to protect John's children and to declare illegal all oaths taken to Louis.² Later he despatched an exhortation to the archbishop of Bordeaux to urge those detaining lands and goods of the king or his mother to give them up, no appeal being allowed.³

In spite of this support from the church, which no doubt contributed to keeping the French king quiet, the problems facing the government were sufficiently serious. Its energies for the time being were concentrated upon the defeat of Prince Louis. All it could do upon the continent was to conciliate all classes, so far as possible, while using the papal support for whatever it might prove to be worth as a means of preserving order. So far as the nobles were concerned conciliation doubtless meant letting them alone, since they might reasonably be trusted not to revolt against a suzerain who did not interfere with them. The towns, however, had grievances. John had imprisoned one prominent burgher and had taken wine without payment, whether by agreement or seizure. This might seem a reversal of his former policy, but allowances must be made for a king of so violent a temper and a government in such desperate straits as his.

The new government at once made haste to set these matters right—on parchment at any rate. Among the prisoners liberated by William Marshall as soon as he had assumed the reins of government was Rustengo de Soler.⁴ Now Rustengo was, probably at this time and unquestionably later, a man of great wealth, of landed property, of aristocratic connections. He was destined, in conjunc-

¹ *Papal Letters*, I, 41.

² *Ibid.*, 43.

³ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁴ *Patent Rolls*, 1216-1225, 11.

tion with his son Gaillard, to stand at the head of one of the two great factions of Bordeaux, and it may well have been that his relatives or friends even then controlled the commune. How this man came to be imprisoned we are not informed, but, for whatever reason, he was, at Henry's accession, confined in Corfe Castle in the county of Dorset.⁵

Not only was Rustengo set at liberty by the regent but, during the next year (1217) he was intrusted with the custody of the castle of Labarre,⁶ and arrangements were made to pay him for 84 dolia of wine which John had taken to provision Dover Castle.⁷ The Bordelais, moreover, continued in favor with the government, since in 1219 we find him acting as one of the bailiffs of Dax.⁸ Nor was Rustengo the only merchant whom the regent deemed it wise to pay. In February of 1218 he ordered the seneschal to pay two and one-half marks sterling to Arnold Reisac of Bordeaux for 20 dolia of wine taken by John.⁹

While thus maintaining friendly relations with the townspeople of Bordeaux, leaving the nobility largely to themselves or controlling them through the church, the regent pressed the war with Louis to a successful conclusion. By the treaty of Lambeth, signed on September 11, 1217, the prince withdrew from England and abandoned his claims in return for an indemnity of 10,000 marks. Yet the

⁵ Corfe had been John's headquarters during the months of July and August. Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 388.

⁶ *Rot. litt. claus.* I, 308. *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 80, 130, 133. Probably *Pat. Rolls*, 157, also refers to this. Labarre was situated in the neighborhood of Condom, near the Toulousan frontier. The whole region of Toulouse was then in a state of anarchy and Honorius III was urging Philip Augustus to intervene in Languedoc. Prince Louis, indeed, headed an expedition there in the following year. It would, therefore, seem that such a frontier castle must have been a place of considerable importance.

⁷ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 137.

⁸ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 46.

⁹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 351 b.

government's difficulties were by no means over. The revolt of the barons and the civil war had gone far to shatter the royal authority and organization. John had intrusted many of his castles to foreign mercenary leaders whom the regent was anxious to remove, the revenues were scanty, and the indemnity to Louis and other debts exhausted the treasury.

These problems occupied the last days of the regent, and at his death, in May of 1219, he left them still unsettled to his successor, Hubert de Burgh. Indeed Hubert found the government so much impoverished that he could meet the current expenses of the administration only by the help of loans from the papal legate.¹⁰ Under these circumstances nothing could be spared for Gascony and there the king's representative, the seneschal, was obliged to do what he could with the resources of the duchy. As these resources were sadly insufficient Gascony drifted steadily toward anarchy, and, at the same time, the attitude of the French became more threatening.

While Louis had been fighting in England Philip Augustus, as we have seen, had remained quietly at Paris. He had, it is true, aided his son, but had not desired to risk a conflict with Honorius III, by attacking Aquitaine. Louis, however, returning from England, soothed his disappointment and reconciled himself with the church by plunging into the war in Languedoc, and by April of 1219 was engaged in the siege of Toulouse. Now it was by no means unlikely that if he failed to take Toulouse he would relieve his feelings by taking some of the English territories. This was the more probable as the truce with France concluded by king John would soon expire, and border nobles were little to be trusted. With such dangers threatening from France the internal condition of the duchy grew constantly worse and the seneschal was helpless.

¹⁰ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 401.

These dangers were clearly pointed out to the English government. Queen Isabella, who after the death of her husband had returned to the continent, sent warnings. In a letter written to her son, probably in the spring of 1219, she reminds him of previous vain appeals for help, and informs him that help is now more urgently needed than ever; for a breach of the truce with France would gravely imperil his possessions.¹¹ Similar warnings were reported from another source. Geoffrey Neville, the seneschal of Gascony, pointed out to the king that while Prince Louis was then busy with Toulouse yet when he returned from his expedition he would probably attack Hélié Ridell, lord of Bergerac, who was in charge of the marches of Agenois and Périgord; nor would it be possible, he added for Hélié to hold these territories without assistance.¹²

With such perils in the air new favors to Bordeaux are not surprising. On May 28 Hubert issued letters of safe conduct to the citizens of that city. These letters confirmed the right of the burghers to come with their merchandise to England, to remain there in safety, and to return freely to Bordeaux on condition of the payment of the right and proper customs—*rectas et debitas consuetudines*.¹³ Such a concession was an obvious benefit to the merchants engaged in English commerce and the list of mayors clearly shows us that this element then controlled the commune in that city.¹⁴

While such concessions—or confirmations of previous concessions, for the Bordelais must have enjoyed these privileges

¹¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 23.

¹² *Ibid.*, 26.

¹³ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 194.

¹⁴ From 1217 to 1221 the office of mayor was held by the following persons: Bernard d'Acra (twice), Peter Andron, W. R. Colom and Peter Viger. Of these d'Acra, Colom and Viger were engaged in the English trade. For d'Acra see *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 496-98. For Viger see the privilege given his brother and noticed on page 6. The close connection of the Coloms with the wine trade will be evidenced by our entire study.

in substance before this time—might retain the towns in their loyalty yet the authority of the seneschal was reaching its nadir. So pressed was he for money that Geoffrey Neville was even detained at La Rochelle for his debts and only allowed to leave on obtaining a loan from Hugh de Lusignan of 160 marks.¹⁵ Under these circumstances the feudal lords broke loose from all control. Hugh of Lusignan, count of La Marche, was harassing the town of Niort and other magnates were threatening other places. Chaos reigned everywhere and in the midst of it the seneschal stood powerless. So, at least, it was that the seneschal himself described the situation in a doleful letter to the king, written in May or June of 1219, complaining of his helplessness—destitute as he was both of men and money—and expressing his fears that unless aid was promptly sent him the king's lands and towns would be seized by Hugh and other lords. He concluded bitterly that unless he was better supported he would leave Gascony where he was useless and go on a crusade to the Holy Land.¹⁶

But the English government was fully occupied in getting rid of the mercenaries whom John had placed in command of the castles and had no help to send. So matters drifted till July, growing worse instead of better. The barons were still devastating the royal domains and seizing and ransoming the burghers. The seneschal again described these conditions to the king and again complained of his helplessness, saying that his poverty was such that he could neither subjugate the barons nor defend the king's lands, and that his credit was so far exhausted that no one would lend him anything. He concluded as before with a threat of leaving Gascony unless aid should be sent him.¹⁷

Badly though the seneschal needed money the English government

¹⁵ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 44.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 37.

would not let him obtain it by means that might alienate the towns. When he demanded the arrears of certain dues from Bayonne he was promptly checked. In June—that is about the time of the seneschal's first letter—Hubert commanded him *not* to exact the arrears of dues at Bayonne, since these duties had been granted to the citizens for fortifying their town; and Hubert even went so far as to command him to pay back to them 25 pounds sterling which he had already collected.¹⁸

Meantime the danger from France grew as the period of the truce drew near its end. Clearly something must be done to guard against an attack from Louis. Apparently with this in view Hubert on July 23 ordered various persons in Bordeaux to set about the task of fortifying the city.¹⁹ Some response must also be made to the seneschal's repeated entreaties for money. But the royal treasury was in no condition to furnish funds. Under these circumstances Hubert turned to the towns for help. Having received many favors they might be willing assist the king, the more so as it would appear to have been plainly to their interest to strengthen the royal government that it might be able to protect them from the nobles. In July, at the same time that he wrote concerning the fortification of Bordeaux, Hubert wrote both to La Rochelle and Bordeaux asking each town to advance 1,000 marks to the seneschal for the defense of the king's lands. At the same time he wrote to the master of the Templars in Aquitaine asking him to advance enough to make up 2,000 marks, in case either of the towns did not advance the entire sum asked for. Hubert also strengthened his appeal by inducing the commune of London to write to the mayor and communes of the two cities, offering to guarantee the repayment of the loan.²⁰

¹⁸ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 393. *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 200.

¹⁹ *Pat. Rolls*, 198.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 198-199.

A word as to the value of money may not be out of place at this time. One of the latest estimates is that of Malvezin in his *Histoire du commerce*

So far the situation appears simple. The nobles were oppressing the townspeople and the king was conciliating them and appealing to them for loans to help him curb the nobles.²¹ The reason for attacks of the nobles on the towns may have been mere turbulence and love of plunder, or it may well have been a desire to extend their powers by forcing the towns to become their vassals instead of continuing to hold directly of the king. In any case before the year was over a new complication arose in the outbreak of violent quarrels between the towns. Toward the end of 1219 the common council of Dax were complaining bitterly of the conduct of the citizens of Bayonne, who, they said, had closed the Adour against their commerce.²² At the same time the relations between La Réole and Bordeaux were becoming strained. It will be recalled that John had granted to the citizens of La Réole exemption from all duties on their goods in the port of Bordeaux. In 1217 William Marshall had commissioned Gerard Brochard, master of the Templars in Aquitaine, and his brother Templars to collect the dues of Bordeaux until they should have repaid themselves 1,157 marks borrowed by John.²³ Gerard had now begun to collect these dues upon the goods of the citizens of La Réole regardless of their privilege. In November of 1219, if we follow the dates assigned by Shirley, the council and all

de Bordeaux. He values the *livre tournois* at 18 francs 97 centimes and the mark at 2 livres 18 sous. The money of Bordeaux equalled that of Tours. Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 306, and *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 199. The pound sterling equalled 4 *livres tournois* (*Rôles Gascons*, no. 263) and the mark sterling was 2/3 of a pound sterling (*Rot. litt. claus.* I, 623). This of course refers to the intrinsic value; the purchasing power Malvezin estimates as nine times greater than today, but Balasque, *Études*, II, 218, puts it only double.

²¹ Only once so far as the records show did the English government take a step that might irritate the burghers. This was when in 1219 it notified the wine merchants of Bordeaux of the discovery that certain of their wine casks were of short measure, and warned them that should this be found again the wine in such casks would be confiscated.

²² Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 45.

²³ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 51.

the burghers of the town wrote a violent letter to the king complaining of this action.²⁴ At about the same time two of their citizens sent the king an account of the quarrel from which it appears that the citizens of Bordeaux were supporting the action of the Templars.²⁵ In the course of these disputes no reference was made to the seneschal, representative of the king in Gascony. This in itself is confirmation that his complaints of powerlessness were not exaggerated.

The danger from Louis seems to have been constantly threatening for we find Pope Honorius III ordering his legate to prevent the prince from seizing the lands of the king of England, whether in Poitou or Gascony.²⁶ This was in May 1219 and was worth something. Still as Innocent III had not been able to prevent this same prince from invading England it might well be questioned if Honorius could hold him back from Gascony, and the province seemed in no condition to withstand an attack.

Before such conditions Geoffrey Neville might well grow disheartened. Perhaps to seek for further support, he went to England in November leaving affairs in Gascony in the hands of a knight named William Gauler.²⁷ We can form some estimate of the condition of the royal authority when we find—if we may trust Gauler—that Neville left him nothing but port dues which amounted to only 50 pounds. In any case Gauler did not enjoy a long tenure of office; for the king issued an order for his arrest in the very month of Neville's departure, though for what reason does not appear.²⁸ After this Neville resumed his duties but was not appreciably stronger than before. The course of events seems to have been entirely beyond his control, and the province drifted along almost as if no royal representative had been present.

²⁴ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 49.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁶ *Papal Letters*, I, 67.

²⁷ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 49.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 54.

Under such circumstances the quarrels and disputes continued unabated. La Réole was still in difficulties with Bordeaux. The justiciar had in July ordered the seneschal to maintain the liberties of the town²⁹ and had written to Brochard ordering him to respect them.³⁰ This had proved insufficient for in November the council and burghers had again written to the chancellor and despatched a certain Marlettus as nuncio to secure a formal confirmation of their liberties.³¹ Marlettus seems to have been favorably received for in February of 1220 the king made him a present of one mark, perhaps as payment of his expenses.³² Bayonne, somewhat irrelevantly, replied to the complaints of Dax by protesting her loyalty to the king³³ and inducing the viscount of Béarn³⁴ and the common council of Bazas to testify to it likewise.³⁵ She, moreover, renewed her request—made formerly, as she declares, to John—for exemption from all tolls and customs.³⁶

In one respect the English government met with good fortune. They were able to secure a renewal for four years of the truce which expired in 1220. This gave a little longer time in which to attempt to put the country in a posture of defense. Though they were successful in this matter the internal conditions showed no sign of improvement with the beginning of 1220. In February or March of that year the mayor and burgesses of La Rochelle thanked the king for renewing the truce with France, but complained to him that the lord of Parthenay was harassing the burghers of Niort and St. Jean-d'Angély.³⁷ The town of Niort speedily echoed these com-

²⁹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 395 b.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 435.

³¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 49.

³² *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 411.

³³ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 65.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 66.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 94.

plaints, with details of their citizens imprisoned and blinded.³⁸ Dax, too, forgetting, or perhaps having composed her quarrel with Bayonne, was petitioning the king to force Geoffrey Neville to repay money borrowed from her citizens.³⁹

It seems clear from such glimpses as these letters give us that, while disorder was general, it was at its worst in Poitou. Dax and Bayonne were not only stronger but the neighboring lords were weaker than was the case with Niort and other Poitevin towns. In Poitou the fate of the English rule depended largely on the attitude of the greatest feudal lord of the region, Hugh of Lusignan, count of La Marche. His ambition was naturally to extend his power in Poitou and to acquire a position of practical independence by playing off the English against the French. Hitherto he had been nominally loyal to the English, but he now saw an opening for his own advancement. Isabella, Henry's mother, had returned to France to administer Angoulême, which she inherited from her father. After having suffered many and repeated aggressions from Hugh—of which she complained in vain to Henry—she now took the step of marrying Hugh in spite of the fact that he was betrothed to her daughter. She explained in her letter announcing her marriage that it was contracted to further, or at least safeguard, Henry's interests. The count was without an heir and as his fiancée was very young had resolved to seek a wife in France. If this project had been carried through Isabella declared that both Poitou and Gascony would have been lost to Henry. She professed to have acted rather for his interests than her own. She closed by demanding, among other things, the town of Niort and the sum of 3500 marks left her by King John.⁴⁰

These demands not being complied with Hugh speedily proceeded

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 95 and 96.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 114.

to acts of hostility against the English. Among the first of these seems to have been an attempt to persuade or force the towns of La Rochelle, Niort, and St. Jean-d'Angély to ally themselves with him. His overtures being rejected, either in revenge or as a means of compulsion he seized such of their citizens as were within his territories. Such a policy would not merely annoy individuals, but, if persisted in, would destroy commerce passing through La Marche and Lusignan. Under such circumstances the towns turned to their royal master.

In May, if we follow Shirley's rather tentative dating, the mayor and burgesses of La Rochelle informed Henry that the count had written them a very menacing letter.⁴¹ They add significantly that a powerful man is much needed as seneschal. This in itself is a strong suggestion of royalist sympathies on the part of the towns. It is, moreover, decidedly confirmed by a letter to Henry from William Gumbaud, an officer in charge of the castles of Fronsac and Mirabeau, who declares that Hugh is threatening the lands under his charge and that he is not in a position to protect them. He asks the king to give orders to Bordeaux, La Rochelle, La Réole and other towns to assist him in defending Fronsac.⁴² Evidently, in this instance, the king's officer relied on the towns to enable him to resist the feudal lords, especially a lord against whom they had so many and such weighty grievances as they professed to have against the count of La Marche.

The quarrel with Hugh, however, did not go so far as actual war, owing to the combined action of the church and towns. Since the king could not preserve order these two powers undertook to do so. The bishops of Saintonge, Poitou, Angoulême and Périgord, acting together, persuaded Hugh to agree to a truce for seven weeks,

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 155.

This truce was announced to king Henry by the mayor and commune of Bordeaux⁴³ who frankly added that it was important and even necessary to retain the good will of the count and that to disturb him was *periculosa et damnosa*. They end their letter by an entreaty to the king to be discreet in his action. In writing thus they pretend to be fulfilling a request of the *prud' hommes* of La Rochelle, possibly to avert from themselves any wrath the king might feel at their rather plain language. Hubert appears to have despatched nuncios to conclude a peace with Hugh, but events did not await their coming. Before their arrival, the bishops with certain barons and representatives of the towns of Bordeaux, Niort, La Rochelle and St. Jean-d'Angély held a conference with Hugh at Angoulême. Thereafter the towns despatched envoys to England to assist in arranging a permanent peace,⁴⁴ which seems to have been concluded in November of that year.

The peace thus concluded was not destined to prove lasting. In reality it was little more than a truce. Hugh for the moment laid aside such of his demands as he deemed it inopportune to press, but the English government could never count upon him with confidence, as we shall have occasion to see. He was quite prepared to desert to the French whenever his interests seemed to dictate that course, though upon the whole he may well have preferred King Henry as the weaker and therefore more lenient master.

With the affairs of Gascony in such a state Hubert could hardly venture to offend the burghers. Nor were these latter likely to let so good an occasion for bringing forward their claims slip by unused. In this matter Bordeaux was particularly active. On the occasion of Henry's second coronation, in May 1220, she requested confirmation of a charter of King John.⁴⁵ From the language of the letter

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 125.

the charter was one referring to commercial privileges, and it was doubtless in response to this petition that, on July 28, the king addressed letters close to the seneschal confirming the exemptions and privileges on wines which had been granted to Bordeaux by John.⁴⁶

During this troubled year the commune was also able to bring to a conclusion negotiations concerning certain debts. John had on one occasion seized 432 *dolia* of wine valued at 1,400 marks. Presumably this had been owned by various private individuals, but by individuals who exerted such influence in the commune that it acted for them, since the matter was brought before the English government by representatives of the "university of Bordeaux." Apparently some of these claims had already been paid and negotiations concerning the remainder had long been pending; for, on March 10, 1220, Hubert issued letters patent stating that he had finally come to an agreement with the citizens of Bordeaux (*Sciatis nos finem fecisse cum Reimundo Divac posito loco universitatis Burdegale pro*, etc.) By this arrangement 600 marks were paid to the citizens in ten yearly installments.⁴⁷ While thus arranging for the payment of a number of private citizens through the commune—for we can hardly suppose that it had engaged in the wine trade as a corporate body—Hubert also paid another debt directly. Geoffrey Neville had borrowed money from Rustengo Colom to the amount of 560 marks.⁴⁸ The Coloms were a powerful family who had already received favors from King John. The brother of Rustengo was at this time mayor of Bordeaux and hence it is not surprising that Hubert took prompt measures to settle their claims. Doubtless because his treasury was then empty he conceded to Rustengo one half the *redditus* of Bordeaux until the debt should be discharged.

⁴⁶ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 425.

⁴⁷ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 229.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 243.

In the midst of the confusion and anarchy in Gascony the towns apparently formed the centre of whatever remained of a royalist party. Already Niort had called for a strong seneschal, and William Gumbaude had asked communal aid in case of war with Hugh, which war had been averted in large part by the action of the towns.⁴⁹ Hubert—evidently depending upon the loyalty of, at least, Bordeaux and Bayonne—strove anxiously to strengthen them against possible attack. In Bordeaux he commissioned Rustengo de Soler to repair the castle, promising to repay him whatever sum he should expend in so doing.⁵⁰ Further, he authorized the levy of certain special taxes on merchandise brought into the city, the proceeds of which were to be expended in fortifying the town. These taxes were, however, to be collected only for a period of three years, and the goods of La Réole were to be exempt.⁵¹ It would not seem impossible that these taxes were levied at the suggestion and wish of the citizens, who might well desire stronger defenses in the midst of the many perils which lowered over Gascony. We can indeed hardly believe that at this moment Hubert would take steps affecting the burghers which they seriously opposed. To such provision for Bordeaux Hubert joined a lesser concession to Bayonne, granting 25 pounds (annually) from the revenue to the mayor, twelve and council for fortifying the town.⁵²

Finally, Hubert took action in the matter of despatching a stronger seneschal. The appointment seems to have been under consideration by the government for some time. At first Hubert thought of conferring the office upon some Gascon noble who would regard the

⁴⁹ It will be recalled that during these troubled years the office of mayor at Bordeaux was most frequently held by men connected with the English trade (see note, page 22). This may furnish one reason for the loyalty of Bordeaux.

⁵⁰ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 245.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 242.

⁵² *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 472 b.

honor as a sufficient recompense, and who might use his own influence and resources in the king's cause. A rumor of this reached Gascony and indicated the viscount of Thouars as likely to be chosen. Straightway the commune of Niort, deeply agitated, despatched to the king a violent denunciation of the viscount, concluding with the pious hope that God would avert any such appointment. The citizens entreat the king to send them as seneschal some noble, discreet, wise and powerful person from England (*aliquem virum nobilem, discretum et sapientem potentem de partibus angliae*). The cause of this outburst lay in the fact that the viscount and the commune had in the past been enemies and the citizens feared that he would use his powers as seneschal to repay his old grudges.⁵³ Their protest was successful in preventing the appointment, and, apparently, convinced the justiciar of the unwisdom of conferring the office on a Gascon. In England matters were now going a little better and Hubert was in a position to support an English representative. At the time of the king's coronation he had persuaded the English nobles to agree to a "free gift" of two shillings on every kind of land to assist the king in preserving his authority in Gascony. Backed by this support, he announced on September 16 the appointment of a new seneschal.⁵⁴ Hubert's choice had finally fallen upon Philip d'Ulecot, a man whom the government had already employed as sheriff of Northumberland.⁵⁵

The grant made by the Great Council had not, however, removed all the difficulties in the way of the government. The collection of the money would take time and the seneschal would need funds upon his first arrival in his province. Yet, when his appointment was announced, a sufficient sum was not yet at hand. Under these circumstances Hubert appealed once more to the towns. On the same day that he informed the Gascons of the choice of d'Ulecot he wrote

⁵³ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 126.

⁵⁴ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 249.

⁵⁵ See under the name in the index of the above volume.

to the mayor and commune of La Rochelle asking them to lend the new seneschal 500 marks. Fearing apparently that his request might not be complied with he addressed a second letter to the *probis hominibus* of Bordeaux asking them to advance the money if La Rochelle failed to do so. Hubert solemnly promised to repay the money within forty days after the receipt of letters from Philip certifying that it had been made.⁵⁶ Furthermore Hubert induced the mayor and "university of London" to write urging one or other of the cities to advance the money and offering themselves as pledges for its repayment.⁵⁷ With a new seneschal thus strengthened, the English government might hope for some improvement in the condition of their troubled continental dependency.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 266.

CHAPTER III

THE ATTACK OF LOUIS VIII, 1221-1227

Continued Anarchy in Gascony and Poitou. Accession of Louis VIII. He renews the war. Conquest of Poitou. Attitude of the towns. Concessions to the towns. Attack on Gascony. Bordeaux checks the French advance. Castles intrusted to the towns. Expedition of Richard of Cornwall. Recovery of Gascony. Failure in Poitou. Part played by the towns in the campaigns.

No opportunity was afforded the new seneschal of testing the loyal liberality of the towns. Appointed in September he died in the next month,¹ and a new choice was thus rendered necessary. Hubert in this instance selected Hugh de Vivona for the position and transferred to his name the letters previously mentioned in favor of d'Ulecot.²

The new seneschal did indeed live to reach Gascony but his rule was not of long duration. Appointed in January of 1221 he was superseded in October of that year by Savary de Mauléon, a Poitevin knight and troubadour, who remained in office till 1224. Both Hugh and Savary, however, faced substantially the same conditions that had confronted Neville. If some of the old quarrels had been composed, new ones had broken out.

Of new complications the chief was a violent dispute between the citizens of La Rochelle and the viscount of Thouars, the former

¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 157.

² *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 266.

enemy of Niort. This arose over an attempt of the viscount to fortify a castle near the city. The strengthening of this castle had been forbidden by the English, possibly because they distrusted the fidelity of one who had already once deserted them. Claiming to act under royal orders, the citizens attempted to prevent the viscount's action, whereupon he wrote them an insulting letter beginning—as they declared—*Omnibus rusticis agrestibus de Rupella, malam salutem*. In this he further declared—if we may trust their account of the matter—that he would fortify his castle in spite of them and of the king of England. If they objected he would not let them go outside their walls. Upon receiving this missive the citizens rose in wrath and tore down the castle. But they were no match for the viscount, who assembled his friends and allies and threatened to destroy the vineyards and property of the townspeople outside their walls. Unable to defend themselves, they were forced to make peace and promise to atone for their action by the payment of 500 marks.

With these circumstances they made haste to acquaint the king in two letters.³ In the second they enumerate several other expenses which they have had to meet for the king's service, among them 150 *sous* given to Savary de Mauléon and 3,027 pounds to his predecessor Geoffrey Neville. They are now bankrupt and cannot pay the viscount of Thouars the money promised, and they close by beseeching the royal aid.

Such a wail as this shows vividly the chaos that reigned in Poitou. We note, also, the powerlessness of the seneschal, who nowhere intervenes or is even consulted in the quarrel. We may conjecture that at least one reason for the failure of the English government to take vigorous action was the fear of driving the side against which they acted over to the French. Already one of the English envoys returning from the French court had informed the

³ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 185, 188.

nuncios of La Rochelle that he had heard it said that both the barons and the towns of Poitou would go over to the French king if that monarch desired it. Such rumors had sufficient verisimilitude to cause the mayor and burgesses of La Rochelle to write to Henry denying their truth and passionately protesting their loyalty.⁴ They cited as evidence the labors and sufferings they had undergone and were undergoing in his cause, as formerly in that of his father. They had seen their houses burned and their vineyards destroyed. Many of the villages without the city were weak and if the king would give them the prefecture over these it would rejoice the citizens and they could put them into better posture of defense against his enemies.

The citizens protested their loyalty; but how far could it be relied upon? They declare in their letter that many wealthy citizens have fallen into poverty through the dangers of war. Their property outside the walls of the town lay at the mercy of the Poitevin nobles; could the citizens fail to follow in their lead? It was here no mere question of keeping open good markets and profitable trade routes. Of what use were these when it rested with the viscount of Thouars and his like whether there should be any wine to sell? The English king could not restrain these lords even while they were his vassals in name. If, then, these lords deserted to the French and La Rochelle remained loyal to the English the new suzerain would have no motive for even trying to restrain his new vassals. Under such circumstances, would not La Rochelle be practically forced to cast in her lot with the side favored by the surrounding feudality? Time was soon to put this question and it received the answer which we might expect.

While La Rochelle was thus disputing with the viscount of Thouars the government's relations with the count of La Marche

⁴*Ibid.*, 194.

were becoming strained. The count had, indeed, concluded a peace with Henry and promised to restore the royal castles and other property which he had seized. The count in this case soon proved to be more ready to promise than to perform, and, probably at the instigation of the king, the pope ordered the dean of the cathedral chapter at Bordeaux to excommunicate the count if he did not fulfill his engagements within reasonable time. As nothing was done, the excommunication was ordered in June, and on November 9 Hubert instructed the dean and other ecclesiastics to carry out the sentence.⁵

In December of this year, 1222, Henry also instructed Savary de Mauléon to resume all crown lands and castles alienated without royal consent.⁶ This must have seemed to the seneschal a rather difficult matter. The king gave him some assistance by ordering the payment of arrears due the government by the towns, cities and castles which owed them. He further commanded his demesne men to receive Savary with respect and confidence⁷ and the men of Entre-deux-Mers were ordered to return to their lands and render their due service. The king also announced to the Gascons by letters patent that Savary was empowered to receive harborage for him.⁸ Armed with these mandates, and others soon to be mentioned, Savary seems to have been able to take some action, sufficient at least to embroil him with the count of La Marche. In August of 1223 the count complained to Henry of the seneschal's conduct in general but without going into details. "You should know," he writes, "that Lord Savary de Mauléon is working grave injury and most serious damage to us and our men without reasonable cause, and will not desist from his evil counsel, which thing unless it be for the sake of reverence and honor to you we cannot tolerate with equanimity. In

⁵ Gasquet, *Henry III and the Church*, 72.

⁶ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 202.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 201. These documents are also printed in the *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 355-356.

truth, if peace is to be made once more between you and us, you should in no wise suffer that he bring injury to us and ours, since we will recede from your service rather than suffer from him such evils and injuries without vengeance.”⁹

This, then, was the first fruit of Savary’s attempt to reassert the royal power in Poitou. The principal seigneurs of that region were opposed to any strong central government and sought to prevent it by balancing the French against the English. As to the towns, we may suspect that they were already looking toward France. The main lines in their commerce, doubtless, ran in that direction,¹⁰ and they may well have despaired of the English power ever introducing order among the turbulent nobility.

But Gascony as well as Poitou presented difficult problems for the seneschal. There the towns, not being checked by such great seigneurs as those of the north, were far more important. Encouraged by the weakness of the government they now began to conduct themselves like independent republics. By the close of the year 1222 Bordeaux had quarrelled with the seneschal, formed a confederation with other towns and lords, sheltered men guilty of taking and burning royal castles, and attempted to levy a tallage on the people of the district of Entre-deux-Mers.

Such a state of things could not be overlooked or the royal authority might as well cease to exist. The dispute with the seneschal Henry settled by arbitration. He discussed the matter with the seneschal and with representatives of the townspeople, and issued letters patent, on December 4, dealing with the question at issue. In these he commanded the seneschal to protect, defend and aid the citizens, while they were to render the customs and service due under the reign of John. He despatched to them Geoffrey Neville to exact these dues and services from them, and at the same time re-

⁹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 208.

¹⁰ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 407.

quired the citizens to add to their communal oath the clause *Salva fide nobis debita et salvo jure nostro*.¹¹

At the same time that he thus attempted to deal with the dispute between the seneschal and the citizens he issued letters patent concerning the other proceedings of the townspeople. He forbade their forming confederacies or harboring the malefactors who had destroyed his castle, and prohibited the tallage.¹²

In a fourth letter written on the same day the king adjusted another dispute, namely, that concerning Chitre. This man had been a seneschal under Richard.¹³ That king and his mother Eleanor had bestowed on him the *terra* of Beggles for life. We have seen that Elias Viger in the time of John had secured possession of this estate, representing Chitre as dead. Chitre would appear to have regained possession of the property; for he now complains that the citizens have deprived him of the estate and have destroyed his castle and pulled up his vineyards. The king in this instance commands them to make immediate restitution and to permit Chitre to enjoy the property in peace.

These measures would certainly seem a severe rebuke for the citizens of Bordeaux. There is, however, no evidence that they resented them or offered any serious opposition. We may conjecture that perhaps the seneschal had means of controlling the commune through the mayor. It is at least suggestive of this that Peter Viger, who was mayor before Savary's arrival, was succeeded by Amaubin d'Alhan who continued in office as long as Savary remained seneschal, and that when Savary departed Peter Viger again became mayor.

¹¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 196. *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 353.

¹² *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 354, for all these letters. They are also printed in Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 196 f. We may note in passing that Bordeaux had concluded a treaty with La Reole during the time that Peter Viger was mayor: O'Reilly, *Histoire de Bordeaux*, I, 363.

¹³ See under Chicre in the index to the *Pat. Rolls*.

Two other measures affecting the townspeople were likewise taken at this time. There had been dissension in La Réole and certain of the citizens had been expelled. The king by letters patent ordered that they be peacefully restored by the seneschal, and the dispute composed, and to this end Geoffrey Neville was called upon to give his counsel and assistance. A new port was also ordered to be established at La Rochelle and the money raised by a harbor due.¹⁴

Before Savary's attempts at restoring order had had time to do much beyond irritate those like the count of La Marche who had profited by the disorders, the danger from France, always hovering in the background, became suddenly threatening. On July 14, 1223, Philip Augustus died, and Louis VIII succeeded him upon the throne. The change of sovereigns might well be taken as presaging a change of policy. In the latter part of his reign Philip's policy had been distinctly pacific. The new king had already shown himself inclined to an aggressive course, and, almost as soon as he had succeeded to the throne, the expiration of the truce with England gave him an ample pretext to attempt the completion of his father's conquests.

It was soon clear that when the truce expired in May of 1224, France would renew the war. Even when this was certain the English were unable to make any serious preparation for defense, as all the energy of the government was for the time required to put down the revolt of Faukes de Bréauté in England. While England was thus rendered helpless by her internal difficulties the situation on the continent was highly favorable to the French. The pope, who before had so strongly upheld the English, needed French aid in Languedoc, and hence could no longer support the wavering fortunes of the Plantagenets by spiritual thunders. The count of La Marche, dissatisfied because Henry would not give him Niort and recall Savary, was already won. Other barons, such as the viscounts of

¹⁴ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 204, 205. *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 356, 357.

Thouars and Chastellerault, were ready to sell themselves to the highest bidder, who in this case was Louis.¹⁵ Even the towns were soon to show that their loyalty was uncertain. Where their commercial interests were not directly involved in the English connection they would seem to have had little motive for loyalty to Henry. Commercially the towns of Poitou would seem to belong rather with France than England. Niort and St. Jean-d'Angély may well have preferred a master who could curb the neighboring lords to keeping open the—for them—distant markets of England. La Rochelle did indeed have a commerce with England, and she may have found herself divided between the interests there involved and her fear of the viscount of Thouars and of the count of La Marche. La Réole, Bazas, St. Émilion may also have been divided between those interested in English trade and those having no such interests. Certainly the French king could hardly expect a more favorable opportunity. Both he and his father had always treated John's forfeiture as complete, and hostilities had been merely suspended by a truce. He now simply renewed the war.¹⁶

Hubert was unable for the time to send any serious help. Nevertheless, he did what he could. He placed in Savary's hands what funds the king then had in Gascony¹⁷ and appealed to the towns for further assistance. On June 26, he issued letters patent authorizing Savary to contract a loan of 1,000 marks for the defense of Poitou and promising to repay the money in England.¹⁸ And, on the same day, a similar letter was issued authorizing the citizens of Bordeaux to borrow 500 marks for fortifying their town and promising that the king would repay it to whoever would advance it.¹⁹

¹⁵ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III^e, 285.

¹⁶ Tout, in Hunt and Poole, *Political History of England*, III, 31.

¹⁷ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 447.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Whatever sums the seneschal succeeded in getting through these letters, Louis had more. If we are to trust one account cited by Luchaire, the French king marched upon Poitou with the count of La Marche and "many jewel boxes and many barrels full of coins did he take with him in order to better terminate the war."²⁰ Numerous chatelains and barons were brought and Louis besieged Savary in Niort. The defense of this place was brief. Savary yielded on honorable terms. He and his men were to be free but he pledged himself not to fight against the French before All Saints except at La Rochelle. To this stronghold he at once repaired. Niort taken, St. Jean-d'Angély yielded without a blow. The viscount of Thouars made a truce with the French king, and a force which was despatched across the Garonne received the submission of St. Émilion and La Réole; but finding Bordeaux loyal did not venture to attack that city. In the north the English had now but one stronghold, La Rochelle, and this Louis besieged on July 15.²¹

So far the main reliance of the seneschal had been on the towns. It was to them that he must look for money at any rate. The nobles had given him apparently very little aid. In the defense of La Rochelle he was supported vigorously by Bayonne, which equipped for his service a fleet of galleys and sent with them a detachment of 400 men.²² The interest of the citizens of Bayonne in the defense is easily understood when we recall that they were engaged in the carrying trade along the coast from their own town to Bordeaux and La Rochelle. This trade might be compromised if that city passed into French hands. Bordeaux remained, apparently, an indifferent spectator to the siege. We may conjecture that she was not disposed to view with great dismay a French victory that would leave her the undisputed center of Anglo-French commerce.

²⁰ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III^e, 286.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 269.

With such resources as the seneschal possessed, we might expect the siege to be a long one. Nevertheless, on August 3, the city yielded to the French. The mayor and commune of Bayonne in a letter informing the king of this disaster distinctly intimate that treason was at the bottom of the surrender.²³ Wendover, the chronicler, affirms that it was the citizens, corrupted by the gold of Louis, that surrendered the city;²⁴ and Matthew Paris, quoting this passage from Wendover, exclaims indignantly at the innate perfidy of the Poitevins, adding that only one burgher remained faithful to Henry and he was hanged by his fellow citizens.²⁵ Whether or not these suspicious were wholly just, we can scarcely avoid feeling that there must have been some tendency to go over to the French. We have seen how much at the mercy of the viscount of Thouars the citizens were, and as he was now in league with Louis, it would not be a matter for surprise if they did not offer a very desperate resistance.

After the fall of La Rochelle there soon followed another disaster. Savary de Mauléon, feeling that the English cause was hopeless, deserted to the French. By this defection, which took place in August of 1224, the English government ceased to have a representative on the continent capable of directing affairs, and this at a moment when the fall of La Rochelle gave Louis possession of Poitou and left Gascony open to attack.

With no seneschal there could be no common or concerted resistance, and under such circumstances the towns were of absolutely vital importance. If they yielded to the French it were hard to see how any fragment of English authority could have been preserved. Even while Savary had directed affairs they had been his chief resource. That the English government appreciated their significance

²³ *Ibid.* Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III¹, 286.

²⁴ *Chronica*, II, 277.

²⁵ *Chronica Majora*, III, 84.

is evident from its policy from the very beginning of the war. As John sought to repel the invasion of Alfonso by favors to the towns, so now Hubert strove to rally them to his support by favors and at the same time to strengthen them against the French attacks.

At the beginning of the war he attempted to injure the French by destroying their commerce with England. With this in view he ordered the seizure of all French vessels in English ports and the detention of all vessels bound for the continent. Yet he was careful that these measures did not injure the citizens of Bayonne and Bordeaux, since he released numerous ships from these cities which, under his previous orders, had been detained in port.²⁶ To individual citizens in both Dax and Bayonne he granted favors, making gifts to certain ones, possibly envoys, to pay their expenses to England.²⁷ He further extended to two merchants of Dax permission to bring their wine and other merchandise to England during two years.²⁸ Large quantities of wine were purchased of the Gascon merchants on credit. Was this wine wholly intended for present use or was this in some cases a settlement of old claims? The documents furnish us with no grounds for answer. In any case a number of merchants received payment for varying quantities of wine. At Bordeaux there were more than twenty such payments during the year.²⁹ Among these merchants figure a John de Solers and several Coloms. Vigorous measures were also taken to put the towns in a posture of defense by improving their fortifications. To the mayor and prud' hommes of Bayonne Hubert conceded certain revenues during four years, the money to be used in strengthening the town.³⁰ At Bordeaux, also, he authorized the citizens to contract a loan of

²⁶ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 620, 611 b, 646 b; *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 498.

²⁷ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 626; II, 7, 21, 12.

²⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 498.

²⁹ *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 585, 610 b, 639, 623 b, 645, etc.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 619; *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 467.

500 marks for strengthening their walls.³¹ Whether the loan was made or not, the citizens of that town acted with energy. They repaired the walls, pulling down houses where necessary, and in other ways prepared themselves to resist an attack. Their preparations seem to have exceeded any aid they had received from the king, for during the siege of La Rochelle the mayor and common council wrote to Hubert telling him that Niort and St. Jean-d'Angély had surrendered needlessly to the French. They recited the measures of defense which they had undertaken and the great expense incurred, and significantly remarked that they trusted Hubert would assist their envoys in the business which they were bringing before the royal curia.³² What the business was we are not informed; but it is at least suggestive that on August 2, Henry despatched letters patent to Savary, who had not yet deserted, together with all his bailiffs, and other officers, in which he declared that because of the great expense incurred by his faithful citizens of Bordeaux he concedes to them for four years all royal revenues in their city.³³ This grant was indeed cancelled; but the succeeding entries make it clear that it was replaced by a direct payment of money. For, on August 25, the king ordered his treasurer to pay to two nuncios of Bordeaux 500 marks to aid the citizens and in November he gave to Bernard d'Acra and his associates, apparently the nuncios of the commune, 2,000 marks to be used by the Bordelais in strengthening their defenses.³⁴

But while thus bestowing favors on individuals and putting the

³¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 447.

³² Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 231.

³³ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 458.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 497; *Rot. litt. claus.*, II. 5 b. D'Acra, who had already been twice mayor of Bordeaux, seems to have used his stay in England for his own advantage, for, on the same day that the 2,000 marks were ordered paid over to him, letters patent were issued giving him the right to carry on trade with England for two years. *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 496.

towns in a position of defense, Hubert also granted more general concessions. On November 14, by letters patent, the mayor and bailiffs of Bordeaux were ordered to protect and defend the citizens and merchants of Dax who might come to those parts with merchandise, to receive them well and to permit no infraction of the liberties they held from Richard and John.³⁵ Earlier in the year—on July 10—the king, at the petition of the citizens of Bordeaux, conceded to them a commune and an elective mayor, merely commanding the election of a mayor loyal to himself.³⁶ Now Bordeaux had long had a commune, but before this time had the mayor been elective? It would seem difficult or impossible to answer such a question with certainty. If the mayor was already elective, this privilege was merely a confirmation of existing conditions; yet that such a confirmation was valuable to the members of the commune would be indicated by the fact of their petition. Yet the right to choose a mayor may have been a new concession. We have seen that during most of the administration of Savary de Mauléon but one person held this office, Amaubin d'Alhan. This might suggest that the mayor was appointive, or else that Savary was interfering with his free election—in either case a sufficient reason for a royal grant. Possibly the mayor had been appointed by the seneschal up to the anarchy following the death of John. With the collapse of the English power in the opening of Henry's reign, we may well imagine that the townspeople began to elect their mayors. In that case Savary may have restored the old method and the townspeople regretted their recently-tasted freedom. If so, now was surely an opportune time to secure the privilege. At any rate the change, if change there was, made little difference with the character of the mayors, since we find Peter Viger, who had preceded d'Alhan in office, now elected to succeed him. Whatever the exact meaning of the concession, it

³⁵ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 498.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 449.

was, if we may trust the language of the document, a real concession, that is, something desired and asked for by the commune.

Such a series of concessions as we have now enumerated can only have been intended to rally and consolidate a pro-English party on the continent. Evidently the English government regarded the towns as most important to its hold on Gascony. Especially was this true of Bordeaux, the largest and most important of the southern towns. The test of this policy was now to come, for Louis, having conquered Poitou, turned on Gascony.

Remaining at Poitiers himself, the French king sent his army and the count of La Marche to the conquest of the south.³⁷ There was no English force to oppose them and no seneschal to direct a resistance. The nobles were probably indifferent, friendly or frightened; some of the towns yielded without a blow. In a short time St. Émilion, St. Macaire, Langon, La Réole and Bazas were in the hands of the French. It seemed for a moment that Gascony might be won as easily as Poitou, but the hopes of such an easy victory were speedily shattered by the resistance of Bordeaux. Commanding as it did the commerce of the Garonne its position as well as its wealth and population made it essential to a permanent occupation of the south, and Bordeaux soon showed herself stubbornly loyal to the English cause. Had Louis advanced with his whole force he might, perhaps, have won;³⁸ but various causes prevented such energetic action. Summer was advanced, the pope was protesting, and the French king decided to suspend the campaign for the winter. That it would be renewed, however, there seemed little doubt.³⁹

Having returned to Paris, in September, Louis was welcomed as a conqueror and made haste to secure his hold upon his new pos-

³⁷ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III¹, 287; Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 236.

³⁸ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 410.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

sessions. Realizing, doubtless, the instability of his position on the Garonne, he sought to counterbalance the resistance of Bordeaux. To La Réole and St. Émilion he granted exemption from all customs in Poitou,⁴⁰ hoping doubtless to compensate them for the loss of their river commerce.⁴¹

With matters in such shape Henry could not afford to relax his grip on any part of Gascony. It was essential that the castles be put in loyal hands and the townspeople seemed more trustworthy than the barons. On November 14, by letters patent, he placed the castles of Dax, La Fave and Farina, with the adjacent territory, under the control of the citizens of Dax, Bayonne and Bordeaux.⁴² Such action is especially noteworthy when we remember that in Poitou many chatelains had sold their castles to Louis.⁴³

Such was the posture of affairs at the close of 1224. Matters were serious indeed, but not yet desperate. Soon after, September 21, Hugh de Vivona wrote to the king to set forth the situation. He states the successes of the French king and the towns that have yielded to him; but he adds that the citizens of St. Émilion and La Réole have refused to allow any French soldiers within their walls. Nothing has been lost, he declares, that may not be easily recovered if the king will but send aid and that at once.⁴⁴

Such optimistic reports found the English government in a position to take more active measures. Faukes de Bréauté had at last been crushed and Hubert could turn his attention to the continent. He would seem to have felt little enthusiasm for the war, still he

⁴⁰ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III^e, 287.

⁴¹ Bordeaux would appear to have closed the river against all commerce, for the first part of 1225 is marked by three letters patent giving merchants license to trade there and forbidding the Bordelais to interfere with them. No such licenses have occurred before and at this time they would seem suggestive.

⁴² *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 497.

⁴³ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III^e, 287.

⁴⁴ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 236.

could not allow the king in whose name he governed to be despoiled without an effort. At a meeting of the Great Council he was given a fifteenth of rents and chattels expressly for the recovery of Poitou.⁴⁵ It has been computed that these grants brought in, in the end, about 57,000 pounds. Thus for the first time since Henry's accession the English authorities on the continent would have money. Nor were alliances, whatever they might turn out to be worth, wanting. Though the pope had so signally aided him, Henry's advisers felt no scruple at promising secret aid to the excommunicated count of Toulouse.⁴⁶ Peter Mauclerc of Brittany was also enlisted as an ally and the sailors of Gascony and the Cinque Ports were let loose.⁴⁷

The expedition with its way thus prepared was placed in charge of Richard, earl of Cornwall and younger brother of the king. As Richard was but sixteen years of age, veteran advisers accompanied him and held the real command. The force despatched from England was indeed small, but reinforcements would be easy to find if there were funds to pay them.

In May, 1225, Richard landed at Bordeaux with a small force.⁴⁸ He was greeted by all the citizens, in the presence of the archbishop, and letters from his royal brother were read in which the king humbly supplicated—*humiliter supplicavit*⁴⁹—all his faithful subjects of those parts to give Richard an amiable reception and to lend him aid and counsel in recovering his territories. This royal appeal did not fall upon deaf ears. In April Peter Viger had been succeeded as mayor by Amaneus Colom. Apparently, then, the wine merchants controlled the commune. Richard could, indeed, look forward to supplies of money from England; still they would seem hardly to have been sufficient for his need. The towns of Bordeaux and Bay-

⁴⁵ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 410.

⁴⁶ Luchaire, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III^e, 288.

⁴⁷ Davis, *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Luchaire, *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Wendover, *Chronica*, II, 283.

onne—either at this time or a little later—came to his assistance and voted him a *mala tolta* or special tax,⁵⁰ and Peter de Bosco, a citizen of Bordeaux, advanced him money for the purchase of horses.⁵¹

In the early part of August Richard received from England a shipment of treasure, which comprised 6,000 marks of silver, besides gold, jewels and other precious objects.⁵² With this support and the revenues from the *mala tolta* the English cause rapidly gained ground. The French hold upon the Gascon towns seems never to have been strong. We have seen them refusing to admit French soldiers. The French power, therefore, rested merely on the presence of their army and their garrisons in various castles such as that of La Réole. Apparently considering it necessary to their position, the French again attempted to gain Bordeaux, and this time by winning the archbishop. They offered to endow him and his successors with "competent revenues" if he would change sides, but he refused and reported their offers to the king. To avenge themselves they seized some of his revenues at La Rochelle and refused to allow him to enter the territory they held.⁵³

Richard and his forces moved against the various towns and castles of Gascony that had been taken. The castle of La Réole was captured after a long siege; the towns of Bazas and St. Macaire yielded; Bergerac was blockaded and its lord recalled to his fidelity; Hugh of Lusignan was defeated in an attempt to raise the siege of La Réole.⁵⁴ Little by little all Gascony returned to English rule.

Gascony had been saved by the close of 1225; but the English did not yet acquiesce in the loss of Poitou. Richard still continued

⁵⁰ Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 287; *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 150. The tax in question was one on commercial transactions; see Langlois, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III², 253.

⁵¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 1216-1225, 543.

⁵² Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 261, 262.

⁵³ Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 278.

⁵⁴ Wendover, *Chronica*, II, 284; *Lettres de rois*, I, 35.

war, and his treasure being exhausted he was forced to rely more or less on the Bordeaux wine merchants. On February 5, King Henry paid 32 pounds, 10 shillings to William Raymond (perhaps W. R. Colom) of Bordeaux, which he had advanced for the royal use.⁵⁵ In the same month he paid 500 marks to William Raymond Colom and his brother Rustengo and 200 marks to Amaneus Colom, which sums had been lent to Richard. In May he paid Amaneus Colom and William Bernard 200 pounds which they had advanced to his brother.⁵⁶ In June he announced that the money—amount not specified—which Amaneus Colom, William Raymond Colom and Bernard d'Acra had advanced to William Lungspe would be repaid them.⁵⁷ Finally, in December, he wrote to Amaneus and W. R. Colom asking them to lend 1,000 pounds to his brother.⁵⁸ Such loans may have had great importance to the English cause, though how great we can scarcely estimate.

Louis, involved in a renewal of the Albigensian crusade, had so far offered no very energetic resistance to the English. The pope also came to Henry's aid and gave him what support he was able. In January he issued a mandate to a number of the Poitevin lords, among them the count of La Marche and the viscount of Thouars, commanding them to return at once to their allegiance to the English king, notwithstanding any oaths they may have taken to the contrary, and giving orders that if they do not obey they are to be compelled thereto by papal sentence. Moreover, he exhorted the archbishop of Dublin to obtain a subsidy for the king from the churches of Ireland.⁵⁹ In June, he commanded Louis to recall his letters of banishment against the archbishop of Bordeaux.

⁵⁵ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 13; *Rot. litt. claus.*, II, 94 b.

⁵⁶ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 21.

⁵⁷ *Rot. litt. claus.*, II, 122 b.

⁵⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 95.

⁵⁹ *Papal Letters*, I, 104, 105.

This support may have been worth much to the English, although the Poitevin lords, such as the count of La Marche, had never shown any great fear of papal mandates. Of far more service to their cause, however, was the death of the energetic Louis in October, 1226, which left an infant king under the regency of a woman. True, the woman in question was Blanche of Castile, but her ability and resolution had yet to be revealed, and her accession was followed by an outbreak of turbulence on the part of the French nobles, jealous of the growing power of the crown.

Under these circumstances Richard made some headway. By the grant of Niort the count of La Marche was won over,⁶⁰ and a similar policy won other lords as well.⁶¹ The regency of Blanche of Castile was viewed with much dissatisfaction by the feudal lords. Among those thus discontented Richard soon found allies. Yet the advantage to the English was slight. Blanche acted with vigor⁶² and the combination fell to pieces as its members were intent only in pursuing their individual interest. Richard, deserted by his treacherous Poitevins, concluded a truce with the French and returned to England in May, 1227.⁶³

Henry, who had just declared himself of age to govern, might well think it prudent to reward those men in Gascony to whom he owed, to some extent, the preservation of a remnant of his continental empire. In June he granted letters of protection of indefinite duration to Raymond and Arnold de Port of La Réole, nephews of Bernard d'Acra.⁶⁴ Very possibly they had been leaders in the English faction in that town, or perhaps it was merely the influence of their uncle in Bordeaux which secured them the favor. On October

⁶⁰ Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 288; Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 301.

⁶¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 302.

⁶² Langlois, in Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III², 7.

⁶³ Wendover, *Chronica*, II, 320. The truce was signed July 17. Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 294.

⁶⁴ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 128.

1, Henry conferred on Rustengo de Solers for his homage and service the lands which Chitre had in La Foreste, Les Cumes, and Corbyac. This Chitre, it will be remembered, had been given the estate of Beggles for life by Richard and the Bordelais had got into trouble by seizing it. These other lands were now conferred on Rustengo—not for life, but in perpetuity—and in return therefor he was to render annually to the king a sore-hawk.⁶⁵ Rustengo also called attention to the debt for the wine which John had seized and for which the king had promised payment at the beginning of his reign. The government, impoverished as it had hitherto been, had seemingly not yet discharged this debt, and it now compounded with Rustengo for 60 marks to be paid in three installments.⁶⁶

When Richard returned to England the acute crisis in the fate of Gascony was passed. The truce with France had marked the abandonment, for the time being, of the attempt to expel the Plantagenets. For the present, at least, they were to retain their diminished territories on the continent. The war, however, had not been without its results. The greater part of Poitou remained in French hands, but Gascony they had failed to conquer. From the accession of John till 1225 the English power had steadily declined. Bit by bit their territories had been seized by the rising French monarchy. Now, however, the most serious effort of the French to drive them wholly from the continent had failed, though made under the most favorable conditions, and one considerable province still remained in their hands. The reason for the French failure we have already seen. It was Bordeaux that checked the French advance. The towns had aided the English to recover their lost ground and drive the French from Gascony. They formed, we may conclude, the basis of the English power. But for the towns it would seem that Gascony would have fallen either to Alfonso or to Louis. The reason for

⁶⁵ *Charter Rolls*, I, 61.

⁶⁶ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 146.

this loyalty we have already seen in part. At Bordeaux the commune was apparently controlled by a group of merchants trading with England, and hence anxious to maintain the connection of the Gascon duchy and the English crown. Bayonne, with the carrying trade of the coast in her hands and extensive interests in the trade between Bordeaux and England, worked for the same end. No doubt the favors they received were instrumental in promoting their devotion, but they were not wholly responsible for creating it. Back of privileges and favors there lay the permanent force of economic interest binding the Gascon communes to the English cause. Where such interests did not exist for the king to build upon, favors and concessions were of little permanent use. Such seems to have been, in large part, the case in Poitou. There, moreover, the towns were overshadowed to some extent by the turbulent nobility. The towns could not, therefore, in this region, form a solid basis for English rule as they had done in Gascony, and this basis being lacking, alliances with the shifty and treacherous feudal lords were but a sorry substitute and could not give the English king a durable supremacy.

CHAPTER IV

GASCONY IN 1227-1230 AND HENRY'S FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST POITOU

Administration of Henry de Trumbleville. His relations with the nobles and the towns. Parties in the towns, their origin and character. Expedition of Henry against Poitou, in 1230. Support given by the towns, military and financial.

THE war with France closed, the English government had to face the same problem that had confronted it before the attack of Louis VIII, namely, to construct a central government in Gascony which could maintain order in the midst of the many elements of discord which that province contained. One advantage the southern region had over Poitou, there were few such great feudal princes as the count of La Marche and viscount of Thouars. Only one such seigneur was to be found, namely, the viscount of Béarn. The place of the great seigneurs in the south was taken by many lesser barons and by the powerful communes. Yet these were sufficiently difficult of control.

After Richard's return to England, Henry—or Hubert who still governed in his name—appointed a certain Henry de Trumbleville as seneschal. In order to increase his revenues, the king, on October 22, requested the towns of Bayonne and Bordeaux to continue for two years the *mala tolta* in wine which they had granted to Richard, promising that he would then renounce all right to it both for himself and his successors.¹ Trumbleville, armed with this concession, was

¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 150.

in a position to take up with better hopes of success the old problems that had baffled Geoffrey Neville and Savary de Mauléon. The loss of Poitou was in itself an assistance. Rid of entanglements in the north he could devote all his energy to Gascony, where indeed he found enough to occupy him.

At the very beginning of his administration two general parties seemed to define themselves in the province; on the one side stood the townspeople and on the other the various feudal lords. The reasons for the opposition of two such elements are surely not far to seek. The seigneurs might derive advantage from innumerable practices and conditions to which the burghers—at least a large number of them—were opposed. Opportunities of friction would be almost innumerable. There was not a toll or a due exacted by a baron which might not arouse the anger and resentment of one or another of the towns. But the chaos struck yet deeper; for several of the towns were torn by bitter factional disputes. Evidently the task of maintaining order would be no light one for the seneschal.

Trumbleville had scarcely arrived in his province when he found himself involved in the disputes which disturbed the country. In as much as, at a later time, the nobles took occasion to laud him as an ideal seneschal we may surmise that he deemed it wise to side with them to a considerable degree. It was perhaps a result of this tendency toward an aristocratic alliance, manifest at the very beginning of his administration, which involved him in trouble with the towns. Bayonne, whose relations with the neighboring seigneurs were not of the friendliest, refused at the start to render him the customary oath.² He appealed to the king, asking him to force the unruly citizens to adopt a more loyal attitude, and besought Rustengo de Soler, who had been appointed custodian of Bayonne, for aid in his difficulties. The citizens had engaged in a bitter private war

² Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 317.

with some of the surrounding lords. They were now devastating the lands of their foes and seizing their men, and both Rustengo and the seneschal found themselves powerless to protect the nobles, who in vain appealed to them, protesting their entire willingness to do full justice to the burghers. The Bayonnese proved utterly refractory and resisted all attempts of Trubleville and his ally to restrain them. In despair the seneschal and the custodian besought the king to detain all Bayonnese ships in English ports as a means of coercing the turbulent citizens.³

Whether or not the king complied with this request we are not informed; but the seneschal was apparently aided by disturbances in the town itself. Bayonne had hitherto seemed to act as a unit against the nobles; but the burghers were in reality divided into two parties whose mutual hostility now displayed itself in riots. The leaders of these factions were John Dardir and Michael de Mans. According to the provisions of the *Établissements de Rouen*, extended to Bayonne by John, the mayor was named by the king from a list of three candidates presented to him by the commune. In the spring of 1228 the commune made the usual nominations, and, on April 4, the king authorized Trubleville to make choice in his place.⁴ Concerning the party affiliations of the three candidates there is nothing to be found. One of them may have been affiliated with the Mans party or one may have made terms with Trubleville in return for the appointment. It is not impossible that the seneschal ignored the list altogether and named a mayor independently, as later seneschals were to do.⁵ Whatever the means employed, it would seem from what followed that the control of the commune passed to the Mans faction, which seems to have been favored by the seneschal.

³ *Ibid.*, 319.

⁴ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 98.

⁵ Nicholas de Molis thus appointed Peter Rosset (Pierre Darroseis) and William de Boell named J. Dardir. Balasque, *Études*, II, 99.

Whether or not these conjectures be accurate, it is at least certain that the two parties soon came to blows and that the Dardir faction, instead of acting through the commune, as doubtless they would have done had they been in control of that body, formed a confraternity and expelled from the city a number of the leaders of the rival party, among them Michael de Mans and his sons. In dealing with this situation Trubleville sought the royal sanction and support. Declaring that if such an organization as the confraternity were permitted the royal authority would be at an end, he applied to the bishop of Chichester to persuade the king not only to forbid the confraternity but to request the church authorities to excommunicate its members.⁶ Whether or not the church took action the king, at any rate, replied to Trubleville's letter by letters patent dissolving the confraternity and commanding the mayor, jurats and commune of Bayonne to reinstate the banished citizens.⁷

Not only was Trubleville drawn into factional disputes at Bayonne but he was likewise involved in similar strife at Bordeaux. There as at Bayonne two parties contended for the mastery. One of these was led by the powerful Soler family and bore their name, the other by the not less powerful and wealthy Coloms and hence styled the Colombines. At Trubleville's arrival the Colombines were in power, with Amaneus Colom as mayor. In 1228 he was succeeded by Alexander de Cambis, a member of the Soler faction. The seneschal seems to have allied himself with the Solers, perhaps he had a hand in their elevation to power. At any rate, he was soon involved in a struggle with their rivals. Amaneus Colom owed money to Savary de Mauléon. The king, possibly at the suggestion of Trubleville, seized such of the wine of Amaneus as he could find in London and Southampton.⁸ Terms were finally arranged by

⁶ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 327.

⁷ *Patent Rolls*, 1225-1232, 192; also Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 330.

⁸ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 136.

William Raymond Colom for the discharge of the debt.⁹ The dispute began in May, and apparently with an attempt of Trubleville's to collect the debt in Gascony.¹⁰ This can hardly have increased the friendship of the Colombines for the seneschal. At any rate, the close of the year saw an outbreak of actual violence in Bordeaux. Unfortunately we know little of the trouble beyond the fact of its occurrence and who were the victors. Probably the Colombines revolted against the seneschal, allied as he was with the Solers. Order was, however, restored and in a letter patent dated February 13, 1229, the king formally expresses his gratitude to those who supported the seneschal in the late disturbance in the city and assisted him to restore order.¹¹ He names in this connection Arnulf de La Lande, Arnulf Lamberti, Peter Lamberti, Raymond Brun, Rustengo de Soler, Bernard d' Acra, William Rustani, Ruffatus Beger, Amaneus Daylans, Raymond Cristian, Raymond de Muneer, Raymond de Cambus.¹² These men and their friends, whether knights or citizens, the king thanks, extends to them his protection, and promises that he will impose no fines on the participants in the late disturbances except with their advice. Herein the dominant party would seem to be shielding their rivals. Possibly the enmity was not yet deep or bitter between the two, perhaps the Soler faction feared that too great severity would produce a reaction in favor of a party that was, doubtless, still powerful. Be that as it may, the Soler party with Trubleville's help became dominant in the commune. The mayor for 1229 is William Rustengo and for 1230 Raymond Monader, one of the citizens thanked by the king. The next year we find Amfrac Lambert in office, very possibly a relative of the Lamberts mentioned

⁹ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 240; also Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 344.

¹² I have reproduced the spelling of the family names as it is in the royal letter. As will be seen it differs in some cases from that which I have adopted.

in the king's letter, or even, perhaps, the same as the Arnulf Lambert therein mentioned.

Thus the two chief towns of Gascony were torn by party strife in which the seneschal was forced to intervene. These party divisions were not temporary accidents but were destined to endure for many years. What, then, was their real nature? Such a question is complex and difficult to answer with certainty. Various conjectures have been advanced. Balasque, whose opinion in all matters concerning Bayonne is entitled to great weight, thinks that in both Bayonne and Bordeaux the strife was between an aristocratic anti-English party and a democratic pro-English party. Giry follows his opinion regarding the Bayonnense factions,¹³ and Bémont takes the same view as to Bayonne but thinks that at Bordeaux the struggles were between groups of equally wealthy and aristocratic burghers.¹⁴

These conclusions seem somewhat dubious, at least, in their application to the period here under discussion. One of the parties does appear as more antagonistic to the feudal nobility than the other but they have equally rich and prominent leaders, drawn in both cases from the municipal aristocracy. So far as leadership goes, neither can be called democratic nor can one be said to be more popular than the other. Balasque, even while calling the parties in Bayonne democratic and aristocratic expressly points out that the leaders of both belong to the "*haute bourgeoisie*" and are descended

¹³ "La conséquence la plus claire de l'introduction à Bayonne des Établissements fut de contribuer à y établir une aristocratie bourgeoise et marchande, d'y développer l'antagonisme des classes et d'y favoriser les dissensions. Le parti aristocratique fut constitué par les propriétaires, les commerçants et surtout les marchands de vins; le parti populaire se composa des gens de mer, des calfats, des charpentiers, des cordiers, des tanneurs et de tous les membres des diverses corporations d'artisans. Ce fut là le parti royaliste anglais. Volontiers, les gros bourgeois firent cause commune avec les barons de Gascogne et prirent parti pour eux dans les guerres suscitées par leur mécontentement." Giry, *Étab. de Rouen*, I, 109.

¹⁴ See his introduction to the *Rôles Gascons*.

from the most ancient and powerful families in the city.¹⁵ We have already had ample evidence that in Bordeaux the Coloms were fully as rich and prominent as the Solers.¹⁶ Nor can there be found any indication that either party had anything in the nature of a popular program. Hence, although it may be true that the one had in some cases a larger popular following than the other yet we can scarcely call them aristocratic and democratic, in the modern sense of these terms.

The question, then, would seem to be not why one faction had a more popular following than the other but rather why the communal aristocracy should be so divided. Certain facts would suggest that the division corresponded to some extent to diverging lines of commercial interest. At Bayonne, for example, there existed a very considerable Spanish trade as well as that which went north toward Bordeaux and England. Of the leaders of the two factions at Bayonne Dardir headed that which Balasque considers the pro-English party, and Michael de Mans the anti-English party. It is surely suggestive to find that Michael had extensive interests in Spain and ended his days at San Sebastian.¹⁷ In Bordeaux, also, we shall see that while scarcely any of the persons figuring in the Soler party can be identified with the English trade, scarcely any of the prominent Colombines cannot be so identified.¹⁸ Rustengo de Soler was, as we have seen, engaged in this commerce in the reign of John, but after that time no further reference is made to him in that connection. Moreover, the first act of the Soler party when installed in power at Bordeaux after the riot, is suggestive of another line of interests. Trubleville, like his predecessors, found his revenues insufficient. Under these circumstances, he suggested to the king

¹⁵ *Études*, II, 97.

¹⁶ See their loans to Richard of Cornwall noticed in the preceding chapter.

¹⁷ Balasque, *Études*, II, 166-7.

¹⁸ For a discussion of this point see chapter viii.

the advisability of increasing the resources of the treasury by doubling the duty on wine collected at Sandwich.¹⁹ This had formerly been two *denarii* to the *dolium* and would thus become four. Such a suggestion was not remarkable from the seneschal, but it is surely significant to find his proposal endorsed by two members of the Soler party, Bernard d' Acra and Boniface Viger. Certainly men deeply interested in the wine trade would be little likely to look with favor upon such a proposition.

These facts would seem to point to a difference in economic interest behind the party divisions in the Gascon towns. In such case we should have, on the one hand, a group of wealthy merchants chiefly concerned in the English wine trade, with such supporters as they could rally to their side, and, on the other, those wealthy burghers who were less interested in the trade with England than in other lines of business. Such an initial difference would lead to many others. A merchant in Bayonne whose business lay with Spain would naturally take a different attitude toward many matters of policy from that of his neighbor who looked to England for his market.

Another fact in favor of such an interpretation of the party divisions is found in the close affiliation of the corresponding factions in different towns. Thus, in 1254, Peter Calhau, one of the popular leaders at Bordeaux, stands as a pledge for Peter Rosset, one of the popular leaders at Bayonne,²⁰ and we shall see evidence of the close affiliation of the so-called popular factions in Bordeaux and the neighboring towns of La Réole and Bazas.²¹ The opposition parties were likewise connected, but not perhaps quite so closely. Such relations are not easy to explain on the simple theory of aristocratic and democratic factions, but once a commercial element enters in, it

¹⁹ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 153.

²⁰ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 319.

²¹ See chapter viii.

becomes quite simple and indeed inevitable. If one party in Bayonne was interested in the trade between Bordeaux and England it would necessarily be closely associated with the merchants there who shipped their wine to England in Bayonnese vessels. We may, therefore, feel warranted in concluding that commercial interests played a large part in the factional strife of the Gascon towns.

Yet this is far from being the whole story. The suggestion of Balasque that, at Bayonne, one party allied itself with the Gascon nobility is deserving of some consideration. Throughout Gascony there would seem to have been two general parties, the barons who profited by various abuses, and others who were injured by them.²² Now it is surely not without significance that the Solers seem to have been closely associated with the baronial party and that Michael de Mans was related to the family of the viscounts of Labourd.²³ Thus the general statement of Balasque would seem to meet with confirmation. If that be the case then we should have in both Bordeaux and Bayonne two parties; one closely identified with English commerce and standing in general hostility to the barons; the other not so closely identified with this branch of commerce and tending to ally itself with the feudal nobility. The attitude of the seneschal goes far to verify such a conclusion. When, later on, the Gascon barons presented their complaints against Simon de Montfort they distinctly describe Trumbleville as having been an ideal seneschal, in contrast with Simon, whom they pictured as the very reverse.²⁴ Now it is significant to find that Trumbleville, who evidently favored

²² Balasque, *Études*, II, 92.

²³ *Ibid.*, 96.

²⁴ Matthew Paris makes the barons say "Henricus de Trumblevilla, qui auctoritate vestra senescallus fuerat Wasconiae et custos noster pius et justus nobis pacifice praeerat similiter et dominus Waleranus Theuto, vir quidem discretus et circumspectus" . . . *Chronica Majora*, V, 295. Some allowance should be made for the rhetorical exaggeration but on the whole it is evident that Trumbleville stood well with the barons.

the nobility, allied himself with the "aristocratic" and "anti-English" party both in Bayonne and Bordeaux, and that Simon, who opposed the nobles, was closely leagued with the "popular" party. We may conclude, then, with some degree of confidence that of the two factions in the towns one tended to alliance with the neighboring seigneurs. Such a policy might have been dictated by economic motives as distinctly as the royalist proclivity of their opponents. Men whose commerce lay mainly in the directions of Béarn and Navarre or those whose landed possessions were at the mercy of these nobles or their allies might naturally seek alliance with the lords. One may perhaps have included the majority of the lower classes in some towns, so that we may easily accept all the statements of Giry and Balasque regarding a popular and aristocratic party at Bayonne and yet conclude that this was hardly the real basis of the division.

With the suppression of disorder in Bordeaux and Bayonne Gascony seems to have enjoyed a few years of relative quiet from internal dissensions. The main interest now lay in the renewal of the war with France, provoked this time by King Henry himself. In 1227 he had been declared of age a second time and this action seems to have been intended by Hubert as a means of getting rid of Peter des Roches, his rival in the government.²⁵ This declaration seems to have had more reality than the first, for from this time on Henry began to take part in state affairs. He had never accepted his reverses in Poitou as final and affairs seemed now to open up possibilities of recovering the lost ground. The truce was about to expire and allies were offering themselves. The French nobles chafed under Queen Blanche and were not averse to an alliance with England. In 1228 Norman envoys sought Henry's aid for a rebellion which had broken out there. Hubert, always out of sympathy

²⁵ Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 411.

with continental adventures, dissuaded the king from active intervention, but the next year Henry was resolute.²⁶ He put forward impossible demands on France²⁷ and sought allies for a renewal of the war. The most promising ally whom he was able to obtain was Peter Mauclerc, count of Brittany. With high hopes he made his preparations for the expedition when an unforeseen event prevented his departure. When his troops were assembled at Portsmouth it was found that sufficient shipping had not been provided. Though Henry, wild with passion, called Hubert a hoary traitor and threatened him with drawn sword,²⁸ nevertheless the facts could not be altered and the expedition had to be postponed.

In the spring of 1230 the expedition did at last set out, though not it would seem in great force. The muster roll shows but 275 barons, knights and men-at-arms. The foot-soldiers we cannot reckon, but as Henry took with him 7,800 marks of silver we may surmise that he intended to enlist men on the continent.²⁹ According to the plan, the king landed in Brittany, to join and support his ally.

In his campaign he was aided by the insubordination in the ranks of the French. The feudal army of Queen Blanche refused to serve beyond the required forty days and broke up as soon as this time elapsed. Philip of Boulogne and his followers, quitting the royal forces, ravaged Champagne, and Blanche with what troops remained turned to his pursuit, thus leaving the English to carry on their operations unchecked.³⁰ To Henry two courses were open, to march north to the help of the Norman rebels or south against Poitou. Hubert's advice decided him to adopt the latter plan and he moved

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 412.

²⁷ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 350.

²⁸ Davis, *England*, 412-13.

²⁹ Ramsay, *Dawn of the Constitution*, 55. Ramsay estimates the value of this sum at £5,200.

³⁰ Davis, *England*, 413.

south into Aquitaine. Possibly Hubert's arguments derived part of their force from a letter of Sir Geoffrey Beauchamp to the king, telling him that his presence alone could save the south from passing to the French through anarchy and treason.³¹ We can hardly avoid a suspicion that this account is, at the least, much exaggerated, since we find little or no confirmation of it elsewhere and since Henry in his southern expedition did little but borrow money. Indeed, the diversion into Gascony seems to have been a decided blunder. All Henry did was to besiege Mirabeau and then push on to Bordeaux. Stopping there only a very short time, he set off again for the north.

To Henry it seemed that the chief obstacle in the way of his success was the lack of money. In July he had written to his chancellor from Pons, urging him to be diligent in forwarding money, as with it the campaign could be carried through successfully.³² Failing to receive sufficient supplies from England, Henry turned for support to the burghers. Possibly his southern digression had this for one of its purposes, at any rate it seems to have been so used; but the king had already begun to appeal to the citizens from the moment of his landing. While still engaged in the siege of Mirabeau he called upon the mayor, jurats and commune of Bordeaux for military engines and bolts for crossbows to carry on the operations,³³ and summoned the militia of La Réole to his aid. But it was in money that the citizens gave the king their most valuable support. Henry had landed on May 23. On June 6 he acknowledged a number of loans. From John le Mercer he borrowed 133 pounds 5 shillings, from Raymond Makayn and his associate merchants 542 pounds 6 pence, and from William Raymond Colom and Colombo de Areis 1,333 marks 6 shillings. In addition he promised to repay to Bernard Raymond de St. George, citizen of Dax, 100 marks, to Peter Bayz of

³¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 367.

³² *Letters de rois*, I, 36.

³³ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 422.

Bayonne 90 pounds, to two citizens of La Réole 125 pounds, and finally to two citizens of Bazas, 81 pounds 5 shillings.³⁴ Apparently the king used his brief stay at Bordeaux for the same purpose, for, on August 12, he acknowledged a new set of debts. The Mayor, Raymond Monader—one of those thanked in connection with the riots the year before,—advanced him 100 marks,³⁵ and in connection with other citizens 200. Amaneus Colom also lent the impecunious monarch 200 marks.

Thus reinforced Henry marched north through Poitou, but without gaining any substantial advantages. The gifts and grants of Queen Blanche, with whom they had recently concluded treaties,³⁶ held the count of La Marche and the viscount of Thouars loyal to the French, and without them the lesser lords counted for little. Thus if Henry met with no resistance from the Poitevins he equally gained no success, and returned to Brittany without accomplishing anything of importance. In Brittany a round of feasts and pageants consumed what was left of the king's funds, and in September, being unable to get more money from England, he returned thither for reasons of health.³⁷

In this abortive campaign the rôle of the townspeople is evident enough. They gave the king support both by their militia and by their loans. If, however, the king received their help he naturally was expected to make some return. It is not surprising then to find the king confirming the commune of St. Émilion,³⁸ and offering no objection when Bordeaux renews her treaty with La Réole.³⁹ He furthermore took care that his decree stopping all commerce with

³⁴ All these debts are acknowledged in the *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 378-379.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 391.

³⁶ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 370.

³⁷ Davis, *England*, 414.

³⁸ *Charter Rolls*, I, 124.

³⁹ O'Reilly, *Histoire complète de Bordeaux*, I, 363. He claims to base his account on the manuscript of the treaty in the archives of La Réole.

the French did not injure the citizens of Gascony. In a number of cases where Bayonnese ships were detained in England by the king's agents, he at once released them.⁴⁰ These orders of release, also, furnish incidental testimony to the extent of the Bayonnese carrying trade. One of these ships is loaded with goods from Bordeaux, La Réole and other Gascon towns. It had been stopped only because of a suspicion that its cargo came from La Rochelle.⁴¹ Three ships are loaded with Flemish merchandise.⁴²

⁴⁰ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 204, 291, 307, 353, 362, 373, 413.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 204.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 307 and 413.

CHAPTER V

PARTY STRUGGLES IN THE TOWNS

Condition of the province. Vivona as seneschal. Difficulties of his position. Colombines in power at Bordeaux. Trubleville restored as seneschal. Collision with the Colombines at Bordeaux. Soler party restored to power there. Increased tranquillity. Dependence of the government on the townspeople in time of peace.

HENRY'S unsuccessful campaign on the continent had not resulted in any serious change in the situation of affairs in Gascony. The old animosities remained and the old discord was ready to break out at a moment's notice. The seneschal was faced by the same difficulties and perplexities as before. When Henry departed for England he left this important office in the experienced hands of Trubleville; but soon considered it expedient to make a change, for on July 1 Trubleville was dismissed and a successor appointed.¹ This successor, named Richard de Burgh, does not however appear to have actually held office, for on September 30 Hugh de Vivona is nominated as seneschal.²

It is possible that the change in the administration in Gascony was in some part due to the influence of the popular party. At any rate, an order of the king issued earlier in the month giving Gaillard Colom authority to make some purchases at Montpellier for the royal

¹ When no other source is specified, the information concerning the seneschal is taken from the list in the Appendix to Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 399-400.

² *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 502.

use³ would suggest that the chiefs of that faction had to some extent gained the royal ear. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the new administration seems clearly to have represented more or less of a reaction from that of Trumbleville. Thus we find Henry, on October 16, instructing Hugh to revoke all lands or other property of the crown alienated by Trumbleville as seneschal.⁴ Also, on December 19, he ordered the mayor, council and jurats of Bordeaux to revoke all such pledges of revenues and sales as had been made by Trumbleville without the royal sanction, and to give possession in such cases to Vivona.⁵ The doubts of Trumbleville's integrity which this implies may well have been suggested by the Coloms and their allies.

As to the inquiry into Trumbleville's grants of lands and revenues, no definite results appear in the rolls. Since, however, the king discharged some of his debts and afterward sent him back again as seneschal, it would seem likely that no very serious abuses were discovered. Some, however, of the new seneschal's difficulties *may* have had their origin in the attempt on his part to revoke grants of his predecessor, but the documents give no indications that this was the case.

That Hugh de Vivona to some extent modified the policy of Trumbleville is farther suggested by the nature of the troubles in which he soon involved himself. These are first traceable in the rolls of 1233, but undoubtedly begin earlier, for the royal intervention would hardly be expected till the matter had already been for some time pending. In other words, Vivona would not be likely to invoke the king's authority till he had found his own inadequate to the case in hand.

Among the troubles of the seneschal we may especially note his

³ *Lettres de rois*, I, 39. See also Bréquigny, LXIII, 117.

⁴ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 507.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1232-1247, 6.

quarrels with the former officers of Trubleville. Thus, we find him in difficulties with a certain Richard de Poncellis, who had been a bailiff under his predecessor and whom Vivona had apparently deprived of this office. Poncellis, however, refused to surrender a quantity of armour, goods and furniture, and received the protection of the canons of the cathedral chapter. Prospering so far in his defiance, he went the length of tearing down one of the towers of the castle for the purpose of strengthening another tower in the vicinity which he held. The royal intervention became necessary, and on January 27 the king wrote to the archbishop commanding him to surrender the rebel, and similar orders were sent to the mayor and commune.⁶

A like difficulty was experienced with a certain Randolf de Talemunt, to whom Trubleville had given—probably for safe keeping—a quantity of targes, cross-bows, lances and bows out of the castle of Oléron. It required a special order from the king to induce him to deliver them up to the seneschal.⁷

Not only did he have such difficulties with particular officers, but Vivona found himself unable to obtain possession of all the royal castles, for we find Henry addressing mandates to the bishop of Bazas and Rustengo de Soler, asking them to help the seneschal in his efforts to obtain possession of the castle of Rocheford.⁸ This appeal to the leader of the Soler faction for his good offices would seem especially significant. Nor was a single mandate sufficient to secure possession of the castle for the seneschal, for the king addressed another letter to the constable ordering him to surrender his castle to Vivona and accompanied this by a letter to Rustengo urging him to assist the seneschal.⁹

⁶ *Pat. Rolls, Ibid.*, 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

In addition to such difficulties, Vivona—like all seneschals—had financial troubles to meet. The communes of Bordeaux, Bayonne and Dax had been commanded by the king to collect the farms of their towns at the time of Trubleville's removal.¹⁰ This they would seem to have been willing enough to do, but when it came to paying over the money to Vivona it was a different matter. Hence, on January 11, the king intervened and ordered the mayor, jurats and commune of Bordeaux to turn over the rents, dues, etc., of their city to the seneschal, and to permit his bailiffs to collect them in the future.¹¹ On January 27 similar orders were dispatched to Bayonne and Dax.¹²

Nor did this end the financial difficulties of the seneschal. Trubleville had left behind him debts which were still unpaid, and Vivona was in need of loans for himself. Thus the king pays Raymond Monader the 100 marks which he had lent to Trubleville,¹³ and in August he applied for a loan on Vivona's behalf; and it is of interest to note that the application is made to Colombines, the king asking Gaillard Colom, Peter Colom and Arnold William Emeric to advance 200 marks to the seneschal.¹⁴

The general turbulence of the province is, also, one of the pressing problems of the royal representative. The nobles were not performing their duties in the way of adequate policing of the roads and the communes were in need of restraint in their encroachments on the royal prerogative. Thus Henry issued letters patent to the barons and knights of Gascony who had sworn the peace—doubtless when the king left the province for England—to guard the roads so that the merchants might travel safely and unmolested.¹⁵

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7, 23.

¹² *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 22. The money was advanced by Gaillard Colom; *ibid.*, 89.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

He furthermore expressly forbade Bayonne to form confederations and commanded the citizens to allow the seneschal to settle any difficulties with the men of Bordeaux.¹⁶ This latter city was also giving cause for alarm by allowing the men of Entre-deux-Mers to join their commune and to escape the obligations which they owed the king, and Henry found it necessary to write to the mayor and commune forbidding them to receive such applicants for membership.¹⁷

If, as we have surmised, Vivona attempted to modify his predecessor's policy, it is not surprising that he should have found himself in difficulties with the Solers, who had been favored by Trubleville, and who had been dominant in the commune of Bordeaux. The attempt to secure loans from Colombine leaders would seem to point towards a policy favorable to their party and likely to involve the seneschal in the party struggles in the city. From 1229 to 1233 the mayors had been taken from the Soler party. In 1233, however, the mayor was a certain Gaucem Colom. It is not certain that he was related to the great family of that name, though this would seem by no means unlikely. He succeeded Vigoros Viger, an undoubted member of the Soler party, and his election seems to have been accompanied by some degree of royal intervention, for on January 13—before the election,—Henry addressed a mandate to the mayor and jurats.¹⁸ He pointed out that the election of a mayor had often been a cause of disturbance, and he directed that they should, with the council of the city, elect one whose choice would cause no dissensions. Either this was an attempt to mediate between the factions, or was an attempt to put pressure on the jurats in the interest of the Colombines. More probably it was intended to serve the interests of a compromise, for there

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

seems no reason to conclude that Vivona identified himself with the Colombines. The result in any case was the choice of Gaucem Colom, who may have been a moderate member of their party who was not especially distasteful to the Solers. This seems the more likely as he was succeeded by Raymond Monader, a man of doubtful party connections. As, however, he was in turn succeeded by Peter Calhau, one of the Colombine leaders, the net result was favorable to the Colombines.

The year 1234 opened with Vivona again in need of money, for Henry on January 20 requested the mayor and commune to advance the sum of 300 marks, which he promised to repay their messenger in England.¹⁹ This attempt at raising a new loan was practically the last act of Vivona's administration. Either he was weary of his office—as earlier seneschals had been—or the king was dissatisfied with the results of his administration. In any case he is out of office in May 1234, although he does not seem to have left the province, where we shall find him a little later, holding important positions.

Whatever the investigation into Trubleville's policy had revealed, he seems to have been the most successful of any of Henry's seneschals and to him the king now reverted. He was appointed Vivona's successor and Rustengo de Soler was commissioned to act for him till he should arrive in Gascony.²⁰ This choice of a deputy was a distinct foreshadowing of the new seneschal's future policy and may well have been made at his suggestion.

For Trubleville to arrive in Gascony was not quite so simple a matter as it may seem at first sight. In that province he had numerous creditors whose claims were still unpaid and a settlement with these was first necessary. His debts amounted, indeed, to the then considerable total of 6,000 marks, and the English treasury could ill

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

spare so large a sum. Henry, therefore, on May 25, assigned one half the rents, farms, etc., of Bordeaux for five years to discharge these loans to his representative, and enumerates the various creditors as follows: Ernulf, bishop of Bazas, Rustengo de Soler, Raymond le Brun, Elias Viger, Bernard d'Acra, Rostand Eborard, Raymond William, Bernard Macheler, Raymond Buchs, Arnold de Peregort, William Gauler and Peter Bonafus.²¹

Of these creditors only one, Raymond le Brun, is demonstrably a Colombine, while several are among the prominent leaders of the Solers. But the omissions of the list are even more significant. Evidently the matter was brought before the king by the Solers or their friends,—who took small thought of anyone except their own party,—for in the following year Peter Colom and his son William Raymond called the king's attention to the fact that, though not mentioned in the list, they and others—probably their friends—had advanced some of the money—indeed a great part of it, as they claimed,—and the king directed Soler, who thus seems to have had in charge the distribution of the dues, to see that their claims were settled with those of the rest.²² Clearly then the Solers were in charge of the matter and had the management of the repayment.

The appointment of Rostand de Soler as his deputy and the arrangement for paying his debts alike point to the conclusion that it was as a friend of the Solers that Trubleville took office. Trouble with the Colombine-controlled commune of Bordeaux might, then, reasonably be expected, and it is not long before we find this anticipation realized.

The first year of Trubleville's administration passed off quietly enough. Special arrangements were made with Soler and Gaillard Colom for the repayment of the money lent by them.²³ A quarrel

²¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

²² *Ibid.*, 91.

²³ *Ibid.*, 49, 89.

with Navarre was terminated by a truce negotiated by Soler and approved by the king,²⁴ and the truce with France was prolonged,²⁵ thus freeing the province from the fear of foreign intervention.

The year 1235, however, increased the likelihood of internal friction between a seneschal leaning on the Solers and the commune of Bordeaux, since it saw Monader replaced as mayor by Peter Calhau, one of the chief leaders of the Colombines. The first part of this year was not, however, marked with serious difficulties. A number of merchants received safe conduct for their ships and merchandise. Among these is Alexander de Cambas, whose wines were protected in June.²⁶ Alexander was a Soler; at least, his nephew Peter was one of the members of the faction imprisoned by the king during Montfort's administration,²⁷ and he would thus seem one of the few members of his party who was also connected with the wine trade. In July a further favor was bestowed upon him when the king transferred to him and his heirs the houses, lands and buildings owned by Peter de Sancto Erardo in and near the town of La Réole, which had been forfeited on account of a trespass of Peter's against the king.²⁸ What the trespass was we are not informed, but it came to have serious consequences. The lands were not given in perpetuity, but were to be held till the king should restore them to their owners. The king may further have irritated the Colombines against the seneschal, who was no doubt the prompter of the policy, by ordering, in July, the mayor, jurats and commune of Bordeaux to surrender to Trubleville the castle of St. Macaire, which was in their hands.²⁹ The commune did not, however, obey; for in October

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 87, and in Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 334.

²⁵ *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 82 and 84. Also Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 330-333.

²⁶ *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 110.

²⁷ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 284. *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 110.

²⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 113.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

the king again directs them to surrender it to Hugh de Vivona,³⁰ who thus seems to have remained in Gascony after his surrender of office.

In England Henry was at strife with his barons, and it was, doubtless, in the course of these struggles that he involved himself in more direct trouble with the townspeople through the seizure of their wines. We find him in April and June promising redress to certain citizens whose wine has been seized and in December paying to Peter de St. George of Dax 118 pounds 10 shillings. Peter acted on this occasion as the agent of John Bivernan of Bordeaux, Peter Ernaldi de la Gride of Dax, and William Vidou de Perer of Bayonne. It may be well to note also that the payment is by an order on the treasurer of Ireland, an indication of the extent of Gascon trade.³¹

As usual the seneschal in the discharge of his duties needed the financial support of the citizens, and those from whom he received it are to be noted. In July the king gave a bond to the archbishop of Bordeaux for 1,500 marks which he had lent to Trubleville,³² and in the same month he gave a similar bond to Arnold Maysent for 100 marks.³³ Also, in July, the king gave a bond to Raymond Makayn and Brunus Causat for 300 marks, and one to Raymond Brun for 200 marks for money advanced to the seneschal.³⁴ Now of these men the archbishop might well be in sympathy with the aristocratic faction. Arnold Maysent, certainly, and Raymond Makayn, probably, were members of the Soler faction. Causat was one of the Solers oppressed by Montfort. Raymond Brun was of the same faction.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 128.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 99, 107, 132.

³² *Ibid.*, 113.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

The bulk of the money seems certainly to have come from the Soler party, or from persons favorable to them.³⁵

With the Solers standing in such intimate relations with the seneschal the Colombines might not unnaturally feel some anxiety as to their continued control of the commune. It is not impossible that it was Vivona's influence that had placed them in power. At any rate they might reasonably wish to remove all chances of Trubleville's intervening in the elections of the mayor and jurats. It was doubtless from some such motive as this that the commune in July applied to Henry for a confirmation of its charter which he accorded without apparent difficulty.³⁶ The charter thus granted is the earliest preserved in the communal archives and has been thought to have established the commune, or to have conceded an elective mayor, whereas it conceded nothing that the town had not already had for a considerable time.

Evidently there were fires smouldering in Gascony by July of 1235. The crisis came during a meeting at Langon held by the seneschal to proclaim the truce with France and also a general peace for Gascony. We have seen that Henry had already conferred confiscated property in La Réole on a citizen of the Soler party. Of what happened in the assembly we have two accounts in two letters to the king, one written by two brothers, the lords of Landiran, and the other by the men of Sainte Baseille.³⁷ The regular business of

³⁵ Maysent is expressly referred to as a friend of the Solers in *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 142. Makayn remained in Bordeaux and was closely associated with the Calhaux at a time when Simon de Montfort had banished the Solers. *Ibid.*, 132, etc.

³⁶ *Charter Rolls*, I, 210. *Livre des Bouillons*, 241. *Livre des Contumes*, 512.

³⁷ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 321; II, 1. Shirley, however, misdates this letter 1228. Champollion-Figeac has also misdated the second letter as 1244. The date, however, may easily be determined, as the letters require Trubleville to be seneschal and Peter Calhau mayor, conditions which existed only in 1235. Calhau was mayor in 1244, but Trubleville was not seneschal and Trubleville was seneschal in 1228, but Calhau was not mayor.

the meeting being concluded, the Colombines demanded the pardon of the citizens of La Réole, who had been accused of treason to the king. The leader in making this demand was Peter Calhau, and, finding the seneschal unwilling to accede to his demand, Calhau and his friends broke forth in violent and abusive language, threatening the seneschal's life and addressing to him "shameful, vile and enormous" words which the modest lords of Landiran shrink from repeating to the king. In the conclusion of their letter the brothers called the king's attention to the fact that there was a party at Bordeaux which was constantly usurping the royal functions and prerogatives.

As to the events following this scene the citizens of Sainte Baseille are more explicit. They inform us that, after the meeting, Calhau and others returned to Bordeaux and seized on the royal castle, the royal revenues, and all the royal property in that city, driving away the royal bailiffs and servants. They even ordered the men of Sainte Baseille to join their revolt, but these loyal subjects refused and informed the king of the high-handed proceedings of the Bordelais.

Possibly the letters exaggerate the revolutionary conduct of the Colombines. At any rate they were far too powerful to be dealt with as rebels, or for any very severe measures to be taken against them. In their English trade, moreover, they had ties which bound them not to go too far in defiance of the English government. Under these circumstances a compromise was adopted, and on October 20, the king commissioned the archbishop of Bordeaux, Elias Ridell, lord of Bergerac, Amaneus de Lebret, Peter de Bordeaux, Bernard de Ryon, Raymond Brun de Barsac, Rustengo de Soler, Gaillard Colom and W. A. Emeric to arbitrate the differences between the mayor and commune of Bordeaux and the seneschal, and he commanded the commune to abide by their decision.³⁸

³⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 129.

The choice of the arbitrators—possibly inspired by Trubleville—seems rather favorable to the pro-aristocratic party of the Solers. Nor is this impression removed by an order of December 9 commanding the treasurer and justiciary of Ireland to pay 640 marks to Raymond Makayn, Brunus Causat, Arnold Maysent, Raymond Brun de Barsac and Rustengo de Soler or their agents.³⁹ The money had been lent to Trubleville and two of these citizens were among the arbitrators.

What decision was reached by the commission we are not told. Possibly a compromise of some sort was the result, for the king pardoned certain citizens of La Réole for deserting to the French.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the outcome of the disturbances was favorable to the Solers, since Peter Calhau was succeeded as mayor by Vigoros Viger and he by Rustengo Soler and that party remained in power till 1243. It is not unlikely that the violent proceedings of the Colombines had alienated moderate men in Bordeaux, and that this, combined with the seneschal's pressure and the action of the arbitrators, facilitated the change.

Calhau, however, did not at once quit office and seems to have remained somewhat defiant of the seneschal, since in February, 1236 (the election of mayor took place in the spring so that Calhau was still in office) the king had to issue a mandate to the mayor of Bordeaux bidding him surrender the castle of St. Macaire and all the lands of the late Peter de Gaveret to Trubleville, who in turn was to surrender them to Vivona.⁴¹ Evidently he had refused to do so and given as an excuse that he had not been paid for his custody. The king expresses his surprise at such a demand, affirming that the castle was held without any warrant whatever.

Whatever the exact extent and nature of the crisis of which these

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

documents give us a glimpse, the king was forced to take notice of the debts contracted by the seneschal during his difficulty with Bordeaux. On February 10 Henry promised to repay the 500 pounds which the prior of St. George in the Isle of Oléron had advanced to the seneschal, as well as 25 pounds to William Gumbaude, and 122 pounds 15 shillings to Elias Viger of St. Émilion.⁴² Of these Gumbaude and Viger were members of the Soler party—Viger though characterized in the rolls as of St. Émilion was a citizen of Bordeaux⁴³—and the prior may well have belonged to the aristocratic faction or have been neutral in the strife. Certainly, the Solers seem now to be men who are helping the seneschal in financial matters. This impression is confirmed by other transactions of the same month, when this same Elias Viger received the farm of the royal customs of Bordeaux for a term of two years at a rent of 40,000 shillings of Bordeaux.⁴⁴

The king also strengthened the seneschal by ordering all persons in Gascony, and especially the mayor and jurats of Bordeaux, to assist him in recovering alienated property. Probably there is here in view such places as the castle of St. Macaire, which the Colombines were still holding in spite of the king's orders, as new orders were addressed to the mayor concerning it in March.⁴⁵ Some light is thrown on the extent of the power and influence of the Solers by instructions of the king in March which show them to have been in charge of the castle of Belin, belonging to Geoffrey Ridell, which they are directed to surrender to him.⁴⁶

With the Soler party thus in power in Bordeaux and in favor with the seneschal, the Colombines might well be anxious to secure

⁴² *Ibid.*, 136.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

guarantees for their privileges and rights. This is doubtless the meaning of Henry's confirmation at this time of a cloth monopoly granted in 1233, when Gaucem Colom was mayor, to Bonafus de Sancta Columba and confirmed by the commune during Calhau's term of office.⁴⁷ The king also promised to continue the repayment to Gaillard Colom of the money lent by him to Hugh de Vivona.⁴⁸

The Solers, once in power in Bordeaux, do not seem to have been much more inclined to respect royal rights than their rivals, for the king is soon again obliged to interfere in reference to the region of Entre-deux-Mers, where the commune continued to enroll knights and others who sought in this way to escape the service due the king. This led Henry to address letters patent to the mayor and commune forbidding this or other infringements of his rights.⁴⁹

In June the citizens took a farther step in the way of getting the control of the collection of the royal revenues into their own hands. Henry in that month farmed the whole custom of avalage of wines at Bordeaux to the mayor and citizens for five years for 3,000 pounds of Bordeaux.⁵⁰ He also on the next day discharged—or promised to discharge, not always the same thing with Henry—several debts of Trubleville and others. He promised to repay 237½ marks advanced in two loans by the archbishop and 400 marks which the archbishop had advanced at the king's request to Geoffrey Ridell, lord of Blaye.⁵¹

The condition of Gascony seemed on the whole peaceful and the administration of Trubleville to have been fairly successful. He had overthrown the Colombine faction in Bordeaux and allied himself closely with the Solers, the head of that faction being the mayor

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 138. The royal confirmation makes Calhau mayor in 1234, doubtless a mistake for 1235.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 188.

for 1237. His policy had been friendly to the nobles and the disorders which marked the beginning of this rule appear to have quieted down. Henry would seem, therefore, to have had reason to be satisfied with his seneschal. Trubleville's tenure of office was, however, interrupted for a brief time, for on July 13 the king addressed an order to the archbishop of Bordeaux as seneschal of Gascony.⁵² But in August the archbishop is out of office, as is evident from the instructions of the king relative to complaints which reached him from the dioceses of Dax and Bayonne.⁵³ Probably the archbishop only acted in some absence of Trubleville.

Very soon, however, quarrels between the towns called for the royal intervention, for Henry ordered the mayor and bailiffs of Bordeaux to protect the merchants and citizens of Dax and to respect their liberties.⁵⁴ Evidently the commune of Bordeaux under the control of the Solers was not concerned to cultivate a good understanding with the Dacquois. It will be recalled that the Solers—individually or through the commune—had taken over the collection of the royal revenues at Bordeaux and especially those on wine, and in the royal mandate reference is made to the wines of the citizens of Dax as being especially a cause of the dispute.

In August Trubleville was replaced as seneschal by Hubert Huse,⁵⁵ whose term of office was extremely brief for in November of 1238 Trubleville was once more in office. There seems no reason to suppose that on being thus recalled to office Trubleville departed in any way from his former policy. It would seem also from the silence of the rolls that his administration was on the whole successful. During the first two years of his second administration nothing occurred to call for royal intervention, which would seem clear evi-

⁵² *Ibid.*, 189.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 194. Shirley in his list makes him take office in September.

dence that the province was fairly tranquil, especially in comparison to its former state. During these two years the Solers continued dominant in Bordeaux, where Bernard d'Alhan and Martin Faure, both of that faction, acted as mayors. In 1241 Rustengo de Soler himself became mayor. In this year the king issued a few letters patent, but as they deal with matters of minor importance we have no need to examine them. On September 22, 1241, Trubleville retired from office for the last time and Henry, already meditating a renewal of the French war, chose as his successor Rustengo de Soler, the mayor of Bordeaux. This would seem to mark the climax of the fortunes of that party. They had been six years in power in Bordeaux and their chief was now the head of that city and at the same time of the English government in Gascony.

From such a survey as we have here attempted, incomplete though it may be, it is evident to what extent already, in the ordinary time of peace, the government relied upon the townspeople. They hold castles, they farm the revenues, they advance money to the seneschal, sometimes having to wait long for repayment. They appear as indispensable to the working of the English rule and at times disposed to take advantage of their importance. What part they played when England found herself again at war with France we have now to see.

CHAPTER VI

HENRY'S SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST POITOU, 1242

Henry renews the war with France. Defeat at Taillebourg. Financial and military aid given by the towns during the campaign. Concessions to the townspeople. Loans of the Colombines to the king. They regain power in Bordeaux. Henry remains in Gascony. Continued loans by townspeople.

HENRY, who had never acquiesced in the loss of Poitou and the north, was constantly seeking an alliance or combination which would enable him to renew the war with fair prospects of success. At length in 1242 the time seemed ripe for an attempt. It will be recalled that Louis VIII had begun the practice of providing for his younger sons by granting appanages. He had given Poitou after its conquest to his son Alfonso. Hugh of La Marche had now involved himself in trouble with Alfonso.¹ Nor was he the only discontented noble in Poitou; on the contrary, constant appeals were being made to Henry with promises of support and certain success.² The English monarch therefore resolved to renew the war, hoping to recover at least Poitou from the French.

Our special interest here lies naturally with the towns and their people, having in view to trace their relations with the king and measure the extent of their support. It is in this campaign the easier to estimate their rôle since the English parliament opposed

¹ Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, IV, 178. See also the letter published by M. Delisle in the *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, série II, IV, 513.

² Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, IV, 181.

the war and refused the king any money for his expedition.³ Money, indeed, was the one great essential. Henry was informed that Poitou and Gascony would furnish him men enough if he could only pay them.⁴

In spite of the discouraging attitude of the parliament Henry set out, and on May 13 landed at Royan with some 300 knights.⁵ The first and obvious step was to summon the feudal forces of Gascony to his aid. On May 25 he addressed a summons to the various knights and barons of Gascony who owed him military service, commanding them to present themselves and their retainers at Pons on the Thursday after Pentecost (June 12). On the same day, the king addressed a summons to the communes of Bordeaux, Bayonne, St. Macaire, St. Émilion, La Réole, Langon, and Bazas, ordering them to have their militia at Royan on the same date.⁶

This appeal to the communes for the aid, which under feudal law they owed their suzerain, seemed for an instant to meet with a repulse. Bordeaux pointed out to the king that, by a privilege previously granted to the town, her citizens were not bound to serve outside their diocese.⁷ This, which at first glance might seem like a refusal to follow Henry, did not in reality bear that significance. What the Bordelais objected to was not the service demanded of them but the manner of the demand. It soon appeared that they were willing to aid the king but of their own free will and not because of a feudal obligation. Henry plainly recognized this attitude and sanctioned it in three letters patent issued on June 16 and 17.⁸

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 181-184. Tout, in Hunt and Poole, *Political History of England*, III, 63.

⁴ Tout, *Ibid.*

⁵ Tout, *Ibid.*

⁶ *Rôles Gascons*, no. 160. Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 402.

⁷ *Livre des coutumes*, 529.

⁸ *Rôles Gascons*, no. 281. *Pat. Rolls*, 1232-1247, 308. Henceforth throughout the chapter the *Rôles Gascons* will be referred to as R. G. The refer-

In these he fully acknowledged the exemption they had pleaded and confirmed the liberty to which they had appealed. At the same time he thanked the mayor and commune for the service they were rendering in Saintonge and Poitou. This he promised should be considered not as a due, but as a free gift, and should in no wise be held as a precedent. Possibly one reason for the readiness of Bordeaux to support the king was the influence of Rustengo de Soler, who was now seneschal of Gascony and had been mayor the preceding year. Perhaps, too, such considerations had had their weight in securing the powerful burgher his appointment.

In the campaign the towns rendered Henry important services. Bordeaux contributed to the royal army both men and munitions of war.⁹ Bayonne despatched her galleys.¹⁰ In the assembling and equipment of the royal forces the seneschal Rustengo bore an important part, even using his own money when needful, for at Saintes, on July 3, Henry issued letters patent promising to repay him the sums expended in equipping galleys and in paying crossbowmen and others for the king's service.¹¹

With such forces as he could get together Henry at once entered on a campaign which proved brief and inglorious. He invaded Saintonge only to be decisively defeated at Taillebourg.¹² Louis pressed forward and threatened for a moment to besiege Bordeaux, but the outbreak of an epidemic in his army led him to abandon this

ences moreover are to number of entry, those of the Patent Rolls to the pages. Of the Patent Rolls, the above volume may be understood unless otherwise stated.

⁹ *R. G.*, 174. All documents in the *Rôles Gascons* are not to be found in the *Patent Rolls*. All documents issued in Gascony were entered in the Gascon rolls. In England they were reënrolled in their proper roll.

¹⁰ *R. G.*, 26, 589, 631, 1249, etc. *Pat. Rolls*, 337, 343.

¹¹ *R. G.*, 315. *Pat. Rolls*, 310.

¹² Henry himself wrote an account of his campaign in a letter to the emperor. Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 25.

purpose and withdraw to the north. A truce for five years was finally concluded in April, 1243.¹³

But the citizens—especially of Bordeaux—supported the king financially as well as in the field. Between the battle of Taillebourg and the truce Henry spent most of his time in Bordeaux, where he contrived to quarrel with such of his English vassals as had followed him. His life there would seem to have been reckless and extravagant, if Matthew Paris is to be trusted.¹⁴ The funds he could obtain from England were probably rather scanty, and, still planning to renew the war, he wished to subsidize various nobles. To accomplish this purpose he had recourse to his seneschal, who advanced 100 marks to Amaneus Lebret at the king's request and received therefor royal letters patent,¹⁵ whatever they might turn out to be worth. Lebret also obtained 100 pounds from Gaillard Colom;¹⁶ who likewise advanced 500 marks to Raymond of Toulouse, which debt the king assumed.¹⁷ Peter Alfonso, son of the king of Portugal, received 40 marks from the same wealthy merchant.¹⁸ The viscount of Castillon had similarly raised 160 marks, on the king's order, from Rustengo de Mercato, but only after William Raymond Colom and Peter Calhau had pledged themselves for the king.¹⁹

During the campaign itself Henry had been forced to rely for a considerable measure of financial support on the citizens. In July, while still at Saintes expecting an attack from the French, he had found his money running short; for, on the tenth, he wrote to Gaillard Colom asking him to advance as much money as possible.²⁰ What the response was cannot be determined with certainty; but, at any rate,

¹³ Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 416.

¹⁴ *Chronica Majora*, IV, 229.

¹⁵ R. G., 440. *Pat. Rolls*, 322.

¹⁶ R. G., 361. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

¹⁷ R. G., 553. *Pat. Rolls*, 334.

¹⁸ R. G., 361. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

¹⁹ R. G., 698. *Pat. Rolls*, 350.

²⁰ R. G., 33.

on the twelfth Henry acknowledged a debt to him of 650 pounds of La Marche for eight war horses.²¹ Horses, indeed, seem to have been in great demand for the royal army. On July 7 Henry ordered his seneschal to stop at Bordeaux a ship from Spain bound for La Rochelle and loaded with horses and other merchandise, to prevent their reaching a hostile prince.²² Very likely he afterwards used them for his own army; but of this we have no positive information. On July 25, at Pons, the king acknowledged a debt to Gaillard Colom of 96 pounds for seven horses purchased for the royal service.²³ This writ was afterward surrendered; but on August 5 one was issued for 327 marks for 15 horses,²⁴ and on October 18 the king gave him a bond for 40 marks to pay him for a horse he had bought for John Fitz-Geoffrey.²⁵ Finally, on October 23, Henry pledged himself to pay Gaillard 25 marks from the first money which reached him from England for a loan made to William de Munt Revel for the purchase of a horse.²⁶

These were, however, by no means the only expenses which the king was forced to meet by loans. He would appear to have called upon the citizens of Bayonne for an amount of military service beyond their feudal dues and for this he was expected to pay. On August 17 he acknowledged a debt to them for their services amounting to 10,000 shillings of Bordeaux and gave them license to harass his enemies.²⁷ The next day, August 18, he gave a bond to the mayor and commune of Bordeaux for 300 marks, which they had

²¹ *R. G.*, 328. *Pat. Rolls*, 311.

²² *R. G.*, 31.

²³ *R. G.*, 350.

²⁴ *R. G.*, 361. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

²⁵ *R. G.*, 546. *Pat. Rolls*, 333.

²⁶ *R. G.*, 612. The *Rôles* gives the sum of money as 1025 marks, which is extravagant for one horse. The *Pat. Rolls* gives the sum as 25 marks. *Pat. Rolls*, 341.

²⁷ *R. G.*, 382, 383. *Pat. Rolls*, 316.

lent him for the payment of the Bayonnese sailors and officers. Later, on November 9, he ordered his treasurer, in England, to pay this sum to the nuncio of the commune.²⁸ Bayonne was also rewarded for her services by a privilege which accorded to the citizens the right of bringing their grain and merchandise to Bordeaux and of purchasing wine there and transporting it to Bayonne.²⁹

But the king had other expenses than those of a strictly military character. Extravagance seems to have been one of the royal vices and Henry is frequently reproached with it by his contemporaries. Matthew Paris declares that the king remained at Bordeaux uselessly squandering his treasure.³⁰ But not many traces of this extravagance meet us in the rolls, though some of the expenditure just recounted may have been useless. In a few entries, however, we find Henry borrowing money for articles of luxury; and here too he turned to the citizens of Bordeaux. On August 6, from his camp on the Gironde, he ordered his treasurers to pay to Centario Gondemer, brother of Peter Gondemer, 62 pounds, 16 *solidi* and 1 *denarius* for various articles thereafter enumerated which had been purchased of Peter. Among the articles we find almonds, dates, pepper and ginger.³¹ Later he requested Gaillard Colom to purchase for him some silk, some scarlet cloth and some ginger at Montpellier.³²

There are, however, numerous acknowledgements of loans where the use of the money is not specified. Thus, on August 20, he conferred on Gaillard Colom the rent of the king's *landes* of Bordeaux till he should be repaid the sum of 400 marks which he had lent the king.³³ These letters, indeed, were surrendered and cancelled but

²⁸ R. G., 384. *Pat. Rolls*, 316, and R. G., 1651.

²⁹ R. G., 715. *Pat. Rolls*, 357.

³⁰ *Chronica Majora*, IV, 229.

³¹ R. G., 200.

³² R. G., 71.

³³ R. G., 393. *Pat. Rolls*, 317.

on the thirtieth new letters give him the profits of the king's *landes* of Bordeaux for a time in part payment of a debt of 600 marks:³⁴ probably the old 400 plus a new loan. To Gaillard Henry also acknowledged a debt of 1,042 marks advanced for various purposes, and promised repayment in England.³⁵ This was on August 5 and by December he acknowledges a debt of 500 pounds Bordelais to the same citizen.³⁶ Of Raymond Makayn, a citizen of Bordeaux engaged in the wine trade and associated with Monader and Arnold Calhau in charge of the royal mint, the king borrowed 500 marks.³⁷

Though Henry drew the greater part of his loans from the citizens of Bordeaux, he also borrowed to a less degree from the other towns and their citizens. Thus he obtained 300 marks from Peter Rosset of Bayonne, the loan being contracted at Bordeaux.³⁸ Also he allowed La Réole to commute the military service which the citizens owed him by money payments³⁹ and borrowed from some of their citizens.⁴⁰ Among these loans was one of 5,000 shillings made to Henry by Raymond de Pins and his brother Donatus, citizens of La Réole and nephews of the Bishop of Bazas.⁴¹

The church too was not neglected, but in common with the townspeople furnished supplies to the king. Thus, for example, the chapter of St. Andrews lent him 10,000 shillings of Bordeaux,⁴² and the

³⁴ *R. G.*, 405. *Pat. Rolls*, 319.

³⁵ *R. G.*, 361. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

³⁶ *R. G.*, 688. *Pat. Rolls*, 349.

³⁷ *R. G.*, 493. *Pat. Rolls*, 327.

³⁸ *R. G.*, 385, 387. *Pat. Rolls*, 317. These letters were cancelled and in January of 1243 the king gave Rosset a bond for 200 marks, very possibly a remainder of the earlier 300. *R. G.*, 807.

³⁹ *R. G.*, 306, 308, 337, 368, 588. *Pat. Rolls*, 310, 312, 315, 337.

⁴⁰ *R. G.*, 400, 636. *Pat. Rolls*, 318, 343.

⁴¹ *R. G.*, 667. *Pat. Rolls*, 347. Canceled but repeated by new letters. *R. G.*, 723. *Pat. Rolls*, 352. For these connections with La Réole see entry in the *Recognitiones feudorum*, in *Archives de la Gironde*, III, 5. Also Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 31.

⁴² *R. G.*, 461. *Pat. Rolls*, 325.

dean and chapter of St. Severin's 6,000 shillings of Bordeaux, and the abbot and convent of St. Cross 100 marks,⁴³ all these churches being situated in Bordeaux.

In spite of these outside sources of revenue in the other Gascon towns and the church, the king's main reliance was in the townspeople of Bordeaux. We may well then inquire a little more closely who the citizens of that town were who made the loans in question to the king? Soler had evidently as seneschal used some of his own money for the king's service; but the largest single creditor is Gaillard Colom. The others were Arnold Maysent, Raymond Makayn, Peter Gondemer, Rustengo de Mercato, Peter Calhau, and the commune itself. Now with the exception of the Solers, who would seem to have abandoned the business,⁴⁴ all these persons were interested in the English wine trade. Though Gaillard Colom does not directly appear, his family were deeply involved,⁴⁵ as we have seen, and it is by no means unlikely that he sold his own wine through his relatives. Of Mercato it is enough to recall that his money was only advanced on the guarantee of W. R. Colom and Peter Calhau. That Calhau dealt in wine is clearly to be seen from a document of the next year, when the king acknowledges a debt to both him and his brother for 302 *dolia* of wine.⁴⁶ Of Makayn it need only be said to make clear his interest that in 1253 the king exempted some of his wine from duties in England.⁴⁷ Of Gondemer we need only recall that the money due is to be paid to his brother and the payment to be made in England. There remains then Arnold Maysent, of whom the king borrowed 200 marks.⁴⁸ He is first mentioned in letters patent issued

⁴³ *R. G.*, 468, 469. *Pat. Rolls*, 325.

⁴⁴ At any rate no further reference occurs in the rolls to connect them with it.

⁴⁵ See later in chapter the privilege accorded William Raymond Colom.

⁴⁶ *R. G.*, 1677.

⁴⁷ *R. G.*, 2697.

⁴⁸ *R. G.*, 666. *Pat. Rolls*, 347.

June 25,⁴⁹ from which it appears that he had complained to the king that Bertram de Cryoyl, in order to provision the castle of Dover, had seized some of his wine. On receiving his complaint the king ordered Bertram to pay for the wine, or, if he did not have the money, to inform him of its value so that he might do so.

It is clear, then, that Henry's chief help in a financial way came from the wine merchants of Bordeaux. Unfortunately we are not able to estimate precisely how important this aid was to him. Yet the sums he borrowed must have had a very considerable military significance in a time where a knight's wages amounted to but 2 shillings a day.⁵⁰ What then were the motives of this support? The men in question, profiting as they did by the union of Gascony to England, may well have been willing to support Henry more or less strongly against his rival. He could, if he would, extend and support their valuable commercial privileges, and certain facts strongly suggest that to some extent they bartered loans for privileges. On October 16 Henry addressed a letter to the mayor and *galiotis* of Bayonne.⁵¹ They were to collect for the king a duty of 5 *solidi* for each *dolium* of wine which they carried, with the exception of wine belonging to citizens of Bordeaux. Such an exemption was doubtless well worth having, and the impecunious monarch might well concede it to those who were advancing him such sums of money. But individuals likewise might obtain exemptions and privileges. In the letters patent by which the king acknowledged the loan of 200 marks by Arnold Maysent he further accorded to that burgher the privilege of loading one ship with wine on the Charente, and of carrying that wine to any part of the king's dominions, or to the dominions of any friendly prince.⁵² The Charente river, it will be re-

⁴⁹ *R. G.*, 20.

⁵⁰ *R. G.*, 2564. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 290.

⁵¹ *R. G.*, 533. *Pat. Rolls*, 332.

⁵² *R. G.*, 666. *Pat. Rolls*, 347.

called, flowed through territory then subject to the French, with whom commercial intercourse had been forbidden. If Arnold May-sent could be thus satisfied what did Gaillard Colom get? We shall deal presently with the measures which were taken to secure him the principal of the money lent; but there was one commercial concession in which he was doubtless interested, although he did not appear directly. On July 25, Henry by letters patent extended certain privileges to William Raymond Colom.⁵³ Gaillard had already lent money to the king; since, on the twenty-seventh, the king authorized him to receive all dues of the city of Bordeaux in payment of a debt,⁵⁴ though the amount is not specified, and had acknowledged specific loans of 650 pounds⁵⁵ and 96 marks.⁵⁶ The privileges accorded to William were, then, very probably in part payment for the loan, and very possibly an engagement of loans to follow. By this privilege Henry took W. R. Colom and his goods under his protection and conceded to him the right to come and go freely and safely with his merchandise throughout the king's dominions, whether by land or sea. In addition he is given the privilege of taking 300 tuns of wine, annually, to Bordeaux or elsewhere *free from all royal dues and customs*, saving—and it is a significant reservation—the liberties of the city of London. Now it is by no means impossible that William acted as the agent for the sale of goods belonging to Gaillard as well as his own. At any rate, it would seem likely that this privilege to William Raymond was due largely to the loyal liberality of Gaillard. Perhaps also the influence of the family in the commune counted for something.

One further point suggests itself. The Coloms were the king's heaviest creditors, and of the others, Calhau belonged to their party,

⁵³ *R. G.*, 349. *Pat. Rolls*, 313.

⁵⁴ *R. G.*, 352. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

⁵⁵ *R. G.*, 328. *Pat. Rolls*, 311.

⁵⁶ *R. G.*, 350. *Pat. Rolls*, 313.

as also, in all probability, did Gondemer and Makayn. Certainly Gondemer was acting mayor in 1253,⁵⁷ when the Colombines were in power and the Solers banished from the city. Makayn can hardly have been identified with the Soler faction, although it is true that when, in 1249, Henry ordered the viscounts of London to seize such of this party as could be found in that city, we find among those named a Raymond Arnold Makayn.⁵⁸ This is the only occasion when the middle name Arnold is mentioned, which in itself creates a suspicion that it may refer to a different person; the more so as there is also mentioned in the same connection an Arnold Makayn de la Ruchelle, showing that the name was not a very unusual one. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that in 1253, at a time when the Soler leaders were in exile, Raymond Makayn not only remained in Bordeaux but received favors from the king,⁵⁹ and was associated with Calhau.⁶⁰ Both Mercato and Maysent would seem to have been Solers.⁶¹ It would appear, then, that of the royal creditors Gaillard Colom, Raymond Makayn, Peter Calhau and Peter Gondemer were members of the Colombine party, and that on the other side stood the seneschal Rustengo de Soler, Arnold Maysent and Rustengo de Mercato. The significance of this is to be seen in the fact that the great bulk of the money lent to the king was advanced by one of the two political parties in the town, and that the party which would seem to have been in opposition.

In 1241 Rustengo de Soler was mayor of Bordeaux and seneschal of Gascony. In April⁶² of 1242 he was succeeded as mayor by Peter Viger of his own party.⁶³ It was in July that the various loans cited

⁵⁷ *R. G.*, 2652.

⁵⁸ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 381.

⁵⁹ *R. G.*, 2697.

⁶⁰ *R. G.*, 2147, 2149, 2425. *Pât. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 248, 249, 275.

⁶¹ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 282, *R. G.*, 2673.

⁶² The election of the mayor seems to have taken place in April.

⁶³ Viger was arrested with the Solers in 1249. Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 282.

above began, and, as we saw, the bulk came from the Colombine faction. On November 10 Rustengo resigned the seneschalship.⁶⁴ In April, 1243, Peter Viger was succeeded as mayor by William Gondemer, a Colombine. In 1244 he gave place to Peter Calhau and he in turn to William Raymond Colom in 1246. Thus, not only did a Colombine come to power in 1243, but the city remained under their control for the next four years. Did the king have a hand in this change? He had every opportunity to exert an influence on the election for he was at Bordeaux from the first to the twenty-fifth of the month. Although the evidence is purely circumstantial, one can hardly help suspecting that the royal influence played a considerable part in this change in party power, and that the liberality of the Coloms was, in part at least, intended to gain this influence. Certainly one act of the king is calculated to support such an impression. On April 21 Henry addressed a letter to the citizens of La Réole and Langon, forbidding them to come to Bordeaux for the purpose of aiding any party there in the factional disputes (*ad succursum faciendum alicui de civibus burdigalensibus contentionem habenti contra alium in eadem villa*).⁶⁵ If Henry, who wrote this letter from Bordeaux, was striving to arrange in advance the triumph of the Colombines he might not unnaturally strive to prevent the Solers from calling in allies from the neighboring towns. At any rate, he clearly desired to prevent one party from using this means to defeat the other. And it is interesting to note that in the riot of June 28, 1249, some of the most influential citizens of La Réole were found fighting among the partisans of the Solers.⁶⁶ The king, it would appear, did not go so far as to drive the Solers entirely from power but, if we may trust a later declaration, he proposed, or perhaps imposed, a compromise by which each party was to have half the jurats.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Shirley's list of seneschals.

⁶⁵ *R. G.*, 1378.

⁶⁶ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 31.

⁶⁷ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 89.

Nevertheless, the Colombines held the office of mayor for several years, which would seem to indicate that they had the larger half.

Though the citizens of Bordeaux advanced money to the king they took good care to secure its repayment, and Henry was forced to give good security by pawning certain of the royal revenues. We have seen that Gaillard Colom received in part payment of his advances the royal profit (*questam*) from the king's *landes* of Bordeaux.⁶⁸ The king likewise committed to him the entire rent of the city of Bordeaux in part payment of a debt.⁶⁹ This was in August. On September 26 the king issued orders to the *prud'hommes* of a number of small villages to pay their dues to the bishop of Dax, and he in turn was directed to use them in paying part of a debt to Gaillard, though the amount is not stated.⁷⁰ In addition the king farmed the provostship of Bordeaux for one year to William Raymond Colom for 35 pounds of Bordeaux.⁷¹

The financial needs of the king did not cease with the war. He remained in Gascony during the greater part of the next year (1243). Matthew Paris charges him with squandering his money in useless luxury.⁷² No doubt there was some justice in the accusation; but Henry had good excuse for some of his expenditure. During the early months of the year, when war might be renewed at any time, it was necessary to keep the province on some sort of a war footing. Then, no doubt, he had many debts to pay which had been contracted during the war and which he could only meet by new debts. At any rate, for whatever purpose, he spent all the money he could get from England and then had recourse to his loyal subjects of Bordeaux. The Gascon Rolls for this year, as for the last, are thickly strewn with acknowledgments of debt.

⁶⁸ R. G., 405. *Pat. Rolls*, 319.

⁶⁹ R. G., 352. *Pat. Rolls*, 314.

⁷⁰ R. G., 485. *Pat. Rolls*, 327.

⁷¹ R. G., 406. *Pat. Rolls*, 319.

⁷² *Chronica Majora*, IV, 229.

The purposes for which Henry now borrows of the citizens seem much the same as in 1242. Some of the loans were contracted to pay salaries or money fiefs, others for articles of luxury, and others for purposes not specified.

As examples of debts of the first sort we have a loan of 60 marks sterling from Peter Calhau, which sum had been paid to Chiwardo de Chaboneis on the fief of 100 marks.⁷³ Again, on April 25, Henry orders his treasurer to pay over to Raymond Makayn 100 marks, which sum Raymond had paid to Peter Chaceporc—a clerk of the king—and which the king had conceded to Peter as a gift.⁷⁴

Of debts contracted for wine or articles of luxury there are a considerable number. On January 13, by an order to his baillifs we learn that the king purchased of two Bordelais citizens a shipload of wine amounting to 320 tuns.⁷⁵ On February 11 he purchased 30 tuns from W. R. Colom at a cost of 105 pounds of Bordeaux.⁷⁶ On February 8 he owed 270 pounds sterling for 302 tuns bought of William Sycard and Arnold Tuscanan.⁷⁷ On January 29 he owed Peter and Arnold Calhau 270 pounds for 302 tuns of wine.⁷⁸ In June the king gave his bond to Arnold Beraud and Gaillard de Lart for 263 pounds 10 shillings which they have advanced to the king's tailor for the purchase of silk cloths and sendal at the fair at Provins.⁷⁹ Later the king not only paid this bond—in June⁸⁰—but in October he paid Arnold Beraud 210 pounds 10 shillings which he had advanced for a similar purpose.⁸¹

These entries nearly exhaust the direct information which the

⁷³ *R. G.*, 895. *Pat. Rolls*, 368.

⁷⁴ *R. G.*, 1766.

⁷⁵ *R. G.*, 761. *Pat. Rolls*, 356.

⁷⁶ *R. G.*, 837. *Pat. Rolls*, 363, where the cost given is 110 pounds.

⁷⁷ *R. G.*, 833. *Pat. Rolls*, 362.

⁷⁸ *R. G.*, 1677.

⁷⁹ *R. G.*, 996. *Pat. Rolls*, 378.

⁸⁰ *R. G.*, 1797.

⁸¹ *R. G.*, 2032.

Rolls furnish us concerning the purposes for which the king borrowed money. One other purpose we may perhaps infer as possible. Since, frequently, the money is lent in Gascony and orders are issued for its payment in England, it is possible that some of the loans were simply to save the trouble of the transportation of the money to Gascony. In many cases it is evident that the king is simply borrowing money till his treasure can reach him. Again and again it is specified that he will pay these debts upon a certain date or sooner if the money arrives from England. Often, then, these loans were due simply to the clumsiness of the transportation system and to the delays which resulted therefrom. The king had treasure in England, but it was a dangerous thing to transport. Boats and men had to be got ready and possibly the winds were unfavorable. Hence, some days, perhaps weeks, elapsed—and the king borrowed money until it arrived. For example, on June 18, the king promised to pay W. R. Colom 5,000 *solidi* of Bordeaux received from him as a loan.⁸² The money was to be paid one month after midsummer, or sooner if money arrives from England before that date. This is an instance taken at random. Other similar instances are numerous. But suppose the man who lent the money was either going to England or had an agent there. Why not avoid the difficulty and danger of transportation by having the debt paid in England? The merchant or his agent could then use the money for the purchase of goods to be taken to Bordeaux and sold. In this way the king orders debts paid to Gaillard Colom,⁸³ Peter Calhau⁸⁴ and his brother, and Raymond Makayn.⁸⁵

Turning now to those who were creditors of Henry, we find the same set of men as in the previous year. In the first rank come the

⁸² *R. G.*, 1020. *Pat. Rolls*, 381.

⁸³ *R. G.*, 1812, 1945.

⁸⁴ *R. G.*, 1466, 1677.

⁸⁵ *R. G.*, 1668, 1886.

Coloms. Gaillard advanced considerable sums to the king, first 420 marks, 8 shillings, 11 pence; then, apparently, 402 marks.⁸⁶ William Raymond advanced the 5,000 *solidi* already mentioned and smaller sums. Both the Calhau advanced money. At one time the king owed them 270 pounds sterling for wine.⁸⁷ At another they and two other merchants received an order on the English treasurer for 540 pounds sterling for wine.⁸⁸ Raymond Makayn had also extensive financial dealings with Henry. In January he received a bond and an order on the English exchequer for 435 marks and another bond for 200 marks. In August he was given a bond for 460 marks and in September an order on the treasury for that amount.⁸⁹ Arnold Maysent, whose wine was seized for Dover Castle the year before, now lent the king various sums, once 1,000 marks, to be paid when money came from England,⁹⁰ at another time on the same terms 1,000 pounds of Bordeaux.⁹¹ These are illustrations. There are other debts to other merchants but the larger part of the money was advanced by merchants connected with the wine trade, and it would appear also that the larger part both of the money and the wine was furnished by members of the Colombine party, now in power; Faure, Mercato and Lambert, all Solers, did indeed advance money, but much less than the Coloms, Calhau and Makayn.⁹² Another rather suggestive point is that none of the men certainly belonging to the Soler party advanced more money after April, in which month the Colombines came to power in the commune. The largest loan from

⁸⁶ R. G., 739, 1812. *Pat. Rolls*, 354.

⁸⁷ R. G., 1677. Among the smaller loans is one of 250 pounds of Bordeaux. R. G., 832. *Pat. Rolls*, 362.

⁸⁸ R. G. 1466.

⁸⁹ R. G., 775, 776, 1103, 1668, 1886. *Pat. Rolls*, 357, 389.

⁹⁰ R. G., 804. *Pat. Rolls*, 360.

⁹¹ R. G., 1109. *Pat. Rolls*, 390.

⁹² Maysent indeed advanced considerable sums. He may have been a Soler but he was certainly a wine merchant, which perhaps explains his attitude. The ground for regarding him as a Soler is the presence in that

their party, that from Martin Faure of 5,000 *solidi*, was acknowledged January 31, 1243.⁹³ Their loyal generosity could not, it would seem, survive their fall from power at Bordeaux.

The townspeople, then, during and after Henry's campaign of 1242, were of large importance to the king. It is clear that he relied upon them both for military service and for money and for the latter very extensively.

party during Simon de Montfort's administration of a certain Ernaldus Maysenge and a certain Ernaldus Maisenne, seemingly two different persons. One or the other *may* be Maysent; for the proper names of the time show great variations in spelling. The identification seems at best doubtful, and Maysent may well have been a Colombine or a neutral. See *Royal Letters*, II, 388-9, and Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 284-295. An Arnold Maynsani also appears in the *Patent Rolls*, 1247-1258, 608, and seems to be a Soler.

⁹³ R. G., 810. *Pat. Rolls*, 361.

CHAPTER VII

MUNICIPAL CHANGES AT DAX AND BAYONNE, 1243

Henry makes a tour of the south. Measures at Bayonne. Names the hundred peers. Reasons for this step. Reorganizes the commune at Dax. Character and causes of this measure.

HENRY'S conduct in remaining on the continent over four months after the conclusion of the war was not, as it seems to have struck Matthew Paris,¹ due merely to idleness and luxury. On the contrary he used the opportunity thus afforded him to attempt a reorganization of the southern towns. Though Trumbleville may have succeeded in preserving some sort of order in Gascony, yet the elements of discord were numerous and were perhaps increasing, for the time of Henry's campaign was marked by disorders in Dax too serious to be ignored. To settle these troubles Henry made a tour of the south and took advantage of the occasion to overhaul the municipal machinery at both Dax and Bayonne.

The party divisions existing at Bayonne we have already surveyed in connection with the troubles arising from the organization of a confraternity in that city. This confraternity, it will be recalled, Henry had forbidden and had ordered dissolved.² It would seem, however, that these orders had never been entirely enforced. The chief officer of the confraternity was the capdel. This officer

¹ *Chronica Majora*, IV, 229.

² See chapter iv.

had remained, apparently as a regular officer, from 1227 till this time.³ This suggests that the commune had been forced to make some sort of terms with the confraternity and that the riots had ended in a compromise. Henry, on his arrival in the town, renewed his former prohibitions against confraternities⁴ and appears also to have suppressed the capdel, who at any rate ceases to appear.⁵

One of the most essential wheels in communal mechanism, according to the *Établissements de Rouen*, was a body known as the hundred peers. Henry, during his stay in Bayonne, took occasion to nominate the members of this body and to confirm their title by letters patent containing a list of their names. From this fact Giry concludes that the *Établissements*, although granted in 1215, by John, had never been really in operation.⁶ But, as we have seen the machinery provided for the nomination of the mayor actually in force in 1228⁷ there seems no sufficient reason for such a conclusion. It would seem more probable that the confraternity troubles had thrown the communal machinery into some disorder, and there were evidently troubles of some sort in the city about the time of the nomination of the peers. This is shown by the fact that though Henry chose as mayor from the list presented a certain Bernard de Liposse for the year 1243,⁸ yet in July of that year we find him referred to as "sometime mayor" of Bayonne and his property as well as that of the capdel sequestered.⁹ We learn, further, that the capdel

³ Bémont in his introduction to the *Rôles Gascons*, I², civ. See also *R. G.* 28, 820, 1068, 1071, 1612 and *Pat. Rolls*, 361, 386, where the capdel is spoken of as an ordinary officer.

⁴ *R. G.*, 1214. *Pat. Rolls*, 403.

⁵ Bémont, in the Introduction to the *Rôles Gascons*, I², cv.

⁶ Giry, *Établissements*, I, 108.

⁷ *Close Rolls*, 1227-1231, 98.

⁸ *R. G.*, 806. *Pat. Rolls*, 360.

⁹ *R. G.*, 1071, 1073. *Pat. Rolls*, 386. The capdel is cited to appear before the king in May. *R. G.*, 1612.

had extorted money from a canon of the city.¹⁰ The mayor, whatever his offense, received a partial pardon in 1244¹¹ and in the following year was entirely reinstated in the commune.¹² These events indicate clearly that there had been troubles of some sort in the commune and the nomination of the peers may well have been a measure of pacification. Under these circumstances, the nomination would be intended either to fix definitely the membership of that body, or to change somewhat its composition. Possibly it did both, since fixation itself might well mean some modification. Though we cannot feel absolutely certain, still it seems highly probable that the new arrangement was distinctly favorable to the "aristocratic" party. This party had as its leader Michael de Mans, while Dardir was at the head of the other.

Michael was one of those expelled by the confraternity in 1228, and with him—hence doubtless of his party—were R. W. de Mente and Laurentius de Puyane.¹³ In 1273, when a truce was arranged between the two factions, we find enumerated as leaders of the Mans party, A. R. de Pins, W. A. de Saubaignac, and Martin de Saint Jean; as leaders of the Dardir party are Dardir himself, Bernard de Meis and P. A. de Viele.¹⁴ Now thirty years are an ample time for men to have changed sides; but, if we assume that these lists represent permanent affiliations, we should have as members of the Mans faction besides Michael himself, the families of Menta, Puyane, Pins, Saubaignac and St. Jean. On the other side would stand the Dardir, the Viele and the Meis. Turning now to the names of the hundred peers,¹⁵ we find that the name of Michael de Mans heads the list, which also contains the names of *P. A. de Menta*, *Laurens de Pinana*,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 431.

¹² *Ibid.*, 468.

¹³ *Pat. Rolls*, 1225-1232, 192.

¹⁴ Delpit, *Notice d'un Manuscrit*, 120-123.

¹⁵ *R. G.*, 1215. *Pat. Rolls*, 403.

B. de St. Jean, G. A. Deus Piz, P. de Pyane and P. de Saubanac.

Though the identification of some of these names may seem uncertain, yet it would certainly appear that the faction of Michael de Mans was well represented. On the other side none of the Dardir is to be found and only one of the Viele, namely, W. de Viele. Peter de Rosset, one of the popular leaders (at least in 1251)¹⁶ is however included. From this we might infer that Henry was following the policy of Trubleville and strengthening the position of the "aristocratic" faction. His suppression of the confraternity—and as we shall see his policy at Dax—would seem to point in the same direction. Possibly he aimed in Bayonne as in Bordeaux at a compromise which would leave both represented, and if, as the prosecution of the capdel might suggest, the popular party had been implicated in recent troubles, the omission of some of their leaders would not be surprising. We have seen no reason to think that the elements dominant in the commune had been actively disloyal, so that Henry probably had little reason for seeking to bring about a communal revolution, but would be more likely to aim simply at preserving the peace both within the town and between the town and the nobles. This latter object might seem to be best secured by predominance of the aristocratic party.

Henry used his tour in the south not only to effect a settlement in Bayonne but also to make certain changes in Dax, to which we must now turn our attention. Dax, as we have seen, had long been in possession of a commune. Up to this time there do not seem to have developed clearly marked differences of party within the commune itself, but there were abundant elements of discord in the town. In 1242 the town was the scene of grave confusion, owing to violent disputes between the citizens and the bishop, in which the king was forced to intervene. Partly for the settlement of this mat-

¹⁶ Giry, *Établissements*, I, 110.

ter the king stopped at Dax on his way to Bayonne, and, when he had returned to Bordeaux from the latter city, he carried through a reorganization of the municipal government. The government of the commune had hitherto been vested in a capdel and twenty justiciars. This organization the king now abolished, and substituted one with a mayor and twenty jurats.¹⁷ In the charter by which he made this change he expressly provided that he should retain the right to withdraw this new organization at any time, and that if he did so the old system should, *ipso facto*, be restored. This last provision is not a mere phrase, as we might at first suppose. It is found not only in the charter granted by the king, but also in the charter issued by the newly created mayor and jurats setting forth the financial arrangements which they had made with the king.¹⁸ Even more important, the clause is repeated in a confirmation by Edward I in 1278, and is there amplified by a statement of the nature of this earlier organization.¹⁹ Hence, it appears that this provision must have possessed some importance in the royal mind.

What, then, was the significance of the change? Or, to make the question more concrete, how did the mayor and twenty jurats differ from the capdel and twenty justiciars? Abbadie conjectures²⁰—what indeed seems practically certain—that the real change lay in the method of electing the mayor and jurats. The election of the jurats is not elaborated in the charter itself, but in the explanation which the new officers made to the burghers it is set forth with sufficient clearness.²¹ The twenty jurats at the end of the year were to name their successors, and the new jurats were then to propose

¹⁷ *Le Livre noir*, 229. *Pat. Rolls*, 406.

¹⁸ *Le Livre noir*, 159.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 187. The charter of Edward is contained in a *vidimus* and confirmation by Philip IV in 1295.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, xxviii.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 159.

three candidates from whom the king's seneschal was to choose the new mayor. If the capdel was an official elected by the commune, as his association with the citizens in their contest with the knights would suggest, the change as to the mayor would be a concession to the king. In which case, why should he so carefully reserve the right to withdraw the new arrangements? The change to mayor and jurats does not, moreover, stand alone. As soon as it was made the new magistrates concluded an accord with the king concerning the dues to be collected by his viguier in the town.²² On the whole, these arrangements seem rather favorable to the royal interests and have somewhat the appearance of concessions by the townspeople. These considerations would seem to suggest that the jurats were the principal point in view in the changes. Obviously the jurats would constitute a communal oligarchy. May not a certain party have so far desired this as to make such concessions in the election of the mayor and financial matters as to secure it?

The events in Dax just previous to the granting of the new constitution may help to explain its purpose. The town, as we have seen, had been torn by furious disputes between the commune and the bishop. This struggle had arisen out of a quarrel over jurisdiction and had been extremely bitter. The bishop and chapter excommunicated the citizens and placed Dax under an interdict. Certain priests, however, refused to obey the interdict and a petty schism was thus created. Violence was resorted to on both sides, and the king, who was forced to intervene, had considerable difficulty in effecting a settlement.²³ Apparently as a result of this struggle, certainly while it was in progress, the commune became involved in a quarrel with the knights, who refused to plead before the capdel and justiciars. From these two struggles we may perhaps safely con-

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, xxxii, 207, 396. Also *R. G.*, 590, 952, 1196, 1201, 1591. *Pat. Rolls*, 337, 374, 399.

clude that there were in Dax two parties, one made up of the clergy and the knights, the other of the burghers. Did the division strike into the commune itself? We cannot say with certainty, but it is suggestive that five knights, who came forward as fidejussors of the bishop and chapter, style themselves *civès*.²⁵ From this it would, perhaps, be rash to conclude that they were members of the commune, though this impression is strengthened by the fact that one of them is, apparently, the first mayor of Dax.²⁶ These facts, in any case, stand out as fairly clear. At first the commune refused the arbitration of the king and seneschal in the difficulty with the bishop, then it submits, perhaps is forced to submit. Following this Henry introduced a new constitution, and a man apparently associated with the episcopal party becomes mayor. Earlier—at the end of 1242—Henry had intervened to protect the knights against the capdel and burghers.²⁷ These facts would seem to indicate the presence of two parties in the commune, one of which probably included some of the knights and was more favorable to the church than the other. Henry intervened in the interests of peace and supported that party most ready to come to terms. To secure peace in the town he introduced certain changes into the communal institutions, changes designed to increase the royal control but also to place permanently in power such members of the commune as seemed most disposed to maintain peaceful relations with the neighboring seigneurs, principally the bishop. He did not, however, wish to establish such persons in power too securely, and therefore reserved to himself the right to withdraw the new institutions whenever he might choose.

²⁴ *R. G.*, 1291.

²⁵ *Le Livre noir*, 297. A knight is also among the citizens swearing to observe the compromise.

²⁶ The name of the fidejussor is given as *Guilhermus Lupi de Tilh*. Du-fourcet (*Bull. de la Soc. Borda*, I, 458) gives the name of the first mayor as *Guilleume de Tilh*.

²⁷ *R. G.*, 1291.

When these arrangements were completed Henry might feel that he had done for the time being all that could be done to secure the tranquillity of Gascony. In the south he had settled affairs in the chief communes and placed securely in power parties seemingly disposed to preserve friendly relations with the seigneurs. In Bordeaux the dominant faction was strongly attached to him by business interests and there the neighboring barons were less to be considered. That the good order of the province was precarious he may have realized, but there would seem to be little more that he could do at the moment. With whatever feelings, whether of confidence or anxiety, he returned to England in September, leaving behind him Nicholas de Molis as seneschal.²⁸

²⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 380. Shirley's list is at fault by a year here. Molis was appointed in 1243, not 1244.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DICTATORSHIP OF SIMON DE MONTFORT, 1248-1254

Continued disorder in Gascony. Montfort despatched as dictator. Harsh conduct toward the nobles. Policy toward the towns. Character of the municipal parties. Montfort supports popular party. Riot at Bordeaux. Proscription of the Solers. Policy in other towns. Revolts of nobles and proscribed burghers. Complaints to Henry. Henry abandons Montfort. Renewed pretensions of Castile. Anarchy in Gascony following Montfort's removal.

DURING the five years following Henry's return to England Gascony drifted steadily toward anarchy. The king sought, indeed, to strengthen his representative by promising Nicholas de Molis, when he was named as seneschal, an annual sum of 1,000 marks for governmental purposes and 500 marks for personal use.¹ Yet the prospect was so little encouraging that before Henry sailed the seneschal obtained a promise that at the end of one year he might resign his office if he chose.²

Although the seneschal actually remained in office some two years, the time was far from a quiet one for the province which he governed. The troubled condition of Gascony is reflected in the zeal with which the king helped the towns to construct and strengthen their walls. He released the citizens of Bayonne from 320 marks of a sum of 500 marks which they had promised him and directed them to apply the

¹ *Pat. Rolls*, 382.

² *Ibid.*, 396.

money to walling their city.³ He also granted them 300 marks from the exchequer for that purpose.⁴ He directed the seneschal to let the mayor and commune of Bordeaux have 1,000 pounds of Tours for the walling of their city.⁵ Later in the year both Bayonne and Dax received the royal bond for 100 pounds each for the same purpose.⁶ The seneschal is likewise given a letter of credit for 500 marks for fortifying the castle of La Réole. In addition he received a letter of credit authorizing him to contract a loan of 500 marks to be used solely for the defense of Gascony. Afterwards three pairs of like letters were given him, and then still others.⁷

Of the troubles which gave rise to these measures a war with Navarre was the chief.⁸ In this the men of Bayonne lent loyal aid and the king accepted as a loan 1,000 marks which they obtained from the seizure of such goods of men of Navarre as they found within reach. In accepting the loan the king promised to be responsible for any future restitution. In the towns themselves there were also troubles. At Bayonne the seneschal named as mayor, in defiance of the *Établissements*, Peter de Rosset, of the popular party,⁹ and the former mayor, Bernard de Liposse, received a pardon.¹⁰ When difficulties with France required arbitration the arbitrator first chosen, the count of Bigorre, could not act because of war and the mayor of Bordeaux was substituted.¹¹

Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that, in July of 1245, Nicholas de Molis laid down his office.¹² The king appointed

³ *Ibid.*, 422.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 423.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 436.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 445.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 422.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 434, 445.

⁹ Balasque, *Études*, II, 99.

¹⁰ *Pat. Rolls*, 431. A full pardon was given later. *Ibid.*, 468.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 434.

¹² *Ibid.*, 457.

William de Boell to take his place.¹³ The new seneschal, who remained in office over two years, followed his predecessor's example at Bayonne, where he named John Dardir as mayor.¹⁴ At Bordeaux the Colombines remained in power for the entire time. Grants on a smaller scale occur for fortifying the towns and Bordeaux received a gift of 500 marks, with a promise of as much more.¹⁵ There were also some debts to citizens both under Boell and Molis,¹⁶ especially to Raymond Makayn.¹⁷ The king likewise intervened in a dispute between Rustengo de Soler and the commune over the height of one of his houses in the city.¹⁸

In November of 1247 Boell was superseded by Drogo de Barentyn.¹⁹ He, however, remained in office less than a year. The general condition of the province was such as to call for a stronger hand than his. During his administration, or the latter part of his predecessor's, a change had occurred in the party in control at Bordeaux. From 1243 to 1247 the mayors belonged to the Colombine faction. In 1247 the year began with a Colombine, W. Gondemer, but his term seems to have been interrupted, for we find in the same year Peter Bonafus of the opposite party in office, and the commune remained under the control of the Solers for the next two years.

These data from the rolls do not, however, give an adequate picture of the general state of the country, which was becoming worse and worse. The disorder constantly increased and matters seemed fast tending toward the condition of the early years of the reign. The nobles had never been under any very great degree of control,

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Balasque, *Études*, II, 99.

¹⁵ *Pat. Rolls*, 468, 506.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 431, 432, 471, 480, 500.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 453, 500.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 473.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1247-1258, 2.

and Henry's repeated failures and disasters on the continent had doubtless much diminished whatever awe they may once have felt for the royal power. They waged their private wars in entire disregard of the seneschal, who found himself too weak to control them. Civil strife raged in most of the cities;²⁰ Dax was being plundered by Gaston of Béarn; the viscounts of Gramont, Soule and Tartas, with the help of the Navarrese, were ravaging the region of the Labour; Amauin de Vayres and the viscount of Fronsac were battling for the town of Blaye.²¹ The towns themselves, under aristocratic factions, were impatient of royal control.²² The agents of the French king circulated through the country and claimants for the duchy, either in whole or in part, arose on every hand to threaten the Plantagenet supremacy in its last province. Among these claimants were the count of Champagne and the king of Navarre, the viscount of Béarn, and the king of Castile, while behind them all, as an ever present threat, stood the king of France.²³

With this spectacle before him Henry determined on vigorous measures. Richard de Grey was sent out as seneschal and charged to restore order.²⁴ He, however, soon abandoned the post and the king turned to Simon de Montfort. Simon, being just about to join St. Louis on a crusade, was most reluctant to undertake the heavy task. Finally, however, the prayers of the king and queen prevailed and he yielded. But he dictated his own terms. He was to be appointed for seven years and was to be left wholly free during that time. If attacked by an outside power he was to have prompt help. Two thousand marks were to be given him at the start, and the king agreed to maintain fifty knights in his service for one year.²⁵ Mat-

²⁰ Tout, in Hunt and Poole, *Political History of England*, III, 70.

²¹ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 21.

²² Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 439, and, Tout, *ibid.*

²³ Tout, *ibid.*

²⁴ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 22. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 9, 10. The terms of the appointment are an indication of the prevailing anarchy.

²⁵ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 22-23.

thew Paris declares that in entrusting him with such powers the king ordered, persuaded and besought him to treat the rebels harshly and sternly.²⁶ Here, then, were clearly indicated Simon's policy and duty. He was a dictator sent by the English king to Gascony to establish order with a high hand, by crushing and punishing the nobles who were disturbing the peace of the province. Whether or not this was the real intention of the king, it was clearly the way in which Simon interpreted his mission. He appears to have considered himself sent to subdue a rebellious dependency, and to have thought that in Gascony he had to deal with traitors and rebels who possessed no rights which he was bound to respect.

And yet, if we examine the case more closely, had the royal policy undergone much change? Hitherto we have seen that the English hold on Gascony had been based on an alliance with the towns. We have found no reason to suppose that the nobles were particularly loyal to the king. It was the towns, not the barons, that had resisted the invasion of Alfonso and opposed the French. It was against the nobles especially that Simon seems to have felt himself sent. How, then, would he be disposed to deal with the towns? The question was no longer as simple as in the early days of Henry's reign, for, whereas the towns had then appeared as united corporations they were now divided between contending parties. If Simon were to direct his chief hostility against the nobles, we should *a priori* expect to find him supporting the anti-baronial party in the towns,—if, as we surmised, one of the communal factions usually tended to a closer alliance with the surrounding seigneurs than the other. As we shall see, this result soon followed.

Appointed on May 1, 1248,²⁷ Simon did not arrive in Gascony till the autumn. In September Drogo de Barentyn was ordered to

²⁶ *Chronica Majora*, V, 293.

²⁷ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 264.

turn over the province.²⁸ (Grey, it would seem, had not taken possession.) When the earl arrived at Bordeaux he found that the two factions had patched up a truce, and, therefore, he began his rule by assuming an attitude of neutrality. The Solers, it will be recalled, were dominant in the commune, and by the election for 1249 of Martin Faure as mayor they retained their supremacy.²⁹ Simon admitted to his counsels men of both parties but began to allow his preference for the Colombines to appear.³⁰ If we may trust the testimony of the Solers themselves the commune under their control was at peace with all the neighboring feudal lords.³¹ This in itself might explain Simon's hostility.

For purposes of feudal justice Gascony was divided into four circuits having as their centers Bordeaux, Bazas, St. Sever and Dax. The new seneschal made a rapid tour of these places, holding his court in each with a sufficient military backing to secure not only verdicts but their execution.³² His dealings with the nobles whom he summoned before his court we have no need to consider in detail. Enough that he proceeded against them sternly and with a contempt for legal forms that boded ill for the future. At his courts he seized, without judgment or trial, some of the seigneurs who had been a source of trouble in times past and cast them into prison. Others he compelled to surrender to him their fortresses.³³ This stern policy could not fail to cause disquiet, the more so as the earl seems to have acted with an arbitrary disregard of forms. This could hardly fail to trouble even the law-abiding. Very likely those seigneurs whom Simon treated harshly deserved whatever they received at his hands; but, if the viscount of Gramont could be flung into a dungeon with-

²⁸ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 27.

²⁹ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 23. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 23.

³⁰ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 23.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 297.

³² *Ibid.*, 23-24.

³³ *Ibid.*, 24.

out even being brought before a judge,³⁴ what security had anyone that any rights or privileges would be respected if he hampered in any wise the action of the stern seneschal?

Such a beginning may have provoked alarm among the townspeople, but Simon gave them other causes of complaint. Some of the citizens were treated no less arbitrarily than the seigneurs.³⁵ He did not hesitate to override, in the case of Saut at any rate, some of their cherished privileges.³⁶ At his court at Dax a decision was rendered which gravely affected the interests of the burghers. When debts were contracted, it was customary for several persons to act as pledges for the debtor and if the latter failed to pay the commune not infrequently ordered the seizure of the property of those who had guaranteed the loan. This practice of seizing property on a simple order of a communal court appeared to Simon as one of the most frequent causes of quarrels with the neighboring seigneurs, and he, therefore, induced an assembly of prelates, barons, knights and burghers to decree its abolition.³⁷ Some of the burghers—perhaps all—had indeed assented to this decree in the assembly, but secretly they detested it as rendering it more difficult for them to collect their debts. The seneschal had thus provoked an undercurrent of ill-feeling in the town.³⁸

Yet Simon gave the towns some cause for gratitude. At Dax he seized the lords of Labourd, who had been pillaging the merchants, and imposed on them a heavy ransom. The viscount of Gramont he consigned to a prison in La Réole. The viscount of Soule was likewise roughly handled.³⁹ No doubt there were many

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 24. He was kept in prison six years.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

³⁷ Balasque, *Études*, II, 102.

³⁸ They make it later a subject of complaint. Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 301. Balasque, *Études*, II, 582.

³⁹ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, in the *Revue historique*, IV, 245-46.

burghers in Dax and Bayonne who rejoiced to see the barons who had pillaged them thus humbled, and the fact that the proceedings were illegal doubtless troubled them but little. Whatever its ultimate consequences, for the moment Simon's stern policy was completely successful. The nobles were awed by such unaccustomed vigor in the seneschal and a sudden peace descended upon Gascony. To complete the pacification of the province he concluded an accord with the king of Navarre and arranged a truce with Gaston of Béarn.⁴⁰

Yet the peace was most precarious. Below the surface innumerable resentments smoldered. Those of the nobles are easy to understand, but the towns were likewise discontented. Bayonne, or rather perhaps some of her citizens, resented the peace with Navarre, and Dax was angered by that with Béarn.⁴¹ Moreover, the party balance in the towns was most unstable. At Dax there were renewed disorders and complaints had no doubt already reached the ears of Simon against the powers that were. At Bordeaux the seneschal tried to take counsel with both parties, and at Bayonne he had forbidden the "companies," which was possibly but another name for the confraternity.⁴² This might seem a blow at the popular party; but he summoned to his side their leader John Dardir,⁴³ so that his attitude still remained ambiguous.

During the following year the trouble came to a head in various places. Dax and Bordeaux, however, were its chief centers. At Dax the retiring mayor, Bernard de Francès, had named his own successor; or, at least, secured the election of the new mayor from his own party. Legally three names should have been presented to the seneschal, who should have chosen the mayor from among them.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 247-48.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* See further Balasque *Études*, II, 582, where the complaints of the citizens are printed.

⁴² Bémont, in Introduction to the *Rôles Gascons*, I², cv.

⁴³ Balasque, *Études*, II, 116-117, and in the *Pièces*, 584.

Francès, or the Dacquois, did not trouble to observe the law but chose the mayor outright.⁴⁴ Simon at once descended on the city. He kept the two in custody till he arrived at Bordeaux, and they based his action upon other grounds. During the tumults in Dax a cleric had been killed by a nephew of Francès, and Francès, who was then mayor, compelled the relatives to pronounce the formula of pardon. The mother of the murdered man, however, appealed to Simon, who, coming to Dax, forced an assembly of burghers to swear not to molest the family of the cleric for their complaint. With that he left the city carrying with him both Francès and his successor. He kept the two in custody till he arrived at Bordeaux and they were then released only after taking an oath not to return to Dax.⁴⁵

Apparently the storm at Bordeaux followed a little later. According to Gaillard de Soler, warnings had some time before begun to reach Rustengo, his father and titular leader of the party, that Simon was allying himself with their enemies and forming a combination for their overthrow. Rustengo, by this same account, refused to believe that the English government could take sides against one who had rendered such important services as he had done. Yet as we have reason to believe that Henry had already placed the Colombines in power at the expense of the Solers, we may discount these statements of Gaillard, which represent his father and party as taken entirely by surprise.

Of what followed we have two accounts, one that of the Soler party contained in the complaint which Gaillard de Soler afterwards addressed to the king, and the other in the answer of Simon to the charges.⁴⁶ On the main facts there is substantial agreement, but in details considerable, though not irreconcilable, difference. Perhaps

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Both are published by Bémont in the *Pièces justificatives* to his *Simon de Montfort*.

from the two we may reconstruct the sequence of events with sufficient accuracy. Also we may inquire if they agree with such tentative conclusions as we have reached respecting the character of the parties.

The situation in Bordeaux was in substance this. Simon, still claiming neutrality, was yet leaning—or seeming to lean—towards the Colombines. The Solers were growing uneasy at the preference shown their rivals. If, as was suggested, the Solers were more or less intimately associated with the neighboring barons and the aristocratic faction at Bayonne, the seneschal might well feel the difficulty of leaving in power at Bordeaux a party affiliated with elements he was preparing to attack. The Colombines, feeling sure of his favor, determined to bring matters to a crisis. On the eve of St. Peter and St. Paul (June 28) a tumult broke out in the city. In the documents the cause is not specified, but we may surmise that the approach of the communal election was the chief factor in the case. At this time the mayor appears to have been chosen on the twenty-ninth of June,⁴⁷ and the riot therefore took place the night before. According to their own statement both the Solers and the seneschal were taken by surprise, yet the presence of partisans from La Réole would seem to indicate that the Solers were not so unprepared as they pretended. Hearing of the riot, the mayor, jurats and three hundred, who seem to have been upon the side of the Solers, hurriedly repaired to the scene of the disturbance and tried in vain to quiet it. At about the same time Montfort was aroused from his sleep by the news of the tumult, and with such men-at-arms as were at hand he hurried forth into the streets. Once upon the spot, he commanded both parties to cease their combat. The Colombines, doubtless sure of the seneschal in advance, at once obeyed, drawing back from the *melée* and toward Montfort. The Solers, disregarding

⁴⁷ *R. G.*, 3767. *Pat. Rolls*, 303.

his presence—or considering him as in league with their enemies—continued the attack. So that, whatever his first intentions, Simon soon found himself fighting side by side with the Colombines against their rivals. After a fierce struggle wherein several prominent men of both parties lost their lives, the Solers were repulsed. Simon and his forces at once besieged the house of Rustengo de Soler, who, old and sick, had taken no direct part in the riot, and finally induced or compelled him to surrender, together with several other leaders of his party.

Order temporarily restored, Simon demanded twenty hostages from each of the two parties. Among those who presented themselves from the Solers were Peter Lambert, Peter Viger, Raymond Arnold Monader, Thomas, son of Martin Faure, Jordan and Bernard d'Arca, Arnold de Camparran and Silvester Raymond Monader. So far as the rolls serve to show, not one of these was engaged in the wine trade. Several, however, may have had relatives who had some dealings in English commerce. But none, either directly or through possible relatives, were deeply involved therein. Not only did Simon compel both parties to give hostages, but he also compelled them to surrender to him a number of their houses.

The attitude of the seneschal could not be long in doubt. To his mind it appeared clear that the Solers were to blame and the Colombines comparatively innocent. Had not the latter promptly obeyed his orders and withdrawn from the *melée* while the Solers had violently attacked him? Very soon, therefore, he released the hostages he had taken from the Colombines, or allowed them to give their sons or relatives as substitutes, and restored to them their property, while he detained the Solers in prison.

Many of the partisans of the Solers had fled the city after the riot and in particular the two sons of Rustengo, Gaillard, the active leader of the faction, and his brother Peter had been absent at the time. Refugees and absentees alike hesitated to return to the city,

where they had to dread not only the hostility of the seneschal but the violence of the Colombrines, who, according to the Soler version, destroyed much of their property without interference from Simon. In vain the seneschal proclaimed that all might return to the city in safety, for he added the provision that they should justify themselves before the court. The Colombrines now held the commune in their hands, and but few of their adversaries cared to face the court, whether it were that of the commune or the seneschal.⁴⁸ Simon declared the goods of those who did not return forfeited, and seized upon them, no doubt to the immense delight of their triumphant enemies.

Outside the city the exiled Solers promptly involved themselves in the baronial wars. Raymond, viscount of Fronsac, and Amauvin de Vayres had previously been disputing for the possession of Blaye. The question had been submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrators ordered the viscount to deliver the castle of Fronsac to Simon during his term of office as seneschal.⁴⁹ Raymond not only refused to surrender the castle but he sheltered in it the fugitive Solers. Montfort acted with vigor and decision. At Bordeaux, after the riot, William Raymond Colom had been installed as mayor. At the head of his knights and of the commune of Bordeaux Simon sallied forth upon the rebellious viscount. Fronsac was besieged and soon taken, but Raymond and his friends succeeded in making their escape.

While these events were in progress the aged Rustengo de Soler died in the prison of the seneschal, Gaillard, his son, having refused to take his place as a hostage. If Gaillard entertained any hopes of succeeding to his father's property he little understood the temper of Simon de Montfort. The possessions of the unfortunate Rustengo

⁴⁸ Their reluctance seems to have been well founded for Simon treated some who did return with scant justice. Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 30. The details are drawn from the complaints of Gaillard Soler above referred to.

⁴⁹ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 30.

were at once seized, among them the castle of Belin, while the same treatment was accorded the property of the viscount.⁵⁰

After the fall of Fronsac, Gaillard de Soler and some of his friends who were still at large fled to England to lay their griefs before the king. At court they were well received and Henry even issued an order for the restoration of their property.⁵¹ But their prosperity was brief. Simon did not obey the order, and the new mayor of Bordeaux, William Raymond Colom, arrived suddenly in London.⁵² In a short time he succeeded in changing the royal views to such a degree that Gaillard and twelve companions were arrested and thrown into prison,⁵³ where Simon found them when he himself arrived in May of 1250. The English council had decided that Gaillard and his colleagues should be tried before the court of Gascony and they were accordingly turned over to the tender mercies of the seneschal.⁵⁴ Simon, without troubling himself to try them before any court, cast them into prison and at length released them only at the price of a heavy fine.⁵⁵

The downfall of the Solers at Bordeaux was felt throughout Gascony. On their side in the bloody riot of June 28 there had fought several members of the Pins family, one of the most influential in La Réole.⁵⁶ Those implicated in the riot Simon seized, and in addition he compelled the town to give hostages. This done, he placed the Pins and the hostages together on the island of Oléron and they remained prisoners till 1254. He also banished many citizens from the town.⁵⁷ From La Réole he turned to Bazas. Here, as

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 31, note 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 381.

⁵⁴ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 31. Letter of the king to Simon in Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 449.

⁵⁵ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 31.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 32. R. G., 3929, 4136, 4137, 4291, 4293. *Pat. Rolls*, 319, 337, 338

at Bordeaux, there were two factions. Thither Simon went, having been warned against one of the factions by the new mayor of Bordeaux. The two factions were led, one by Bertrand de Ladils and Arnold de Ladils, the other by William Arnold de Ladils and Mendaldus Guitarin. It was this latter faction which was favored by the Colombines, and Simon's first act was to demand hostages from their opponents. Fearing the same fate as that which had overtaken the Solers, they refused his demand and took refuge in the church, which Simon promptly besieged. Many burghers were killed, others seized and banished and their property pillaged.⁵⁸

The communes of the north thus temporarily settled, Simon turned to the south to stop the ravages of Gaston of Béarn on the Adour.⁵⁹ Temporarily triumphant on all sides, he was able to leave the province in February of 1250 for a visit to England. In a single year he had upset the political balance in three of the chief communes of northern Gascony. What, then, was the inner significance of these events?

For one thing it is evident that the parties in these three towns were intimately related to each other. Some of the leaders of the factions of La Réole were involved in the riots at Bordeaux on the side of the Solers, and at Bazas the action of the seneschal was attributed to the influence of the Colombines. How and why should these parties be thus connected? What was the real basis of the division at Bordeaux?—for this will almost certainly throw light upon the problem. Of the persons who are named in the course of the tumult and the events following nearly all of the Colombines were more or less involved in the English wine trade, while scarcely any of the Solers can be found mentioned in this connection. Jullian, indeed, considers that the basis of the hostility of the two parties was a com-

⁵⁸ These facts appear in a complaint against Simon drawn up by two citizens of Bazas and published by Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 309.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

mercial rivalry in the English market.⁶⁰ Though he states his conclusions as *sans aucun doute*, nevertheless there appear strong reasons for questioning it. There is no doubt that, in the time of John, Rustengo de Soler was an English wine merchant. John's seizure of his wine proves it. Yet from that time forward no record is to be found of his being engaged in that trade. If he were a large wine merchant it is strange that, while the English king was almost continually buying wine of the Coloms, he *never once* appears as buying of the Solers.⁶¹ This silence of the rolls would seem to warrant the conclusion that Rustengo had turned his attention in other directions. As early as 1217 he had been put in charge of a castle as a royal officer. In 1219 he had been bailiff of Dax⁶² and in 1227 he had been granted estates in fief.⁶³ In 1228 he is put in charge of the Castle of Belin,⁶⁴ which by 1249 he holds as a regular feudal possession. In addition, he had been custodian of Bayonne⁶⁵ and served as seneschal of Gascony.

From such a career the conclusion seems evident. Abandoning the wine trade Rustengo has become a feudal lord, and gradually affiliated himself to some extent with the other feudal lords of that region. Around him in his faction he had grouped the Acras, the Lamberts, the Faures and the Vigers. Of these we may dispose briefly. In 1224 Bernard d' Acra obtained permission to bring goods to England for two years.⁶⁶ At the time Acra was the repre-

⁶⁰ *Histoire de Bordeaux*, 142.

⁶¹ The only record of such a purchase that I have been able to find is in 1224, when Henry paid John de Solers for 55 tuns of wine bought at Bristol, *Rot. litt. claus.*, I, 597. The name Soleris was not unknown at other places than Bordeaux, as a glance at the index of the Rolls will show, and there is nothing definitely to connect this person with Bordeaux except the name.

⁶² Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 46.

⁶³ *Charter Rolls*, I, 61.

⁶⁴ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, I, 320.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 319.

⁶⁶ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 496.

sentative of the commune in London. Otherwise, neither of the Acras is to be found mentioned in connection with the English trade. The Vigers—or at least Elias—were engaged in the English wine trade in the reign of John, that is, in 1203. In 1204, however, Elias acquired the estate of Beggles and seems to have followed in the footsteps of Rustengo, for he is not again heard of in this connection. There is nothing to show that the Lamberts or the Faures were ever engaged in commerce. Another partisan of Rustengo, Peter Bonafus, was a wine merchant in 1224, but, like the others is not again thus mentioned. The other supporters of the Solers can none of them be identified as engaged in the English commerce. If we turn now to their opponents, the case is different. The Coloms themselves were deeply involved in English trade. With them was associated Peter Calhau, who was also prominent in the same field.⁶⁷ Thus we find the chief leaders of the party distinctly representative of this class of interests. Of course, on the basis of these facts we are not warranted in assuming that the Solers had entirely abandoned the wine trade but only that their English interests had ceased to be their main ones, that they had become distinctly subordinate to other interests.

To sum up then what we may conclude concerning the parties at Bordeaux: It would seem that the early commune was ruled, largely if not wholly, by merchants engaged chiefly in English commerce; that as time went on a division occurred. Some of these merchants, having doubtless amassed considerable wealth, began to invest this wealth in land, to acquire fiefs and to mix with and draw towards the Gascon nobility. Gradually there arose an opposition between this element and those citizens who had continued their commercial activities. By 1229 hostility had grown so great that a revolt

⁶⁷ William R. Colom was engaged in the English trade in 1242 and 1243. (*R. G.*, 349, 837. *Pat. Rolls*, 313, 363). Peter Colom obtains an exemption for a ship loaded with wine in 1254 (*R. G.*, 2955). The Calhau were engaged in the same trade in 1243 and in 1253 (*R. G.*, 1466, 1677, 2743).

broke out directed against the seneschal, who, with the aid of the aristocratic party, suppressed the disorder. The now dominant Solers at once suggest to the seneschal the taxation of wine, a thought not likely to occur to men seriously interested in this traffic. The two parties continue their strife intermittently till Henry, in his campaign of 1242, is brought over by loans from the Colombines and induced to put them in power. They fall, however, before their adversaries in 1247. In 1249 Simon de Montfort again hurls the Solers from their supremacy and replaces their rivals.

Assuming that this interpretation of the situation and events at Bordeaux is correct, how does it help us to understand the parties in La Réole and Bazas? A party allied with the nobility might easily have more or less close relations with a similar party in other towns, and business relations—for one thing—might draw their opponents together. Close personal relations between various leaders is evidenced by the occasions on which they acted as pledges for each other, as when Peter Calhau and Bernard d'Alhan pledged themselves to the extent of 500 marks for the loyalty of Peter de Rosset of Bayonne.⁶⁸ Similarly we find Columbus de Burgo, a citizen of Bordeaux, acting as an agent for Garsie Aquelin, a citizen of St. Macaire, and receiving money from the king for his use.⁶⁹ Inter-marriage also, at times, bound together members of the different parties in certain towns, as when a daughter of W. A. de Ladils, popular leader at Bazas, married Columbus de Burgo, one of the Colombines at Bordeaux.⁷⁰ If the Colombines were a commercial party, they would almost necessarily have an affiliated faction in the neighboring towns. A group of men engaged in the export of Gascon wine to England could easily form close relations with such groups of persons in La Réole and Bazas as were accustomed to

⁶⁸ *R. G.*, 3925. *Pat. Rolls*, 319.

⁶⁹ *R. G.*, 2680.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4384.

make Bordeaux their market. Then too, members of the same family might in the way of business settle in different towns. This is suggested by the fact that persons of the same name are to be found associated with different communes. Thus there was a Bertrand de Ladils at Bazas, another at La Réole⁷¹ and, later, still another at Bordeaux.⁷² Moreover we have seen reason to conclude only that the Solers and their affiliated factions were not deeply interested in the English trade, not that they had withdrawn from all commerce. Some of their estates may have been so situated that they found other markets for their wine more advantageous. It is suggestive in this connection that in 1248 the commune of La Réole undertook to protect the persons and property of merchants of Toulouse in their city;⁷³ and, also, that some of the Réolese citizens who fled before the wrath of Simon sought refuge in Marmande and some in Spain.⁷⁴

Simon had evidently, then, made up his mind to trust the Anglo-commercial party at Bordeaux and its affiliated factions at Bazas and La Réole. No doubt the friendship of the Solers for the feudal lords such as the viscount of Fronsac had much to do with their downfall. Simon must have known well enough how much the nobles hated him and he may well have thought it unsafe to leave parties friendly to them in control of the towns. When he returned to England the province was outwardly at peace, but discontent was bitter and the situation precarious.

During the earl's absence, in March of 1250, the signs of revolt began to show themselves. He hurried back to Gascony to meet the insurrection, but found that province outwardly tranquil. His enemies were arming but had not yet struck a blow. At Bordeaux he

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 4281, and page 124 of this study.

⁷² See Index to *R. G.*, vol. III.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, XV, 168.

⁷⁴ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 72.

imposed a peace upon the citizens and forced both parties to swear it. The reason for this was perhaps the fact that he saw himself forced to release some of the Soler faction and wished to put it out of their power to do him mischief. The peace did not, however, include the principal Soler leaders, who were to be anathema to all good citizens as they were to the earl. Gaillard de Soler is expressly mentioned as a child of discord and the citizens are obliged to swear to oppose him and his chief followers as well as to be loyal to the seneschal.⁷⁵ At Dax also a riot on July 25, ending in the death of the mayor, Domemic de Bilambiz, had given Simon an opportunity to impose a peace and to compel mayor, jurats and citizens to swear it.⁷⁶

For the rest, the seneschal fortified and waited for the malcontents to strike the first blow.⁷⁷ At length, having allowed the earl to expend most of his money in fortifications and other expenses, his enemies rose in open revolt in January of 1251.⁷⁸ The leaders of the insurgents were Gaston of Béarn, Amaneus d'Albret, the viscount of Fronsac and other nobles, reinforced by Gaillard de Soler and many citizens from Bordeaux, La Réole and Bazas.⁷⁹ A sharp and bitter struggle followed wherein, in spite of many odds against him, Simon triumphed over his adversaries. By the beginning of 1252 he had temporarily cowed the Gascon nobles and compelled the Solers to pay a ransom and swear not to return to Bordeaux during his administration. Hence he was able to return to England for the purpose of defending himself before the king.

During this struggle with the Gascon barons Simon had com-

⁷⁵ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 86. The text of the treaty as approved by the king is published in Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 461. See also Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 35-36.

⁷⁶ Bémont, *ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁷ The revenues of Ireland had been assigned to him by Henry in November of 1249 for the purpose of fortifying. See Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 55, and *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 55.

⁷⁸ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 36.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

pleted the series of communal revolutions by overriding the *Établissements* at Bayonne and naming a mayor from the popular party.⁸⁰ Such a revolution is not surprising; the wonder is rather that it was so long delayed. The popular faction had been in favor with Simon from the first; he declared later that John Dardir had been his adviser throughout his administration.⁸¹ This party was, moreover, closely affiliated with the Colombines, since later on Calhau acts as a pledge for Rosset, whom Simon had named as mayor. In addition there would seem to have been special reasons for suspicions against the faction of Michael de Mans. For one thing, Mans himself belonged to the family of the lords of Labourd, whom Simon had arrested without a judgment on his first arrival in the province. In any case, with Rosset mayor of Bayonne the allies of the Colombines dominated all the towns of Gascony.⁸²

Outwardly, Simon was successful in his policy. Gascony was again at peace and the revolt against him had been put down. Yet the end of his administration was near at hand. His overthrow, however, was accomplished not in Gascony but in England. Ever since Simon's arrival on the continent complaints had poured in to the king. At the very beginning of the revolt of 1251, while Simon was yet in England, Henry's faith in him had been shaken. When the earl was returning to Gascony Matthew Paris represented the king as saying to him: "By God's head, Sir Count, I will not deny that you have fought bravely for me and rendered efficient service. But, in truth, there ascends a clamor of grave complaint against you, that men coming to you in peace and summoned by you in good faith, you have seized and even put to death."⁸³ The clamor was ascending more and more with every year of Simon's government,

⁸⁰ Giry, *Établissements*, I, 110.

⁸¹ Balasque, *Études*, II, 584.

⁸² Except, perhaps, Dax.

⁸³ *Chronica Majora*, V, 209.

and the king was more and more doubtful of the policy of his lieutenant. For the time, in 1251, he had sent Simon back with supplies, especially money.⁸⁴ He had, however, sent over commissioners to investigate the severity of his seneschal.⁸⁵ Now, when at the end of 1251 Simon returned victorious, the king was more than ever shaken by the storm of accusation and denunciation which that victory had called forth. For the moment Simon won with the king as with the Gascons. Indeed the earl had two strong arguments to offer. Behind him lay a pacified province, and in his hands he bore a letter from the commune of Bordeaux in which the Colombine faction, now wholly dominant, declared that, amidst the gravest difficulties and the bitterest opposition, the earl had, up to that time, governed the king's lands "with potent strenuousness, with prudent circumspection, with just moderation, with persevering clemency, assisting loyal subjects and punishing rebels, without danger to any or profuse expenditure."⁸⁶ Such a letter from the chief commune of Gascony had doubtless a great effect on Simon's contemporaries. Influenced by the restored order on the continent and the enthusiastic endorsement of Bordeaux, the king hesitated and wavered,⁸⁷ when news arrived which destroyed Simon's chief defense. Hardly had he left Gascony when the province he had pacified rose in revolt. The whole task had to be undertaken again and new supplies of money must be found. The earl's policy had accomplished nothing, and order in the duchy was as far off as before. Again the rebels proffered the same excuse. The injustice, violence and cruelty of Simon left them no other recourse. Under such conditions Henry could hardly avoid suspecting that there was foundation for the com-

⁸⁴ Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, V, 209.

⁸⁵ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 37-38. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 85.

⁸⁶ From a letter of Adam Marsh published in the *Monumenta Franciscana*, 122.

⁸⁷ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 45.

plaints, and truth in the accusations. Besides, if this went on much longer, would not the exasperated nobility call in the aid of other claimants, as the king of France or of Castile? Henry felt it necessary to abandon his seneschal and ordered an examination of his conduct. To Gascony he despatched envoys commanding that the chief towns, Bordeaux, La Réole, Bazas, Dax, St. Sever, St. Émilion and Bayonne, should send representatives to present their grievances to him directly, and that some of the chief nobles should attend in person.⁸⁸ He ordered Simon to remain in England to meet and answer his accusers.⁸⁹

The royal commissioners found Gascony in chaos. The nobles were in full revolt, the towns were shaken. At La Réole, where Simon was especially unpopular because of a *taille* he had levied,⁹⁰ the party depressed by him had revolted and, with the help of Gaston of Béarn and 100 men-at-arms whom he brought with him, were besieging the earl's partisans in the castle.⁹¹ The commissioners, after some difficulty, succeeded in imposing a truce until the king could finish his investigation.⁹² Simon, however, did not obey the king. Justifying himself, no doubt, by the charter which had given him the government of Gascony for seven years, he set off for that province with such money as he could obtain.

Now the threads of Gascon affairs tangled themselves into a deeper skein. Three sets of events moved forward simultaneously, war between Simon and his foes in Gascony, investigations of his conduct in London, and negotiations between him and his royal brother-in-law. From every corner of the province complaints poured up against him. Even the towns deserted the seneschal. Bazas and

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁸⁹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 81.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 76. Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 41.

⁹² Bémont, *ibid.*, Shirley, *ibid.*

Bayonne besought the king to remove him. At Bayonne the popular party itself, which he had placed in power, abandoned him, and John Dardir headed a delegation to complain of his conduct.⁹³ It may easily have been that the earl had gone farther than even his partisans were willing to follow, or it may have been that the violent turmoil in the province was reacting injuriously on trade, and the popular factions felt it necessary to secure a somewhat less radical policy. The burghers had, moreover, special causes of complaint. The terms which Simon had made with the nobles had often irritated the citizens, especially, perhaps, those of the popular party. He had also made certain changes in the currency which had not been received with favor.⁹⁴ Many of the exemptions and privileges of the towns he had refused to respect, as when he had insisted upon the payment of the *taille* by the citizens of La Réole in spite of their protests.⁹⁵ The peace which he had imposed at Dax and at Bordeaux may have been unpopular with certain classes, and he had shown scant respect for the burghers on some occasions, as when he punished certain citizens of Dax upon his own authority in defiance of the complaints of the commune that this contravened their rights of justice.⁹⁶ Often, too, the local agents of the earl seem to have been unwisely chosen and to have brought discredit on their master.⁹⁷ Behind all other subjects of complaint there was, no doubt, the greater one of the general disorder of the province. That disorder may well have seemed intolerable and the burghers have discerned no hope of peace under Simon's government. So clear had this become that even Colombine Bordeaux forsook the seneschal, though somewhat later.⁹⁸ Perhaps already the nobles were threatening to

⁹³ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 305. Balasque, *Études*, II, 584.

⁹⁴ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, in the *Revue historique*, IV, 263.

⁹⁵ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 72.

⁹⁶ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, in the *Revue historique*, IV, 267.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 261-262. Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 441.

⁹⁸ Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, V, 378.

call in the king of Castile, as they were shortly to do, which would in itself have tended to alienate the popular factions.

Henry began at once an attempt at conciliation and compromise. Simon in vain defended himself, the king modified and interfered with his policy. Besides dealing with the nobles the monarch sought to mediate between the parties at Bordeaux. On June 6 he wrote to the commune directing that the jurats should be taken in equal numbers from both parties as he had arranged when he last visited the city.⁹⁹ We may, however, surmise that the letter had but little effect on the Colombines. The king had already, on May 16, cancelled as illegal an agreement which Simon had forced the Solers to sign, pledging themselves not to appeal from his judgment to the king's.¹⁰⁰ Seeming to fear that his effort at compromise would fail, Henry ordered the citizens of Bordeaux to keep the peace till he should come to Gascony.¹⁰¹ Already, then, he had decided to attempt in person that pacification which—as it seemed—Simon had failed to accomplish. As a step in this direction he solemnly—and despite the protests of Richard of Cornwall—designated his son Edward as duke of Aquitaine. Simon at length grew weary of a struggle in which he was so ill-supported by his master. Already the situation was growing worse; for Alfonso of Castile was preparing to revive the claims which had once before been asserted in the duchy. The Gascon malcontents would have foreign support while the seneschal was abandoned by his sovereign. Under these circumstances he yielded to the inevitable, and resigning his government in return for a sum of money, he withdrew to France.¹⁰²

No sooner had he turned his back on Gascony (in April of 1253) than a new revolt broke out. This time it had as its nominal head

⁹⁹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 89. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 158.

¹⁰⁰ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 388.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 90. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 159.

¹⁰² Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 49 and *Pièces*, XXV.

the Castilian king, who grouped about him numerous feudal lords—among them Gaston of Béarn—and many powerful burghers. It was against this combination that Henry had to make head when, in August of 1253, he arrived at last at Bordeaux.¹⁰³

The administration of Simon de Montfort in Gascony cannot be pronounced a success. As to the causes of his failure it is more difficult to speak with certainty. Montfort himself was certainly not blameless. His recklessness, his contempt for forms and even rights, his harshness, all weighed against him. Then, too, though a gallant warrior in the field he was no administrator. From all sides there were complaints against his bailiffs and other subordinates.¹⁰⁴ Yet it is only just to note that his policy was hardly given a fair trial. The plan of governing Gascony by the exclusive support of the popular parties and the stern suppression of the nobility and its sympathizers may have been a possible one. But to succeed it needed to be persevered in steadily and the vacillation of Henry destroyed all chance of success. Yet some historians have, it would seem, been unduly severe to the king in this matter. By resolutely supporting Simon he might have succeeded in crushing opposition, but it seems clear that he must have risked Gascony on the result. One can hardly blame him if he declined to take the risk and preferred to recall the earl. It remained now to be seen whether a gentler policy could quiet the turmoil which Simon had let loose upon the land.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 50. Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, V, 365 and 370.

¹⁰⁴ Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, 42, note 5.

CHAPTER IX

THE ALFONSIST REVOLT, 1254-1255

Alfonso claims Gascony. Peril to the English rule. Revolt of the Gascons. Attitude of the towns. Successful campaign of Henry. Support given him by the towns. Privileges to citizens. Treaty with Alfonso. Restores peace in Bordeaux and other towns. Treaty with France.

NO SOONER had Simon de Montfort left Gascony than the opposition which he had to some extent overawed broke out in full violence. Alfonso X, king of Castile, at once laid claim to the duchy, and the commune of Bordeaux informed Henry that only strong and immediate action could save the province from falling into his hands.¹ Those in favor of Alfonso gathered under the leadership of Gaston of Béarn.² In vain, Henry sought to impose a truce till he could arrive in Gascony and promised to liberate some of Simon's prisoners.³ Henry had, in May, 1253, named as seneschal a knight resident at Bordeaux, Peter de Burdegala.⁴ In August he himself crossed over to the continent.⁵ He found the revolt well under way, with La Réole and Benauges as its centers.

What, then, were the resources on which Henry could rely to

¹ Matt. Paris, *Chronica Majora*, V, 365.

² *Ibid.*, 370.

³ Thus he promised to release two brothers of the Pins family taken by Simon at the riot in Bordeaux and still detained in prison. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 158, 159. He likewise ordered the restitution of the property of Peter Bonafus and B. Bidau. *Ibid.*, 159.

⁴ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 193.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 221.

make head against his rival? Of course he had such support as he could get from England, but this seems to have been hardly sufficient to enable him to undertake a vigorous campaign.⁶ He certainly depended, in large part, on such support as he could muster in Gascony itself. Here he could rely on only two forces, on the aid of such barons as were loyal or could be won over, and on the towns. Our attention, in accord with the general purpose of the study, will be directed almost wholly to the latter. What, then, was the general attitude of the towns toward Henry after four years of Simon's rule? La Réole was completely in the hands of the rebels, but what of the other communes? According to Matthew Paris many of the chief burghers were angry with the king himself for having seized or detained their wine in England.⁷ Angry they might be; but the Colombines and their allies were not prepared to rebel against a king who controlled their markets in England. The Solers as was natural had joined the standard of Alfonso, and with them many other discontented or banished citizens.⁸ Yet the king clearly trusted to the Colombines for even before his arrival in the province he had placed the Castle of Vayreis in charge of Peter Calhau⁹ and had thanked the commune of Bordeaux for its loyal attitude.¹⁰ Some of the rebellious citizens may of course have been wine merchants whose wines had been seized by the English government, since we are only entitled to conclude that the Soler party were not *primarily* interested in the wine trade and not that they had *no* interest in it. Even in the case of the Solers themselves we may well imagine some continued

⁶ Such would seem to be indicated by his numerous borrowings. See also Davis, *England under Normans and Angevins*, 443, and Tout, in Hunt and Poole, *Political History of England*, III, 77; likewise his appeal to the English lords for help, *Pat. Rolls*, 279-280.

⁷ *Chronica Majora*, V, 365.

⁸ See their pardon at the close of the war.

⁹ *Archives de la Gironde*, IV, 19.

¹⁰ *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 233.

connection with the English trade but this, if it existed, was of minor importance and their conduct was determined by their other interests, especially those which linked them to the feudal nobility. The attitude of the other towns toward the king was similar to that of Bordeaux. Henry simply took Montfort's place and inherited at once the support of the earl's friends and the hostility of his foes. Thus, the very position of affairs imposed upon Henry a general continuance of the seneschal's policy, with such concessions as might seem necessary to prevent the spread of revolt. At Bordeaux he found the Colombines in power with Peter Doat as mayor; nor did he interfere with their supremacy; for in 1254, in the first elections that would normally be held during his stay in Gascony, Doat was replaced by William Raymond Colom. In Bayonne the party opposed to Simon was, perhaps, larger and more aggressive, for, instead of placing in office a mayor belonging to either faction, he had recourse to an outsider and named Bertrand de Podensac, following an arrangement which the earl had made with the citizens.¹¹ What the arrangement was is not stated; but from the use made of it it seems evident that the citizens had, willingly or under compulsion, surrendered to Simon the right to appoint the mayor. The man selected on this occasion was not a Bayonnese nor a burgher, but a knight of considerable importance, since he owed the king a feudal service of three men.¹² He was, also, a Bordelais allied to Peter Calhau.¹³ Doubtless this nomination was intended as a slight concession to the opposition, though his affiliation with Calhau would mean that Henry still relied upon the popular party and, perhaps, had his policy dictated from Bordeaux.

¹¹ *R. G.*, 3755. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 302.

¹² *R. G.*, 159.

¹³ Balasque, *Études*, II, 143. Podensac is appointed in June. In April Henry had appointed a certain Furt de Urnum whose connections are entirely obscure (*R. G.*, 3144).

On his arrival Henry looked to the towns for aid and support against his enemy. So far did he regard the municipalities as friendly that, in spite of the protest of the abbot, he commanded his faithful subjects of St. Sever to elect a mayor during the war.¹⁴ The towns of Bordeaux, Dax, Bayonne and Bazas, at least, rendered considerable services to the royal cause. Let us examine briefly the nature of these services.

At the very beginning of his campaign Henry called upon the towns for their communal militia as a part of his feudal army. From Bazas he demanded 300 men¹⁵ while Bordeaux was ordered to send 3,000 crossbowmen to Rions.¹⁶ Bordeaux, it is true, exhibited some alarm concerning her exemption from military service outside the diocese; for the king felt it necessary to confirm solemnly this privilege.¹⁷ In spite of such initial anxieties Bordeaux took part in the military operations, since in 1254 Henry found it necessary to postpone the communal elections, as the mayor, jurats and the men of Bordeaux were then under arms before La Réole.¹⁸ In addition to military aid Bazas and Bordeaux had to furnish supplies for the royal army. At the same time that Henry called upon Bordeaux for her 3,000 crossbowmen he also requested the Bordelais to bring with them all the provisions they could find in their city, which provisions he promised to pay for.¹⁹ Bazas was called upon to furnish wine²⁰ and to Bordeaux the king turned for armor, cord, weapons and other supplies.²¹ Surely such assistance both in men and munitions of war must have been a very important asset for the royal cause.

¹⁴ *Lettres de rois*, I, 121. *Pat. Rolls*, 1247-1258, 280. Hereafter when the *Patent Rolls* are cited without a contrary indication this volume is meant.

¹⁵ *R. G.*, 3566.

¹⁶ *R. G.*, 3564.

¹⁷ *R. G.*, 3768. *Pat. Rolls*, 303.

¹⁸ *R. G.*, 3767. *Pat. Rolls*, 303.

¹⁹ *R. G.*, 3564.

²⁰ *R. G.*, 2745, 3609.

²¹ *R. G.*, 2661, 2695, 2721, 2724.

The southern towns also rendered valuable support, though in a somewhat different way. At the opening of the campaign their chief use seemed to lie in the annoyance of the king's enemies, since in September of 1253 Henry ordered the mayor and citizens of Bayonne to seize upon all goods of Gaston of Béarn or of his subjects which were to be found within their jurisdiction.²² In the next year, however, the Bayonnese rendered the king a much more important service. Gaston attempted to seize Bayonne and introduced some of his followers into the town. But the royalist party at once took action, driving out the Béarnese and punishing the conspirators.²³ Here we may attempt to read behind the scenes a little and surmise that the leader of the conspiracy was Peter Rosset, the very man whom Simon de Montfort had made mayor, since we find him in prison in August of that year and only pardoned by the intercession of the king of Castile.²⁴ It may have been only after this attempt that Henry named Podensac as mayor of the city. If this be so Calhau was still friendly to Rosset for he is one of two Bordelais to stand as a pledge for him, the other being Bernard d'Alhan.²⁵

Also, from several towns Henry obtained considerable sums of money. From Andreas de Bilambix of Dax Henry borrowed 100 marks 39 shillings 11 pence during 1254.²⁶ At Bazas he received, in the course of 1254, 71 pounds Bordelais from Peter de Flus,²⁷ and at different times 60 marks, 20 dolia of wine, and 86 pounds 11 shillings 11 pence from Raymond Markes, mayor of the city.²⁸ Bayonne was yet more liberal. At the end of 1253 Henry had appointed a commission to contract a loan and sent them to the communes of

²² *R. G.*, 2070. *Pat. Rolls*, 241.

²³ Blay de Gaix, *Histoire militaire de Bayonne*, 56.

²⁴ *R. G.*, 2985, 3954. *Pat. Rolls*, 321.

²⁵ *R. G.*, 3925. *Pat. Rolls*, 319.

²⁶ *R. G.*, 2323. *Pat. Rolls*, 264.

²⁷ *R. G.*, 2611. *Pat. Rolls*, 295.

²⁸ *R. G.*, 2400, 2505, 3749. *Pat. Rolls*, 273, 284, 301.

Bayonne, Dax and St. Sever.²⁹ At Bayonne the commissioners obtained 500 marks.³⁰ In addition to this Henry obtained a loan of 370 marks 2 shillings 4 pence from two citizens of the town.³¹

Yet Bordeaux was in this as in former campaigns the chief resource of the royal treasury, and favors to citizens are judiciously interspersed among the loans. Thus, soon after his arrival in Gascony, Henry secured W. R. Colom, mayor of Bordeaux, from interference in regard to certain mills that he possessed until the king's council should have judged the case.³² During the next month Henry borrowed 100 pounds of him.³³ The king arrived in August. By November he owed 533 pounds to Arnold Calhau, Raymond Monader, Elias Monader and Raymond Makayn for cloth and other goods,³⁴ and had borrowed 600 pounds from Elias and Seguin Barbe,³⁵ and 100 marks sterling from Elias Monader.³⁶ In return for these advances Henry had farmed the small customs of Bordeaux to Elias Monader,³⁷ and had exempted the wine of Raymond Makayn and Peter Calhau from all dues in English ports except the royal prisage.³⁸

The most serious part of Henry's campaign came in the first months of 1254, and he continued to borrow extensively from the merchants of Bordeaux. A complete enumeration of these loans is hardly necessary and a few examples will serve our present purpose. In January, February and April Henry acknowledged debts to Arnold W. Emeric and Raymond Alaundi of over 116 marks, received

²⁹ R. G., 2237, 2238.

³⁰ R. G., 2371. *Pat. Rolls*, 269.

³¹ R. G., 2322. *Pat. Rolls*, 264.

³² *Archives de la Gironde*, IV, 28. R. G., 2809.

³³ R. G., 2247. *Pat. Rolls*, 258.

³⁴ R. G., 2147. *Pat. Rolls*, 249.

³⁵ R. G., 2147. *Pat. Rolls*, 248.

³⁶ R. G., 2144. *Pat. Rolls*, 248.

³⁷ R. G., 2145. *Pat. Rolls*, 248.

³⁸ R. G., 2697, 2743.

as a loan, and 183 marks for wine bought for his use in England.³⁹ He also borrowed 400 pounds from Seguin and Elias Barbe and acknowledged a loan by them of 500 pounds to his seneschal,⁴⁰ over 500 pounds from Elias Carpentarius,⁴¹ and over 500 pounds from Elias of Blaye,⁴² 145 marks from Raymond Monader,⁴³ 500 pounds from Elias Monader,⁴⁴ and 100 marks from Peter Gondemer.⁴⁵ There are records of numerous smaller loans, among them several from the Colom family. William Raymond advanced the king 80 marks,⁴⁶ Amaneus advanced 25 pounds,⁴⁷ and Rustengo 20 marks.⁴⁸ Later William Raymond advanced 57 marks in three separate loans⁴⁹ and Rustengo 60 marks.⁵⁰ In return for the money Henry conceded a provostship to Raymond Monader,⁵¹ and exempted the wine of Peter Colom from all dues except the royal prisage.⁵²

In September the king, in a single charter, acknowledged debts to various citizens aggregating 5,000 marks.⁵³ This money had been advanced by the following citizens: 3,300 marks by Peter and Arnold Calhau, Seguin and Elias Barbe, Raymond Makayn, Elias Carpentarius and Raymond Emeric, all wine merchants, and by Elias Monader, and Raymond de Camparian, cloth merchants; 1,700 marks by W. R. Colom, Amaneus Colom, Arnold W. Emeric, Raymond Mon-

³⁹ R. G., 2270. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴⁰ R. G., 2271. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴¹ R. G., 2272. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴² R. G., 2273. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴³ R. G., 2274. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴⁴ R. G., 2321. *Pat. Rolls*, 264.

⁴⁵ R. G., 2511. *Pat. Rolls*, 285.

⁴⁶ R. G., 2277. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴⁷ R. G., 2278. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴⁸ R. G., 2283. *Pat. Rolls*, 261.

⁴⁹ R. G., 2512. *Pat. Rolls*, 285.

⁵⁰ R. G., 2510. *Pat. Rolls*, 285.

⁵¹ R. G., 2336. *Pat. Rolls*, 265.

⁵² R. G., 2955.

⁵³ R. G., 4302. *Pat. Rolls*, 357.

ader, Peter Divac and William Russinol, all wine merchants, and and Peter Gondemer, Arnold Bages and several citizens not named. Thus the money came almost wholly from the wine merchants and very largely from the Colombine party.

That such loans as these were of considerable importance in financing the campaign of Henry would seem quite clear. It would, indeed, seem scarcely possible that he could have made head against Alfonso's partisans and finally defeated them at La Réole without the military and pecuniary support which he received from the towns. Certainly if the townspeople of Bordeaux and Bayonne had been actively hostile his cause would have been hopeless.

But if the townspeople, especially of Bordeaux, assisted the king loyally they meant to have their reward. We have already seen that the king granted exemption from duties on wine to certain individual citizens. In February he extended this privilege to the citizens generally. On February 10 the Irish officials are informed that the queen has received letters from the king granting the concession,⁵⁴ but it is not till February 11 that Henry himself issued letters patent to that effect.⁵⁵ By these he declares that in consideration of the great services rendered him by the citizens of Bordeaux, he exempts their wine, whether in England, Ireland, Wales or other of his lands, from all dues or exactions saving the old customs due at ports, and the royal prisage of 2 dolia from each ship. He furthermore provides that there shall be two judges to assess the prisage without unnecessary delay, which delay he defines as more than five days. These letters he sealed with the small seal which he had with him in Gascony, but promised to cause letters to be issued under the great seal and confirmed by Prince Edward. For this charter the

⁵⁴ *Cal. of Doc. rel. to Ireland*, no. 314.

⁵⁵ *R. G.*, 2602. *Pat. Rolls*, 294. The charter is also contained in the *Livre des Bouillons*, 220, where it is given in a confirmation by Richard II. Another confirmation is given in the same work, on p. 237.

citizens paid the king the sum of 2,000 marks, though doubtless their previous loans did something toward obtaining it. The privilege was therefore one of great value to the wine merchants. Later, in March, Henry provided that letters patent sealed with the seal of the commune of Bordeaux should be sufficient to secure the exemption.⁵⁶

A part, at least, of the significance of this concession is obvious. The commune of Bordeaux had rendered and was rendering important services to the king. Partly no doubt to retain their loyalty and to reward their services, and partly, as is obvious, for financial reasons, the king extends to them the privilege. It is a plain hint as to what interests were dominant in the commune—the Colombine party, be it remembered,—and a sufficiently clear explanation of the steadfast devotion of the Gascon capital to the English connection.

Over the details of Henry's campaign we have no occasion to linger. On his first taking the field he directed his attack against the Castle of Benauges. This taken, he turned on La Réole, whither his worst enemies had repaired. The siege of La Réole was long and difficult. Indeed, at the end, the king did not win by force as much as by negotiations. He succeeded in prolonging his truce with the French and in arranging a peace with d'Albret, the counts of Comminges and Armagnac, and with the viscount of Béarn.⁵⁷ Finally, he entirely ended the war by a treaty with the king of Castile, concluded in April.⁵⁸ Prince Edward was to marry a half sister of Alfonso, and Alfonso was to transfer to him all his rights to the duchy.⁵⁹ With this treaty, which was accompanied by a pardon to Alfonso's chief Gascon partisans, the revolt came to an end, at least as an open war.

⁵⁶ R. G., 2464. *Pat. Rolls*, 279. *Cal. of Doc. rel. to Ireland*, nos. 339 and 342.

⁵⁷ Tout, in Hunt and Poole, *Political History of England*, III, 73.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 498f.

⁵⁹ Tout, *Ibid.* Rymer, *Ibid.*, 509.

What remained was the task of settling the affairs of the still distracted province.

As long as Gascony remained full of wealthy citizens exiled from their native towns there seemed little prospect of an enduring peace. Therefore as soon as his Spanish rival was disposed of Henry undertook to restore to the towns the burghers banished during the iron rule of Simon de Montfort. Prominent among them were, of course, the Solers. Shortly after his arrival in Gascony, Henry had authorized Peter Calhau to collect and keep—*colligere et deponere*—the wine of Gaillard de Soler, but had forbidden him to use any of it until he should receive further orders.⁶⁰ Even before his arrival Henry had, in June of 1252, restored their property to two of the Soler faction whom Simon had imprisoned in Bordeaux without bringing to trial, namely Peter Bonafus and Bernard Bidau.⁶¹ Whether the order was carried out may be doubted, but if so, they were again imprisoned, for in June of 1254 they are prisoners of the king.⁶²

By such measures, small as was the benefit to the Soler party, the king intimated to them that his disposition was more conciliatory than that of his seneschal had been. The banished citizens could certainly entertain some hopes of royal clemency, and Gaillard de Soler met Henry with a petition for pardon and professed his willingness to stand trial for any offenses charged against him. The king replied by granting him a safe conduct.⁶³ Perhaps Gaillard and his friends were not as eager for a trial as they represented or perhaps their advances had not met as flattering a reception as they hoped. At any rate, during the revolt they joined the Alfonsists, for in July of 1254 we find them in the train of Gaston of Béarn⁶⁴ and their final pardon is given at the instance of the king of Castile.

⁶⁰ R. G., 2654.

⁶¹ Shirley, *Royal Letters*, II, 389. *Pat. Rolls*, 159.

⁶² R. G. 3314.

⁶³ R. G., 2188. *Pat. Rolls*, 252.

⁶⁴ R. G., 3678.

Not all the members of the Soler faction, however, went along with the leaders, and even they may not have taken a very active part in the conflict. At any rate, some of their partisans were readmitted to Bordeaux during the struggle, for, on March 6, 1254, Henry permitted the Lambert brothers and certain other citizens who had been banished by the mayor to return to the city, and even ordered his officers to escort them there.⁶⁵

It was not, however, till the withdrawal of Alfonso that the Solers themselves were fully forgiven. On August 4 Henry, then encamped on the Gironde, issued letters patent extending full pardon to Gaillard de Soler and his friends and permitting them to return freely to Bordeaux. He also granted them the restitution of all the lands and possessions which they had formally held, except the castle of Belin, which he retained temporarily in his own hands.⁶⁶ But even this pardon seems to have been little more than an announcement of policy, and the Solers do not appear to have ventured to Bordeaux; for, on August 23, Henry gave them letters of safe conduct permitting them to come to him at that city,⁶⁷ where he then was. Doubtless the animosity of the Colombines was too bitter for them to return except under the protection of the royal presence, till peace could be arranged between the factions. Nor does their property outside the city seem to have been actually restored to them, for in September Henry issued a series of orders, one to the mayor of Bordeaux directing him to permit them to return,⁶⁸ another to the seneschal of Gascony directing him to restore their possessions,⁶⁹ and special orders to lesser officers, one a bailiff, and one a provost, directing the restoration of such property as lay within their districts.⁷⁰ This would seem to indicate that the property of

⁶⁵ *R. G.*, 2612. *Pat. Rolls*, 295.

⁶⁶ *R. G.*, 4275, 4283, 4284. *Pat. Rolls*, 350, 352.

⁶⁷ *R. G.*, 3941. *Pat. Rolls*, 320.

⁶⁸ *R. G.*, 3697.

⁶⁹ *R. G.*, 3695.

⁷⁰ *R. G.*, 3696, 3698.

the Soler family lay mainly in the district of *Entre-deux-mers* and about the castle of Belin.

To pardon the Solers was, however, but the first step. It was imperatively necessary that a peace should be arranged between the two parties. Very possibly the Colombines had long seen that the permanent exclusion of their rivals would be impossible and were ready for peace—on favorable terms. Henry was, moreover, too deeply in their debt to go far in opposition to their wishes. When, therefore, he proclaimed in October a general peace and declared that it had been made by an agreement of both parties, he was probably well within the truth. The peace, he declared, was made by the consent of the parties and by the advice of his council and of the following citizens: Raymond Brun, the mayor of Bordeaux (doubtless a less violent Colombine who had replaced William Raymond), Peter de Burdegala, knight, Peter Calhau, Bernard d'Alhan, Arnold William Emeric, Elias Barbe and Raymond Monader.⁷¹ The absence of the Coloms is especially striking. Apparently the peace was drawn up by the more moderate members of the party. Its provisions would certainly seem just and reasonable. Satisfaction was granted the Colombines for the murder of their mayor William Gondemer, by the perpetual banishment of Rustengo de Pomerès, who discharged the crossbow by the bolt of which the mayor was killed, and by the banishment for five years of Peter Bonafus who was present at the time. If the Colombines suspected others, those so suspected should clear themselves by oath. One other citizen was banished for five years for wounding a Colombine. In return, if the Solers suspected any of the Colombines of killing certain of their partisans those whom they accused should clear themselves by oath. All other grievances and quarrels should be adjusted in a like manner and all agreements and oaths contrary to the provisions of the peace were

⁷¹ R. G., 4552.

annulled. The mayor and 100 men from each party should swear to observe the peace and the king expressed the pious wish that marriages might be contracted between the two parties to allay their bitterness. He did not press this, however, saying that marriage ought to be free.

Such a peace depended for its success upon a reorganization of the city government. Accordingly, on the day before the drawing up of the peace, Henry had caused 14 jurats to be named in his presence. The choice of these men was, no doubt, the most difficult part of Henry's peace-making, for upon it hinged the future government of the city. The jurats thus named were Gaillard Colom, Gaillard de Soler, W. R. Colom, P. Calhau, Elias Barbe, Raymond Monader, Seguin Barbe, Peter Colom, Ruffard Lambert, William Arnold Monader, Raymond Arnold, his brother, Arnold Maysent, Arnold William Emeric, Arnold Calhau.⁷² It is evident from an examination of this list that a large majority were engaged in the English wine trade and that Henry was placing this interest securely in power. No less than ten of the fourteen (namely W. R. Colom, Gaillard Colom, Peter Calhau, Arnold Calhau, Elias and Seguin Barbe, Arnold W. Emeric, Arnold Maysent, Raymond Monader and Peter Colom) either were themselves engaged in this branch of commerce or their near relatives, often brothers, were so engaged. Now as the jurats chose their own successors, the wine merchants, thus securely fixed in power, could not be displaced short of a revolution. As to the party affiliation of the new officers, there is somewhat more of doubt. Yet seven are certainly chosen from the Colombine faction (namely the three Coloms, the Calhau and the Barbes) while only four are certainly of the Soler party (namely Gaillard de Soler, Lambert, and W. A. and R. A. Monader). Three (R. Monader, A. Maysent and Emeric) are doubtful, though Maysent probably was a

⁷² *R. G.*, 3723.

Soler, while Raymond Monader and Emeric seem to have been at least moderate Colombine. It would seem, therefore, that Henry left the Colombine in power while admitting some of the Solers to office. If so, he had abandoned his former plan of having half the jurats from each party. In this connection the mayors for the next few years are most important. Since the jurats chose the mayor their choice would be indicative of their party leanings. In the following year they elected Peter Gondemer, a Colombine.⁷³ In 1257 they chose Arnold William Emeric, who was succeeded in 1258 by W. R. Colom. He gave place to John Colom, who handed the office over to Arnold Calhau in 1260, while Peter Condemer returned to power in 1261. During the next six years, therefore, no pronounced adherent of the Soler party was elected and, at least, five Colombine mayors held office, and it is highly probable that the sixth was of that faction. With such evidence before us we may safely conclude that Henry, while readmitting the Solers and giving them some representation among the jurats, yet left the Colombine wine-merchants in control of the commune.

The return of the Solers to Bordeaux was naturally accompanied by the pardon of the corresponding factions in other towns. The reinstatement of the Bordelais exiles furnished a striking proof of the solidarity of these various groups. Henry had pledged himself in his treaty with Alfonso to indemnify the citizens of La Réole for the losses they had suffered during the war, but in August, apparently after his first pardon to Gaillard and his friends, the citizens of La Réole, in gratitude to the king for the pardon as they affirm, solemnly renounce all claims to this indemnity.⁷⁴ Possibly this had been one of the influences leading to the pardon, but of this we are not informed. In any case the restoration of the Solers would seem to

⁷³ He served as acting mayor in 1253, when W. R. Colom was mayor, *R. G.*, 2652.

⁷⁴ *Archives de la Gironde*, VI, 163.

be the fairly obvious course for the king. The reorganization of affairs at La Réole was continued by Prince Edward, who introduced there a set of laws known as the new customs,⁷⁵ in which, among other provisions, he confirmed the privileges of the members of the commune in Bordeaux.⁷⁶

Peace restored on the Garonne, there remained the southern towns. The Ladils and their faction were pardoned, as Alfonso had stipulated in his treaty, and this probably applied not only at La Réole but also at Bazas.⁷⁷ At Dax Henry finally extended a pardon to William de Francès⁷⁸ and doubtless to others there who had been involved in the recent disturbances. The conduct of affairs in Bayonne the king had delegated to Prince Edward even during the war. The Prince had followed somewhat the same policy as that which his father adopted at Bordeaux. In November of 1254 he compelled the citizens to swear a solemn peace, pledging themselves to form no confraternity, conspiracy, or confederation. The principal leaders of both parties were obliged to sign a solemn agreement.⁷⁹ To prevent the recurrence of disorder in the city Edward assumed the right to nominate the mayor, and for some time chose soldiers who were not residents of the town. Thus Bertrand de Podensac remained in office three years.⁸⁰ Probably the prince or his delegates held the balance fairly even between the contending factions, though very likely inclining somewhat to the popular party.

When, in November of 1254, Henry left Gascony his rule in that province practically terminated. Prince Edward remained in his place and seems to have continued his father's general policy.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 241 f.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*; see article 38.

⁷⁷ *R. G.*, 4281. *Pat. Rolls*, 351.

⁷⁸ *R. G.*, 4292. *Pat. Rolls*, 353.

⁷⁹ A copy made by Balasque is to be found in the Bréquigny collection, Archives de Bayonne, Pièce IV, f. 20. Also in Rymer, *Foedera*, I, 531.

⁸⁰ Balasque, *Études*, II, 193.

When, in 1259, Henry concluded a definitive treaty with Louis IX the period of uncertainty and crisis came to an end. Hitherto the question of whether or not the English rule in the south should be maintained might be said to have been unsettled. The French government had treated John's forfeiture as absolute and had made at least one serious effort to enforce the decree of the court of peers in Gascony. That attempt had not been renewed, but it might have been at any moment. At the same time, the claims, good or bad, of Castile were not disposed of till 1254. By the treaty with Alfonso (in 1254) Henry removed all danger from the side of Spain. By the treaty of 1259 he secured from France definite acquiescence in the English occupation of the south.

CONCLUSION

What now are the general results of our survey of these sixty years of Gascon history? Certainly, it seems clear that it was the action of the towns that preserved the English rule. At no time did the English king bring a large English force to Gascony and at no time could he rely greatly on the feudal lords. The militia of the towns formed an important part of his army, their money financed his campaigns; had they deserted either to the French or Spanish it is difficult to see how English rule could ever have been restored.

In Gascony the towns overshadowed the whole province as they did not in Poitou. Hence, in the south the burghers were the deciding factor and they were largely swayed by their commercial interests. Gascony was a wine-producing country and needed a market for her wine. In France or Spain she had to encounter many rivals; England furnished a market where she could hope to shut out competition to whatever degree was necessary. In the early days of the Angevins a large trade arose. Bordeaux was necessarily the great center of this trade and in her port much of the wine of the smaller towns of Gascony found a market. From Bordeaux this wine was shipped, to a considerable extent in Bayonnese ships, to England. Bayonne was thus deeply involved in the trade between England and Bordeaux. The triumph of France would have cost Bordeaux her best market and Bayonne a valuable carrying trade. The English government must, therefore, be loyally supported. With these two towns loyal the smaller towns must either sacrifice their trade in these two ports or follow their lead. Thus the combination of

Bordeaux and Bayonne could exert more or less pressure on the other communes, the amount varying directly with the importance for the town of keeping open these ports. Thus the pressure was strong at Dax because the right to trade freely in Bordeaux and Bayonne was very necessary to her; it was slight at La Rochelle, which did not depend upon them. The extent of English rule on the continent may roughly be defined as the radius within which the Bordeaux-Bayonne pressure was strongly felt. Outside that radius England never gained a durable hold. Within that radius her grasp was strong even in weakness. The smaller towns might yield for a time but they came back readily, so that while France might overrun a portion of this territory easily she could secure no enduring foothold.

That the towns were thus the basis of their power, both John and Henry more or less clearly realized. Favors to the towns were their constant resource when hard pressed, privileges and charters their chief arms against invasion. Yet many of these privileges were more than simple favors. They developed and extended that network of commercial interests on which the English power rested. Thus Dax received the privilege of trading in Bayonne and Bordeaux, and La Réole gained valuable exemptions in the latter port. Whether such favors were granted without thought of ultimate consequences, or whether the king in his charters deliberately sought to link the towns together in an interdependence on his crown, in any case, the result was the same. And, if the lesser towns were linked to Bordeaux and Bayonne, these towns were by the same process bound to England, in whose market Bordeaux obtained special privileges for her wine. A system of privileges which in its results closely approximates to the preferential tariff of to-day united the scattered realm of Henry. That monarch was consciously or unconsciously building up a sort of imperial *Zollverein*.

The problem of government in Gascony was extremely complicated. The towns were, indeed, linked to England by their commerce but they had other interests as well. Some of them had a large trade in other directions. Bayonne in particular had an extensive commerce with Spain, and Dax was very likely in the same position; La Réole, and doubtless Bazas, dealt to some extent with Toulouse and, probably, with France. Each of these towns was, moreover, torn by bitter party conflicts. These parties were much more complex than the usual explanations of democratic and aristocratic factions would indicate. Apparently they corresponded to a considerable degree with the varying commercial interests that existed in each town. Thus at Bayonne the leader of one party was engaged in Spanish commerce while the other seems to have been drawn mainly from the Anglo-Gascon traders. At Bordeaux the Colombines were distinctly a party of English wine merchants, while the Solers were not, as a party, deeply interested in this branch of commerce.

In addition to these varying commercial interests, or very probably springing out of them, were differences in attitude toward the surrounding barons. In a general fashion those elements involved in English trade stood out as more or less distinctly hostile to the neighboring lords while their rivals inclined more or less strongly to an alliance with them. This is most clearly to be seen at Bordeaux, where we have the fullest information, but numerous indications point to the same conditions in the other towns.

The chief towns of Gascony were not merely interdependent in a general way but there existed a striking solidarity between the parties in the different towns. Thus the Colombines at Bordeaux were closely affiliated with the corresponding factions in La Réole, Bazas and Bayonne, while the same thing was true of the Solers. In the midst of such conditions the policy of the English government necessarily varied. As the seneschals were friendly or unfriendly to

the nobles they supported first one and then another of the parties. But, obviously, the English hold on Gascony depended on keeping up friendly relations with the Anglo-commercial party and keeping that party as much as possible in power. This seems to have been the policy of Henry III himself after his campaign of 1242, at least in Bordeaux. It was systematically the policy of Simon de Montfort, nor did Henry attempt to reverse it after the earl's fall. It would seem then that in proportion as the commercial basis of the division grew clearer,—for at first the party lines may have been much confused,—the English authorities drew more and more to the Anglo-commercial side.

One other consideration is here suggested. Did this necessity, more or less clearly realized, of maintaining the Anglo-commercial party in power exert an influence on the form of government adopted for the communes? In Dax, Bayonne and Bordeaux the king set up institutions favoring a class monopoly. May not this consideration have led to the creation in these towns of communes which were close corporations? At Bayonne all rested on the hundred peers and Henry named them himself on, at least, one occasion.¹ In Dax he abolished an older organization and substituted a self-perpetuating body of jurats, and in Bordeaux as well communal institutions centred in such a self-perpetuating body. Such machinery, whether or not consciously designed for the purpose, was admirably adapted to secure the permanent predominance of a certain body of merchants in the chief towns, once they had obtained possession of power.

These, then, are the general conclusions to which our study leads and some of the queries it suggests. Whether the same points would stand out as equally true concerning Gascony in the succeeding years a study of these years alone could show with certainty, and

¹The peers seem to have been a permanent and hereditary body though in the *Établissements* nothing is said about their election.

yet the general policy of England and the general attitude of the towns seem based upon considerations too fundamental to admit of any very large variation. At any rate, we have resolved the questions with which we started and have seen how and why, not merely in general terms but in detail, the Plantagenets, John and Henry III, were able to preserve to their successors a remnant of the imposing continental empire once ruled by Henry II.

LIST OF MAYORS OF BORDEAUX

The list which follows is based upon that given in the *Livre des Coutumes*. The list compiled by O'Reilley and that drawn up by M. Brutails from indications in the municipal archives have been carefully compared with that of the *Livre*. Where the differences seemed serious they have been indicated in a note. Mayors certainly belonging to the Colombines or Soler parties have been marked C or S.

- 1208. Peter de Lambert.
- 1217. Bernard d'Acra.
- 1218. Peter Andron.
- 1219. Bernard d'Acra.
- 1220. W. R. Colom.
- 1221. Peter Viger.
- 1222. Amaubin d'Alhan.
- 1223. Amaubin d'Alhan.
- 1224. Amaubin d'Alhan.
- 1225. Amaubin d'Alhan.
- 1226. Peter Viger.¹
- 1227. Amaneus Colom.—C.
- 1228. Alexander de Cambus.²
- 1229. W. de Rustengo.—S.
- 1230. R. Monader.
- 1231. Amfrac Lambert.—S.
- 1232. Vigoros Viger.—S.
- 1233. Gaucem Colom.—C.
- 1234. R. Monader.
- 1235. Peter Calhau.—C.
- 1236. Vigoros Viger.—S.
- 1237. Rustengo de Soler.—S.
- 1238. R. Monader.
- 1239. Bernard d'Alhan.—S.

¹ 1226, O'Reilley gives Arnaud de Cambis.

² 1228, O'Reilley gives William Rostangh.

- 1240. Martin Faure.³—S.
- 1241. Rustengo de Soler.—S.
- 1242. Peter Viger.—S.
- 1243. William Gondemer.—C.
- 1244. Peter Calhau.—C.
- 1245. W. R. Colom.—C.
- 1246. John Colom.—C.
- 1247. W. Gondemer,—C, and Peter Bonafus.—S.
- 1248. W. A. Monader.—S.
- 1249. Martin Faure.—S.
- 1250. W. R. Colom.—C.
- 1251. Seguin Barbe.—C.
- 1252. Amaneus fils de P. Colom.—C.
- 1253. Peter Doat.—C.
- 1254. W. R. Colom.⁴—C.
- 1255. R. Brun de la Porte.⁵—C.
- 1256. Peter Gondemer.—C.
- 1257. A. W. Emeric.—C.
- 1258. W. R. Colom.—C.
- 1259. John Colom.⁶—C.
- 1260. Arnold Calhau.—C.
- 1261. Peter Gondemer.—C.

³ 1240. O'Reilley gives John Colom.

⁴ 1254, O'Reilley gives Raymond Brun.

⁵ 1255, O'Reilley gives Peter Gondemer.

⁶ 1259, O'Reilley gives Arnold Calhau.

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DOCUMENTS

Almost all the documents used in the foregoing study are in print. It would appear indeed that at least most of the sources of real importance for the subject have been published. Such unpublished pieces as proved serviceable were found among the copies made for the Thierry collection, now in the *Fonds Français de Nouvelles Acquisitions*, Bibliothèque Nationale. The extensive collection of copies known as the Collection Moreau (often referred to as the Collection Bréquigny) also contains a considerable number of documents, though none of the first importance for the period dealt with in our study. Search was made in the Public Record Office, London, outside of the patent, charter, and close rolls, but nothing of moment discovered. No use was attempted, however, of patent, charter or close rolls not yet calendared, nor was search made in local archives.

The patent, charter and close rolls for the reigns of John and Henry III, as published by the English government, and the *Rôles Gascons*, published by the French government, are the sources of the greater part of the material. The English rolls utilized extend from the first that are extant in the reign of John to varying points in the reign of Henry: the charter rolls from 1199 to 1216 and 1226 to 1257, the patent rolls from 1201 to 1258 and the close rolls from 1204 to 1231. The Gascon rolls cover the years 1242 to 1243 and 1253 to 1255: they are thus fragmentary because the term was used at first only of documents—whatever their contents—issued by the king in Gascony while documents concerning Gascony but issued in England were entered upon the regular rolls. The full titles of the volumes of the rolls used are as follows:

Rotuli chartarum in Turri Londinensi asservati, 1190-1216. London, 1837. Edited by Thomas Duffus Hardy.

Calendar of the Charter Rolls, 1226-1257. London, 1903.

Rotuli litterarum patentium in Turri Londinensi asservati, 1201-1216. London, 1835. Edited by Thomas Duffus Hardy.

Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 1216-1225. London, 1901.

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Calendar of Documents relating to Ireland in the Public Record Office, 1171-1251. London, 1875.

Calendar of Documents relating to Ireland in the Public Record Office, 1252-1284. London, 1877.

Calendar of Papal Registers, Papal Letters, vol. I, 1198-1304. London, 1893.

First among the other sources drawn upon are charters, lists of mayors, etc., to be found in the series of volumes issued by the city of Bordeaux under the title *Archives Municipales de Bordeaux*, in 7 volumes. Of chief importance are the first two volumes, bearing the subtitles *Livre de Bouillons* and *Privilèges de Bordeaux*.

The most important part of the archives of Dax has been published by M. Abbadie under the title *Le Livre noir et les Établissements de Dax*, Paris, 1902. This work forms the thirty-seventh volume of the *Archives historiques du Département de la Gironde*.

Of great interest, especially as showing the conditions of property, is the small volume of Martial and Jules Delpit, *Notice d'un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque de Wolfenbüttel, intitulé, Recognitiones Feodorum*. Originally published in volume XIV of the *Notices des Manuscrits* of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belle-Lettres, it was printed separately as a small in-folio at Paris in 1841.

Some information concerning the property of certain burghers and also concerning the mayors of Bordeaux in the earlier period is to be gleaned from Luchaire, *Recueil de Textes de l'ancien dialecte gascon*, Paris, 1861.

Considerable material is likewise to be found in such general collections of documents as Rymer (*Foedera, conventiones, literae*, etc., 20 vols. London, 1704-35. References are to the original edition), and Champollion-Figeac (*Lettres de rois, de reins*, etc., 2 vols. Paris, 1839-47). Fagniez, in his *Documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie et du commerce en France*, 2 vols., Paris, 1898-1900, has published at least one piece of great importance (the "*Constitutio societatis navium Baionensium*," p. 118f. in the first volume).

Much more significant for our purpose is the considerable number of

documents concerning Gascony which Shirley has included in his *Royal Letters*, which work is one of the most important, especially for the earlier years of Henry's reign. It also includes some valuable documents concerning Montfort.

Numerous documents for the period of this study have been published in the *Archives historiques du Département de la Gironde*, and a few in the *Bulletin de la Société de Borda*.

There is considerable reference to Gascon affairs in the *Chronica Majora* of Matthew Paris, the edition here used being that by the Rev. H. R. Luard in the Rolls Series, London, 1872-1884.

In conclusion, attention should be called to the *Pièces Justificatives* published by several writers, especially Bémont, Balasque, and Giry, in the works mentioned below.

WORKS

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Brissaud, D., *Les Anglais en Guyenne. L'administration anglaise et le mouvement communal dans le Bordelais*. Paris, 1875. The work was apparently prepared with care. It is, however, brief, and besides containing little upon our subject, is open to the farther objection of being based wholly upon French sources. As a consequence the author falls into several important errors in dealing with the thirteenth century.

Bordeaux—

Jullian, Camille, *Histoire de Bordeaux depuis les origines jusqu'en 1895*. Published under the auspices of the city. Bordeaux, 1895. On the whole the best work on the subject. It is careful and fairly detailed. It is throughout based on the documents, mainly the Rolls and the city Archives. It is, however, as the title indicates, a general history and does not deal in more than a few sentences of generalities with the special questions discussed in the preceding pages.

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knowledge of Bordeaux in the period under consideration—and that is wrong, as has been shown by Rabanis and Sansas.

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In addition to the above there are numerous articles in the *Bulletin de la Société de Borda*. Some of these are of interest but few add much to what is found elsewhere. Specific reference to them is perhaps hardly necessary.

Other Towns—

O'Reilley, l'Abbé, *Essai sur l'histoire de la ville et de l'arrondissement de Bazas, depuis la conquête des Romains jusqu'à la fin du 18e siè.* Bazas, 1840. Practically the only history of the town, it yet contains very little of importance on the thirteenth century.

Gaudet, J., *Saint-Émillion, son histoire et ses monuments.* Paris, 1841. The work was crowned by the Institute and is of some importance. Although the treatment of the thirteenth century is very brief, the author publishes one or two *pièces justificatives* of interest.

Samazeuilh, J. F., *Histoire de l'Agenais, du Condomois et du Bazadais,* 2 vols. Auch, 1846-47. Mainly a chronicle of wars; contains nothing of importance on the communes.

Dupin, *Notice historique et statistique sur La Réole.* La Réole, 1839. Is quite unimportant.

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
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